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Two competing agendas for the future of the island of Ireland emerged at the close of the 18th century – Tone’s dream of uniting ‘Protestant, Catholic and dissenter’ in an independent republic and Pitt’s decision to unite Ireland and Great Britain in a single kingdom. Both agendas, reduced in scope, are still in contention in the ‘narrow ground’ of Northern Ireland.
The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement did not resolve the issue – though it is a remarkable achievement. It is accepted by both governments and by the main political groups in Northern Ireland, including those linked with former IRA and loyalist paramilitaries. It ended years of violence, notwithstanding sporadic efforts by small dissident groups to rekindle the flames; it created a framework to accommodate the rival aspirations; and it established political institutions to promote co-operation and gradually reduce the sharpness of the contention.
The agreement finessed the central constitutional issue. The participants agreed that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom so long as that was the wish of a majority. They agreed also on the condition for possible future change proposed by John Hume: Irish unity would require “concurrent consent” North and South. Furthermore, the two governments undertook to make “changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland”.
This was done. We should recall that when there is talk in London of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK. Integral perhaps, but now also separable. The UK Northern Ireland Act 1998 envisages a Border poll, at the discretion of the secretary of state, and possibly repeated polls at intervals of seven years or more. If a majority vote for Northern Ireland to leave the UK and be part of a united Ireland, then proposals to that effect, agreed with the government of Ireland, will be put before parliament. This makes Northern Ireland’s present status conditional and justifies the special provision made for it in the European Union protocol.
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Constitutional conditions
There is a counterpart to this. Those of us who hope to see Tone’s dream realised should remind ourselves of two conditions we added to the Constitution in 1998.
One is that Irish unity is to be achieved “in harmony and friendship”.
It has to be said that the Assembly parties show little evidence in their day-to-day working relationships of the “partnership, equality and mutual respect” they committed to in the agreement. Is it likely that will change to harmony and friendship after an early Border poll?
We also added a second condition – that unity would depend on “the consent of a majority . . . in both jurisdictions”.
Taken together these conditions raise a question: will Ireland really be at peace with itself and united “in harmony and friendship” if just over 50 per cent in Northern Ireland vote for unity?
Seamus Mallon, a staunch nationalist, did not think so. He knew, better than most, that the agreement says “a majority”: it would be difficult to tell Northern nationalists now that something more is needed..
Nevertheless, in his 2019 autobiography, he argued for “parallel consent” by unionist and nationalist communities. For many his proposal goes too far. But the concern behind it was surely right. If not that, then another way must be found to avert the lasting alienation of outvoted and disgruntled unionists in an Ireland united through a simple headcount like that which created Northern Ireland a century ago.
Since partition, Irish unity has been an aim, a demand, a dream – even, in one Supreme Court judgment, a “constitutional imperative” – for this State. It may not be imminent but it is at least time for realism about what it would entail.
Change in ethos
If North and South did vote for Irish unity, what would follow? The agreement is silent on that beyond envisaging that proposals would be “agreed with the government of Ireland”. Clearly, there would be a great deal to settle in implementing the decision. It would be dramatic for the UK; and traumatic for convinced unionists in Northern Ireland – just as a decision to rejoin the UK would be for nationalists here. But it would be nothing less than existential for this State. We would have to recast our institutions radically and – depending on the form unity takes – accept a substantial change in ethos to accommodate the unionist identity and ethos: as the New Ireland Forum Report 1984 recognised, that “comprise[s] a sense of Britishness, allied to their particular sense of Irishness”. It would probably not be the Ireland of Tone or Pearse. Are we ready for that?
Such a radical restructuring of this island, of the UK and of their future relationship would require close co-operation between the two governments. It would best be done in stages.
One idea worth considering is that, if it happened, a date would be set – say 15, even 20 years ahead – on which it would take full effect. This could damp down opposition somewhat and make the transition less sharp and more gradual for those unionists who had voted against Irish unity.
During that implementation period the two governments would exercise joint authority in Northern Ireland, while possibly retaining a devolved administration. There could be an all-Ireland constitutional convention comprising nominated or elected representatives, a George Mitchell-type outside chair and perhaps a requirement for ‘parallel consent’ or a weighted majority – if not in the convention then in a subsequent all-island referendum on its proposals. Negotiations would be prolonged and probably difficult. If the aim were a two-part confederal Ireland, with a consultative role for the British government on unionist community issues analogous to that of the Irish government under the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, and a continuing right to be British or Irish or both, then unionists – and indeed nationalists – might find it easier to accept.
There may yet come a time for a Border poll and a time to talk of all that. My own view is that it would be premature now and for the medium-term future – although I have tried to visualise what might happen eventually. Much better, however, to focus now on more generous co-operation within the Northern Ireland power-sharing institutions so that, as intended, they reduce community tensions gradually and soften the starkness of the contention between Tone’s and Pitt’s rival agendas for the future of our island.
Noel Dorr is a former secretary general of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Irish ambassador to the UK