To date, Ireland has relied on fossil fuel energy to underpin economic activity. Given the vast bulk of the coal, oil and gas we have needed over the past century came from outside the country, energy supplies have been disrupted at various times due to external circumstances.
Energy insecurity has periodically threatened our economy and way of life, as during the second World War when nearly all imports of fuel were halted. During the prolonged and exceptionally cold spell in spring 1947, the UK banned exports of coal to Ireland to preserve its own supplies, which accentuated hardship here during the long freeze.
I vaguely remember the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, and the related gunboat diplomacy by the UK and France, when they attacked Egypt. The disruption to oil supplies due to the closure of the Suez Canal saw rationing of petrol here.
In 1973, war in the Middle East affected oil supplies and resulted in a substantial hike in prices. A further shock to oil prices in 1979, combined with unwise domestic policy action, saw huge queues at fuel stations in Ireland.
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The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 resulted in the ending of dependence on Russian gas, raising fears we would not be able to source alternative supplies to fuel electricity generation and to keep our homes warm. While we did not run out, and we kept the lights on, this came at a big financial cost to secure alternative supplies.
Thankfully, the UK did not repeat its 1947 tactic of refusing to sell fuel to Ireland to conserve stocks for its own citizens. Nonetheless recent events have emphasised, again, the vulnerability of our supplies of oil and gas.
If we meet our 2030 targets of generating most our electricity through renewables, we will reduce, but not completely eliminate, our reliance on imported oil and gas. Because renewable supply depends on weather, we will need buffer sources of energy for when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine.
We will depend heavily on interconnections to Britain and France for gas supplies and electricity. A lot of our energy supply flows through three gas connectors from mainland Britain. By 2030, we will have five electricity interconnectors with Britain and France, and, it is hoped, the interconnector to Northern Ireland. The security of these connectors is critical for us.
Any serious damage to these connections would cause severe disruption, especially if we have a prolonged windless cold spell where our wind energy supply falls to nil. Such an eventuality would leave many freezing homes, disrupt industry and leave electrified transport high and dry.
While the move to supplying our energy needs predominantly from renewables will end the risk that distant wars pose to our primary fuel sources, it will potentially expose Ireland to different threats to our supplies from malign operations in our coastal waters.
Rogue actors could not only jeopardise our buffer energy supplies, but also our many telecommunications connections to North America.
Security of our vital marine interconnectors must be given high priority. After Ukraine war broke out, the undersea gas interconnectors between Russia and Germany were put out of action in circumstances that are still murky.
In recent months, the electricity interconnector between Finland and Estonia, and other fibre optic cables across the Baltic, were broken, probably by Russian agents.
While action to damage terrestrial interconnectors, for example between Poland and Germany, would be considered an act of war and therefore most unlikely, we have seen disruptions to interconnectors in international waters, which have carried much less serious consequences for the presumed perpetrators and therefore such acts continue to take place.
Ireland is exceptionally vulnerable to such malign action. By 2030, we will be more dependent on undersea interconnectors for energy than any other European country. Yet our defence forces are totally inadequate to defend these vital connections.
Nato is unlikely to give us a free pass that would see the UK, French or US navies protect our infrastructure in return for minuscule contributions
Finland and Sweden have been able to supplement the actions of their own armed forces with a recently launched Nato mission to protect subsea infrastructure in the Baltic.
Joining Nato would be politically sensitive – but not a cheap way either to protect our underwater interconnectors.
Nato is unlikely to give us a free pass that would see the UK, French or US navies protect our infrastructure in return for minuscule contributions. The UK forces are also likely to be fully occupied protecting its own interconnectors, including those between the North and Scotland.
In or out of any military alliance, we need to greatly increase our naval and air defences to protect our vital sources of energy and our telecommunications links.
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