NEPAL: Nepal's King Gyanendra yesterday vowed to strike hard against Maoist rebels. Rahul Bedi looks at the background to this week's royal coup.
Maoist rebels have been fighting since 1996 to topple Nepal's monarchy and establish a Communist republic there, based on the teachings of China's Communist patriarch Mao Zedong.
Over 11,000 people have died in the insurgency and analysts and diplomats fear that the revolt could spin out of control, rendering Nepal a haven for terrorist groups and drug traffickers.
The Maoists model themselves on Peru's Shining Path guerrillas, following their four-path strategy - agitation and propaganda, creating liberated zones, armed struggle in rural areas and armed struggle in urban areas.
Their shadowy leader Prachanda (meaning Awesome) claims the "people's war" has reached the third stage, with Maoist influence clearly prevalent in over 50 of Nepal's 75 districts.
The 20,000-30,000 Maoist cadres not only enjoy local support, but their motivation and ability to repeatedly force the government to declare an emergency has given them confidence.
Their cause is also bolstered by ineffective and corrupt local administrations across the impoverished kingdom. They fill this power vacuum by running parallel authorities and carrying out activities such as tax collection, running village schools, setting educational curriculums and settling land and other disputes in kangaroo courts.
The Nepalese response to contain the rebels has been a poorly applied and often harsh use of force, as well as abuse of anti-terrorism legislation. The resulting, self-perpetuating cycle of human rights abuses has, in turn, exacerbated local resentment and heightened social tensions, often driving the victims into the Maoist ranks.
In keeping with Chairman Mao's guerrilla tactics the rebels have progressively expanded their influence over villages by means of coercion and indoctrination, and by encircling, but never attacking, cities. Last year they successfully brought Kathmandu to a standstill for a few days simply by issuing a call for a general strike.
The Maoists' war strategy is divided into three parts.
The first is the armed struggle against the Nepalese police that the Maoists claim to have won. The second is the ongoing fight against the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), while the third stage cuts across territorial boundaries and envisages a clash with neighbouring India. The rebels believe, and rightly so, that India will not be a silent spectator to their gains and will help crush their movement in the Himalayan kingdom.
Meanwhile, entry to Maoist zones across the country is via the local commissar. Taxes are collected here and swift justice dispensed through Maoist courts.
The rebels also levy protection money on local businesses across the country and have served notice to industrialists, mostly Indians, to nationalise their concerns or face the penalty.
Consequently, tourism, which is Nepal's principal money-earner, has been adversely affected, with many Western governments issuing cautionary advice to their nationals travelling to the Himalayan kingdom.
Over the years Maoists' attempts at negotiation have remained a tactical pause, to help them regroup, re-arm and re-deploy, convinced that their differences with the government were unbridgeable except through armed conflict.
Nepal's neighbours, China and India, were closely watching King Gyanendra's war against the Maoists as the 45,000 strong RNA has no combat experience.
The last time Nepal's Gurkha army saw action on its soil was against weary, ill-equipped Khampa rebels fleeing Tibet in the 1970s.
Officials in Kathmandu concede the RNA is inadequately trained for operations in mountainous terrain. It is also hampered by inadequate communication systems and paucity of intelligence collated by agencies that are both inexperienced in information gathering and infiltrated by rebel sympathisers.
Being the King's army, its senior officers are either drawn from the monarch's extended family or those patronised by him and hence, lack professionalism.