Editorial comment: Banking inquiry

Predictions of inquiry’s imminent collapse were exaggerated

Reports of turmoil and rebellion within the Oireachtas banking inquiry and predictions of its imminent collapse were exaggerated. They reflected personal political ambition and the thin gruel of the media "silly season" when governments shut shop and party leaders take their holidays. At the heart of those reports, however, was an important issue: should the former chief executive of Anglo Irish Bank David Drumm be allowed to give evidence by video link from the United States? The answer, on the basis of precedent, was almost certainly "no". Other Anglo Irish officials had been excused on the grounds that their evidence might affect ongoing criminal prosecutions. For the committee to make an exception of Mr Drumm, who is the subject of a Garda extradition warrant and faces serious charges, would have been a travesty.

Any damage Mr Drumm might cause to political reputations has already happened. An invitation from the committee to attend and give evidence might have seemed a good idea at the time. But it opened the door to mischief-making. Not only did he offer to give video evidence, he was preparing to flatly contradict the assurances of former taoiseach Brian Cowen that they had never discussed banking matters at private meetings. In its final report, the committee will have to decide what weight, if any, should be given to this statement from a man whose evidence has already been branded as "unreliable" and "untruthful" in a US bankruptcy court.

Political motivation behind the creation of the banking inquiry has never been concealed, even though committee chairman Ciarán Lynch and most of its members have attempted to tread an impartial path. Taoiseach Enda Kenny initially regarded it as a way to remind the electorate of the nexus between Fianna Fáil, big builders and bankers and to blame them for the economic crash. With an election in sight, he recently returned to that theme. During the inquiry, however, a more complex picture emerged. Long years of inflationary policies, public sector pay rises and little or no regulation of the banking and financial services contributed to a perfect fiscal storm. Mostly, opposition parties did not shout "stop".

As for what happened on the night of the banking guarantee, the committee received conflicting testimony. Representatives of the "pillar banks" wanted a guarantee but insisted they had made no proposals. Other witnesses recalled banking representatives presenting a written document. Selective amnesia was not confined to bankers, however, as builders, regulators, senior officials and politicians participated in a game of pass-the-parcel that transferred responsibility elsewhere. For a time, it appeared as if the European Central Bank might have caused the entire debacle. So much for Irish accountability. The inquiry continues.