MR Justice Lynch described as "speculative and unsatisfactory" the evidence supporting the allegation that the Government's campaign had a significantly persuasive influence on the electorate.
He did not accept that it had been established, even as a matter unconstitutionally funded campaign had any ascertainable or measurable influence on the electorate when voting on November 24th last.
Mr Justice Lynch said the use of public funds to support a Yes vote was unwarranted and wrongful as contravening the constitutional guarantee of equality between citizens, in so far as that guarantee applied to voting in a referendum.
He said this campaign was not in itself wrongful in the sense of being misleading or untruthful much less so false as to deceive voters.
However, counsel for Mr Hanafin relied on the judgment of Mr Justice Blayney in the McKenna case in the Supreme Court as not merely declaring that the Government, in expending public monies promoting a particular result, was acting in breach of the Constitution but also as deciding - that the Government was prohibited from advocating a Yes vote at all once the Bill had been passed by the Oireachtas.
He (Mr Justice Lynch) did not read the judgment of Mr Justice Blayney as thus deciding at all.
"It would be a very strange state of affairs indeed if the Government, which consisted of a group of citizens holding ministerial office - who had introduced the Bill for the amendment and therefore clearly approved of it - were to be the only group of citizens to lose their constitutional right given by Article 40 (6.1) to express freely their convictions and opinions," he said.
Mr Justice Lynch recalled that in the Crotty (Single European Act) case, Mr Justice Henchy in the Supreme Court had stated there was nothing in the Constitution to prevent the Government or any person, group or institution from advocating or campaigning or otherwise working for a change in the Constitution.
In the McKenna case in the Supreme Court, Mr Justice O'Flaherty had held the Government was clearly entitled to spend money providing information to the public on the implications of the constitutional amendment. Further, he had added, the Government as such was entitled to campaign for the change and individual Government members were entitled - either in their personal, party or ministerial capacities - to advocate the proposed change.
Mr Justice Lynch said he was satisfied, therefore, that the campaign, if financed otherwise than by public finds, would have been proper and unobjectionable even though expressly put forward on behalf of the Government as government and not merely on behalf of the political parties from whose members the Government was formed.
It was further submitted on behalf of Mr Hanafin that this Government campaign constituted an obstruction of, interference with or irregularity in the conduct of the referendum, and that if necessary those words and the term "conduct of the referendum" should be given a wide construction to enable the court to protect the referendum's constitutional integrity.
It was submitted that a government might act in an unconstitutional manner, without doing anything specifically mentioned in section 43, to such an extent as unduly to influence citizens to vote in a particular way, and that, in those circumstances the courts would not only have a right to intervene but would have a duty to do so.
Mr Justice Lynch said he found it very difficult to imagine such unconstitutional conduct by Government or anyone else which would not fall within one of the four paragraphs mentioned in section 43 (1).
However, one could not rule out the possibility of such an event occurring. If it did occur, the courts would have a right and duty to intervene.
Whatever such circumstances might be, they would have clearly to damage the integrity of the referendum to such an extent that it could be said that referendum did not, or very probably did not, reflect the true will of citizens who cast their votes.
No such circumstances arose in this case. Citizens who saw and read the advertisements unconstitutionally funded by the Government were quite entitled to read and consider them and take points therein into account or reject them.
There was no acceptable evidence, and no allegation in the petition or points of claim by Mr Hanafin that any citizen who voted did not do so freely or in accordance with his or her free will and choice.
It was accepted by Mr Hanafin's counsel that the advertising was neither misleading nor untruthful. In those circumstances, if the advertising was sufficiently persuasive to convince a citizen to vote Yes, that decision would be his or her own, made having weighed up the options without having had anything misleading or untruthful in the advertisements.
The judge said that in the circumstances, it would be a wholly improper interference with the democratic process of legislating for the amendment of the Constitution if the court were to set aside the votes of 1,628,570 citizens who did no wrong and order a retaking of the referendum in all 41 constituencies on grounds that a third party - in this case the Government - acted in an unconstitutional manner prior to the referendum.