Jim O’Callaghan's united Ireland plan will be unpopular with FF base and Republic’s electorate

Fianna Fáil TD Jim O'Callaghan has delivered his blueprint for a united Ireland in a speech to his old college at Cambridge, heavily promoted to the media.

The concern hanging over his proposals is that he is using unification as a wedge issue in a bid for the party leadership and as an outflanking manoeuvre around Sinn Féin. O’Callaghan makes few bones about this, which helps somewhat to allay any charge of dangerous careerism. Blatant ambition is at least sincere.

O’Callaghan certainly cannot be accused of populism, as the two key points in his speech will be unpopular with Fianna Fáil’s base and the Republic’s electorate across the board.

His first proposal for a united Ireland, or specifically for the new constitution of what he repeatedly calls a “new country”, is a requirement that “a certain number of cabinet positions be filled by representatives of unionist parties”. He notes the total unionist vote in this new country might be about 11 per cent.

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O'Callaghan clearly understands the implications for a united Ireland, as he advocates power-sharing instead of making proposals himself on symbolic issues

Unionists would not have to take up their positions and O’Callaghan is not proposing any Stormont-type vetoes, but the idea of guaranteed power-sharing is otherwise lifted straight from the Belfast Agreement.

I made a similar suggestion in The Irish Times five years ago, although I imagined it as a transitional rather than a permanent arrangement. So I have had a taste of the reaction O’Callaghan can now expect, which will range from rejection to incomprehension.

Why would a united Ireland need power-sharing, will be the general refrain, when it would have equal rights for all? What would a unionist bloc even comprise, when unification would be the end of the unionist cause?

These questions prove why power-sharing must be considered.

Sovereignty

Northern Ireland has had the same human rights and equality laws as the Republic, almost to the letter, for over two decades. When nationalists complain of lacking rights and equality in the North, what they primarily mean is parity for their nationality, as reflected in issues from symbols to citizenship. Yet the Belfast Agreement recognises full British sovereignty, pending the choice through a border poll for full Irish sovereignty. At that point, unionists would start complaining of discrimination on the same grounds.

It is unavoidable, given the indivisibility of sovereignty, that one national community will tend to feel excluded from the other’s state. Describing this purely in terms of rights and equality is dishonest victimhood – would there be parity for Irish and British flags in a united Ireland, for example? Of course not. The real issue is political power, with power-sharing offering inclusion.

Dismissing British nationality as a false consciousness or colonial construct that sufferers will snap out of is Ireland's own cultural supremacism

In a Stormont debate this Monday, Sinn Féin demanded parity of Irish and British symbols. Although judicial rulings have confirmed this is not the meaning of the Belfast Agreement, power-sharing lets Sinn Féin block British symbols in practice and show its voters it has real input into this concept of equality.

O’Callaghan clearly understands the implications for a united Ireland, as he advocates power-sharing instead of making proposals himself on symbolic issues. Nationalist suggestions of new flags, anthems, Commonwealth membership and similar totems are well intentioned but can fail to confront the uncomfortable fact that unionists would need meaningful power in contentious decisions.

As for the idea that a unionist bloc would cease to exist after unification, O’Callaghan recognises unionism as a people, culture and tradition with “its home in Ulster”.

Dismissing British nationality as a false consciousness or colonial construct that sufferers will snap out of is Ireland’s own cultural supremacism.

Partition

This all ties in with the second key point in the speech, worth quoting at length.

“There is a tendency amongst Irish republicans and nationalists to ignore the divisions that existed within Irish society at the time of partition. Although it was an act of the Westminster parliament that partitioned Ireland, the reason for that partition was because of what were viewed as irreconcilable differences and divisions between Irish people. Looking back at those divisions and their irreconcilability, it is probably fair to say that partition was not an irrational political decision. I believe it was not the correct decision; but it was not an irrational decision.”

The more widely held view that partition was a "sectarian headcount" tells unionists their national self-determination was an act of prejudice

O’Callaghan’s argument is that partition is no longer rational, although there will still be “strong and coherent arguments made by those in favour”.

Recognising Northern Ireland’s historical legitimacy is a brave step for a Fianna Fáil leadership contender but it is essential to any hope of unification with reconciliation.

The Sinn Féin position that Northern Ireland is too illegitimate even to mention by name foresees unity as victory – conquest over a historic wrong and the community that perpetrated it. The more widely held view that partition was a "sectarian headcount" tells unionists their national self-determination was an act of prejudice. Why would the same not apply to a nationalist win in a border poll? It is Ireland’s own supremacism again, and not likely to work any better than its unionist equivalent.