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Has Trump awoken the sleeping EU defence beast?

Former US president’s remarks that he would ‘encourage’ Russia to invade an ally have prompted a rethink on Nato’s ‘comfort blanket’

It may not be something one thinks about daily, but the United States has nuclear weapons scattered around Europe: in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, a legacy of the Cold War.

This is at the heart of what is sometimes referred to as the Nato “security blanket” over Europe. Brussels is now considering whether that blanket is about to be pulled off.

In a rally in South Carolina, presidential hopeful Donald Trump told the crowd that not only would the United States not come to the aid of a European ally if Russia attacked, but that he would “encourage” Moscow to go ahead with it.

He was telling an anecdote to the crowd in which he said the leader of a “big country” had asked what the US would do if a country was attacked, but had not met its defence commitments.

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“I said: You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent?” Mr Trump recalled. “No I would not protect you, in fact I would encourage them to do whatever they want. You gotta pay.”

The nature of Nato spending commitments is not as Trump seems to imagine. There isn’t a membership fee or payment due to the US; rather, members commit to spending 2 per cent of their GDP on their own defence.

Those on the front line – Poland and the Baltic States – pay this and more. Western Europe is more lax: Germany spent 1.4 per cent in 2022, Spain 1.5 per cent. Ireland, for reference, spent 0.2 per cent.

Before his last election, Trump equivocated on whether the US would uphold Article 5, the Nato provision whereby if one member is attacked, the others will come to its aid.

But his latest remarks were the frankest yet, and the declaration that he would “encourage” Russia to invade a supposed ally particularly shocking to many.

In Brussels, the remarks are being taken seriously – and as a belated wake-up call.

Some member states, particularly France, have long been calling for the EU to develop its own “strategic autonomy”. That means to no longer rely on China for essential trade, on Russia for energy, or on the US for security.

French president Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly called for this, declaring in 2022 that there was “war in Europe” and that “we cannot depend on others to defend us”, urging European defence to “take a new step forward”. Last year, he said the EU should not be “America’s followers”.

Nevertheless, attempts to create a European security structure that would either work alongside Nato or serve as an alternative to it have largely failed.

When asked why, France’s former ambassador to the US Gérard Araud had a frank answer. “Because the Europeans have been opposing for 30 years all the French initiatives in this direction,” he wrote. “Why? Because the US protection was cheaper.”

France would have a leading role in any more muscular Europe that emerged, as the EU’s only nuclear power, and this idea appeals to those in Paris who want to re-establish the country as a large force in the world. Macron called for France’s weapons to become the new basis of Europe’s nuclear deterrent back in 2020.

While the idea was mostly ignored at the time, in the wake of the Trump remarks senior German politicians have begun calling for its reconsideration and speaking of the importance of an independent European nuclear deterrent.

In defence-averse and nuclear-sceptical Germany, the idea is far-fetched to many, leading to a certain degree of hilarity over the idea of a “deutsche Atombombe”.

Shortly after Trump made his remarks, a security report was issued by Estonia’s foreign intelligence service that sought to illustrate the stakes involved.

Given its history and vulnerability – repeatedly invaded, perched on the edge of Russia’s vast territory with a population of 1.3 million compared to Russia’s 143.4 million – Estonia has long been wary of ambitions from Moscow to expand its territory.

The report warned that a military reform planned by Moscow would mean a “significant increase” in Russian troops near its border.

“The Kremlin is probably anticipating a possible conflict with Nato within the next decade,” it concluded.

None of this was inevitable, it continued. The reason why goes some way to explain Estonia’s staunch support for Ukraine.

Russia’s plans for its military will be “largely determined by the course of the war in Ukraine”, the report wrote.

“The security situation in Europe and along Estonia’s borders in the near future depends on whether Ukraine, with the support of its allies, can shatter Russia’s imperialist ambitions.”