Thirty years is a long time in politics but a short period in historical terms. The State papers issued by the National Archives provide confirmation of what was already widely believed but never officially acknowledged - namely, that in 1970, in the event of a dire emergency in Northern Ireland in which the British army was unable or unwilling to act, the Government had taken a decision in principle to intervene in order to prevent a massacre of nationalists.
Possible courses of action in this "Doomsday" situation included military incursions into the North and the dispatch of arms and ammunition across the Border to besieged nationalists. Guns and equipment were moved to Dundalk in the mistaken belief that an attack on defenceless Catholics was imminent, but were quickly withdrawn. A scheme to import arms from the Continent was aborted, although the role of various political figures in this remains a matter of considerable ambiguity. It is difficult to convey the atmosphere of the time to the younger generation. The North, which had been relatively quiescent in the 50 years since Partition, unexpectedly erupted into widespread and sustained violence. Not just the people of the island, north and south, but the British and Irish governments with all their security and intelligence resources were caught largely unprepared.
The release of top secret documents from Military Intelligence constitutes an invaluable contribution to the state of public knowledge about these dramatic and disturbing events. Caught in the eye of the storm, the Lynch government issued a directive to the Defence Forces to prepare for emergency action. The newly-released papers show how the Army sought both clarity and certainty from the Government, via the Minister for Defence, James Gibbons, as to what precisely was intended and what resources were available.
While Mr Gibbons was clear about the resources, and their limitations, he was less sure-footed when it came to proposed forms of action. It is alarming even at this distance in time to read that the Minister reportedly "had no idea" who was to receive arms in the case of an emergency. Although the Army was equally in the dark, cool heads kept probing for clarification and stressing the practical consequences of Government policy. It is intriguing, to say the least, that no diplomatic representations were to be made to the British Government prior to an incursion: the documents show that this decision aroused considerable embarrassment subsequently within the governmental apparatus.
Circumstances forced Mr Lynch to exchange the role of chairman for that of chief and to stamp his authority at last on his political rivals. Unionists and others may react with horror to the latest revelations but they should bear in mind that both governments were travelling in uncharted waters in a situation which seemed likely to get out of hand at any time. Happily, relations between Dublin and London have never been better than they are today, as witnessed by their role in encouraging the Northern parties to sign the Belfast Agreement and their continuing efforts to implement it in a fair and equitable manner.The Arms Crisis represented the failure of politics and diplomacy and, for a brief period, the spectre of civil war hung over this island. The healthy state of the British-Irish partnership and the solid, if halting, steps towards reconciliation in the North give firm grounds for believing that it could never happen again.