Dennis Kennedy's article - "When NI events went beyond civil rights" (Irish Times, January 5th) - was thought-provoking, not least because of its highly selective inference and conclusions.
While some of the facts cited are beyond dispute, for instance those relating to some reforms initiated in the North in 1970, one difficulty is that the article suggests that that, in itself, adequately dealt with the situation there, without reference to why such drastic and wide-ranging reforms were necessary.
Another difficulty is that the article seems to treat 1970 (or part of it) in isolation, as if what happened then had no connection with the horrendous events of 1968/69 (the consequences of which were still very evident). And as if the initiation of some reforms would, de novo, inform and alter Northern Ireland for the better, as if the legacy of past tensions and terrors did not exist.
The period was one of great social upheaval in the North: a continuum of political and indeed, as we see from the reports of Bloody Sunday, military violence and unrest of many strands, stretching both before and after 1970.
Welcome reforms there undoubtedly were, but they must be recognised for what they were: long overdue and long-term. They were not, and were not seen as being, an instant panacea.
The article makes the point that in spite of such reforms the "government in Dublin was moving 500 guns to Dundalk and was discussing how these might be given to the minority in the North". This is entirely wrong and misleading.
Contrary to what the article suggests, the primary objective of the government then in relation to the North was, as it is now, to help reduce and if possible eliminate ideological and sectarian violence there. Ordinary criminal violence is not a question in this context.
Unfortunately, there is a danger that misleading inferences such as those in the article could feed or inflame unreasoning ultra-unionist/loyalist terrorist prejudices. It is therefore important to make clear that the movement of arms to Dundalk was - like the concurrent establishment of field hospitals in Border areas for the thousands of refugees burnt or forced from their homes in Belfast and elsewhere - a contingency measure for the circumstances of the time.
Contingency measures are part of what an army is about. If an army does not have them, it is not doing its job. The movement of arms and equipment to Dundalk was simply such a measure.
The contingency situation envisaged was "Circumstances of a complete breakdown of law and order in the North". The sole object in such circumstances would have been, either in conjunction with or in the absence of, British security forces (by which was meant the British army, which at the time was understood to be in the North on a temporary basis), to protect lives, homes and property, particularly of the minority who were already in need of such protection.
IN case it might be interpreted otherwise, there was absolutely no connection between these contingency plans/movements and the illegal plot to import arms with an entirely different intent.
Dennis writes that two other things happened in 1970 - the emergence of the Provisional IRA and the Arms Trial, implying that this meant sinister involvement on the part of the government.
That is clearly not so and it is regrettable it has been suggested. The suggestion is pinned on what is described as the "contrast that emerges in the documents between the Army's advice to the government, and the government's instructions to the Army as regards possible intervention in the North in the early months of 1970".
Given the confusion and intrigues of the period, it is not to be wondered at that some of the papers now released may be capable of conflicting interpretations. But certainly nothing as farfetched and as far from reality as this. It is beyond any question: 1. That such movements of material were part of the contingency response by the government to alarming circumstances in the North at that time; 2. That there was no intention to issue these, or any other, arms and munitions (whatever about respirators) to civilians in either Northern Ireland or the Republic; 3. That there was no connection between such standard military logistic dispositions and the plot to import arms; 4. That the Army, very properly, sought clarification from the government regarding contingency policy (planning was its own affair) and that its advice to the government was based on its resources (at the time very limited).
In a gigantic leap of suggestion the article then asks: "Why was it [the government] considering how to arm the Northern minority, and possibly send in troops, at a time when there was little violence and when a reform programme was being pushed through?"
Well, of course, the government was not considering how to arm the Northern minority, or any other civilians North or South. Quite the contrary. The arms sent to Dundalk were hurriedly (most within 36 hours, the rest before the end of the month) returned to Dublin precisely because of the risk of a raid by subversives of any colour.
Secondly, the government was not considering the possibility of sending in troops etc. It did what any responsible government conscious of its duty would do in similar circumstances. It instructed the Army to prepare plans contingent on certain events occurring.
Thirdly, the over-optimistic impression of the initiation of reforms suggested in the article is not borne out either, since that year violence escalated as loyalist terror tried, again, to eliminate the minority and nationalists, this time, fought back.
Finally, in a complex question evidently ad captandum, Dennis asks "did the government's apparent acceptance of a militant nationalist view of the Northern problem, plus actual financial help, play an important role in the growth of the Provisional IRA and the transformation of a problem of real, and sometimes imagined, infringements (sic) of minority rights into one of armed nationalist terror?"
The short answer is No. But the question should be dealt with part by part.
The government did not accept "a militant nationalist view of the Northern problem" and there is no basis for saying so. Its view may be summarised: firstly, as seeking to bring about peace and, secondly, as seeking unity by peaceful and co-operative means.
Such financial help as was given was, specifically, for the relief of distress in the North. Misuse of any part of these funds was outside government policy.
Accordingly, the notion that these suggestions played any, much less an important, role in the growth of the Provisional IRA is just that, notional. It is wrong and is not credible.
As for the statement that such supposed government acceptance also contributed to what is called "the transformation of a problem of real, and sometimes imagined (!), infringements of minority rights into one of armed nationalist terror", one can only wonder what exactly this is supposed to mean.
The minority population in Northern Ireland was deprived of normal human rights for many years. That was very real and injurious. The manner of deprivation and prevention was vicious and rigorous. All of this is easily verified.
The penultimate paragraph of the article, following the complex and misleading question quoted, begins: "It will not be easy, in these days of galloping political correctness, to get an honest answer." Well, galloping political correctness notwithstanding, it is easier to get an honest answer if one asks an honest question.
Eoin Neeson is an author and journalist. He was director of the Government Information Bureau between 1968 and 1973.