Not for the first time since the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and Hamas last October, the prospect of all-out war in the Middle East seemed a real possibility as recently as a week ago, after Israel launched a series of pre-emptive strikes across southern Lebanon, destroying thousands of Hizbullah rocket launchers and killing three people.
Hizbullah nonetheless claimed to have fired more than 300 rockets and drones at 11 Israeli military installations, to avenge the assassination in Beirut on July 30th of Fuad Shukr, a senior Hizbullah commander. Despite fears that the exchange of hostilities might develop into open war, neither side desires to escalate the situation for the moment. The leadership of Hizbullah has sent clear signals that all-out war with Israel in not in its interest.
Shortly after the attack on Israel a week ago, its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, told a group of students that a response “does not always mean taking up arms, rather it means thinking correctly, speaking properly, understanding things accurately and striking the target with precision”. In a televised speech, he stated that Hizbullah had targeted an Israeli base where the army’s intelligence unit is located, adding that the group had no plans to attack Tel Aviv, which would almost certainly have provoked a dramatic escalation of the conflict.
Part of the reason for Hizbullah’s caution stems from a realisation that all-out war with Israel would come at great cost. Lebanon has been dealing with a devastating economic crisis and political vacuum for years, and the militant organisation is under domestic pressure not to drag the country deeper into crisis.
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From an Israeli perspective, a wider war is also undesirable. Israeli forces remain mired in the conflict in Gaza, and there is little appetite to open a second front that would seriously stretch its military capacities.
The imponderable in all of this is Iran, whose leadership is committed to avenging the assassination in Tehran in July of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, although what form this might take is still uncertain. On August 27th, Iran’s deputy defence minister, Hojatollah Qureishi, reportedly stated that Iran’s response would be “unpredictable”, while a day earlier, its ambassador to Lebanon said that Iran would “certainly” retaliate against Israel.
It’s not surprising therefore that US national security adviser John Kirby suggested that Iran was “postured and poised” to attack Israel and underscored the commitment of the US to maintain its deterrent posture in the region so long as necessary to protect Israel and defend US troops and facilities.
Nevertheless, just as Nasrallah appears to have backed Hizbullah away from broader confrontation with Israel, so the Iranian leadership remains wary of any response that might lead to regional conflict. The killing of Haniyeh in Tehran constitutes a clear provocation to the Iranian leadership.
However, there is also realisation of the need to find a way to respond that does not invite retaliation from US forces. Since Haniyeh’s assassination, the US has dramatically increased its presence in the region, deploying two aircraft carrier strike groups, a fighter squadron and additional warships to the Middle East.
An indication of Iran’s lack of willingness to escalate the conflict came earlier this week when its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggested to the country’s new government, led by the reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, that there was “no harm” in engaging with Iran’s enemy – the US – signalling that negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme could be renewed.
Pezeshkian, the surprise winner of presidential elections earlier this year, has vowed to work towards the removal of sanctions reimposed on Iran in 2018 when then US president Donald Trump withdrew from a 2015 deal on the country’s nuclear programme.
Both Iran and Hizbullah have also claimed that a cautious response to Israeli provocations is warranted to allow for the successful conclusion of negotiations on a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas.
However, negotiations appear to be stalled and, notwithstanding repeated expressions of optimism on the part of US officials, it is difficult to see how the impasse can be resolved.
The current proposal refines an earlier plan proposed by US president Joe Biden in May, according to which there would first be a six-week ceasefire and a release of hostages in exchange for Palestinians detained by Israel. Palestinians displaced from northern Gaza would be able to return home, while Israeli forces would withdraw from populated areas of Gaza. The second phase would see a permanent ceasefire, followed by a third phase over several years during which the reconstruction of Gaza would take place.
One of the most contentious issues concerns the withdrawal or otherwise of Israeli forces from Gaza. Negotiations have focused, in particular, on two buffer zones currently controlled by the Israeli military. The Philadelphi corridor is between Egypt and Gaza and has existed for decades, while the Netzarim corridor is a 6km stretch of land dividing northern from southern Gaza and was created by the Israeli military during the current conflict.
Binyamin Netanyahu insists that Israel will withdraw from neither, a position firmly rejected by Hamas. Reports from Israel suggest that the security establishment – Mossad, Shin Bet and the IDF – is willing to accept withdrawal from the Egyptian border and Netzarim, but Netanyahu has ordered negotiators to take a tougher line. Suspicion persists that he has deeper motivations to avoid making a deal.
His position depends on the support of right-wing ministers who want to see Israel reoccupy Gaza and they threaten to bring down the government if Netanyahu cedes too much ground. This would force elections that could see him lose power and face trial on corruption charges. It might also mean an earlier reckoning with the security lapses that preceded the attacks of October 7th.
Netanyahu’s position on negotiations appears to have been strengthened, at least in the short term, by the revelation of the deaths of six Israeli hostages, whose bodies were recovered by the IDF on Saturday. He stated that those who killed them do not want a peace deal.
Thus, for as long as the conflict in Gaza continues with no end in sight, and for as long as it draws in regional actors in the form of Hizbullah and Iran, the potential for regional escalation, whether intended or not, remains a real danger.
Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the UCD school of politics and international relations
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