Jamie Sinnott (a person of unsound mind not so found suing by his mother and next friend, Kathryn Sinnott) (plaintiff) v The Minister for Education, Ireland and the Attorney General (defendants).

Kathryn Sinnott (plaintiff) v The Minister for Education, Ireland and the Attorney General (defendants).

Constitutional Law - Education - Constitutional right to free primary education - Whether age limitation on constitutional right to free primary education - Constitutional right of the family as a unit - Damages - Statute of Limitations 1957 - Bunreacht na hEireann 1937, articles 41 and 42.4.

The High Court (Mr Justice Barr); judgment delivered 4 October 2000.

Having regard to the provisions of Article 42.4 of the Constitution there was a constitutional obligation upon the State to provide free, basic, elementary education for all children. The right to free primary education was not subject to any age limitation and such right existed from the enactment of the Constitution in 1937.

The High Court so held in granting the declarations as sought and awarding the plaintiffs damages for breach of constitutional rights, negligence and breach of duty by the State.

Paul Sreenan SC and Pearce Sreenan BL for the plaintiffs; James O'Reilly SC and John O'Donnell BL for the defendants.

Mr Justice Barr said that Jamie Sinnott was born on 11 October 1977 and that Mrs Sinnott, his mother, had been his primary carer all his life. At about four months Jamie began to develop autistic symptoms. Having endeavoured without success to obtain treatment for Jamie from several institutions in Cork, Mrs Sinnott brought him to Chicago where occupational therapy, physiotherapy, speech and language training were recommended. When they returned to Ireland Jamie was given the benefit of what transpired to be a "babysitting" service. Mr Justice Barr said that Jamie had had less than three years of meaningful education and training in 23 years of existence. He accepted the wealth of expert testimony that Jamie suffered from and had suffered for almost all his life from severe autism and related profound mental and physical handicap.

Mr Justice Barr considered the High Court judgment in Paul O'Donoghue (a minor) v The Minister for Health, the Minister for Education, Ireland and the Attorney General [1996] 2 IR 20, in which Mr Justice O'Hanlon had stated that having regard to the provisions of Article 42.4 of the Constitution there was an obligation upon the State to provide for free, basic, elementary education for all children. Mr Justice Barr adopted the following definition of education by the then Chief Justice Mr Justice O Dalaigh in Ryan v The Attorney General [1965] IR 294, at page 350: "Education essentially is the teaching and training of a child to make best possible use of his inherent and potential capacities, physical, mental and moral." Mr Justice Barr said that if Jamie Sinnott needed continuing primary education and related services from the State for life, his right to such services derived from Article 42.4 of the Constitution. He said that there was nothing in Article 42.4 which supported any contention that there was an age limitation on a citizen's right to on-going primary education provided by or on behalf of the State. It was evident that the right to primary education would be fundamentally flawed if narrowly interpreted as ending at an arbitrary age, i.e. 18 years. That right existed from the enactment of the Constitution in 1937 and failure to honour it had sounded in damages at least from the early 1970s when expert opinion widely accepted that those who suffer grievous mental disablement are capable of and would derive benefit from appropriate primary education.

Mr Justice Barr said that claims for damages for breach of constitutional rights as in the present cases were analogous to a common law action in tort and that the relevant provisions of the Statute of Limitations 1957 applied. Apart from the fact that Jamie Sinnott was profoundly mentally handicapped, a condition which stopped the limitation clock from running against him, he was an infant until his 18th birthday on 11 October 1995 and his action commenced within three years from that date. Accordingly, he was entitled to damages from October 1981 (being the time when the State ought to have provided for his primary education) up to the present and into the future.

Mrs Sinnott had been at all material times a de facto single parent and head of the Sinnott family of which she was primary carer. Mr Justice Barr stated that the State guaranteed to protect the family in its constitution and authority (article 41.2). He said that Mrs Sinnott and her family (in particular her son, Jamie) were entitled to equality of treatment by the State and ought not to be deprived without just cause of basic advantages which the State provided for others (article 40.1). Mr Justice Barr said that the State shall provide for free primary education and when the public good required it, provide other educational facilities and institutions (article 42.4). This was a right for the benefit of the family as a unit as well as for individual members thereof. The State had failed to honour its foregoing constitutional obligations to Mrs Sinnott and to her son, Jamie. The foreseeable consequence of that had been, inter alia, that an inordinate burden which had dominated her life had been imposed on her. Mrs Sinnott's claim was analogous to a claim for personal injury in tort and is subject to the limitation period of three years as provided in the Act of 1957 in that regard. However unlike a claim for personal injury arising out of, for example, a traffic accident where the date of the precipitating event determines the limitation period, the wrong done to her was a continuing one which existed from 1981 and has gone on since then. Her action commenced on 17 December 1996. Accordingly, Mr Justice Barr stated that she was entitled to damages for the harm done to her from 17 December 1993 and into the future.

Mr Justice Barr said that the State did not have a constitutional obligation to provide education directly but could rely on other appropriate bodies to supply that service on its behalf. When the State elected to take that course it retained primary responsibility for the nature and quality of the educational service which was provided on its behalf.

Mr Justice Barr held that both plaintiffs were entitled to the declarations as sought and to damages arising out of breach of their constitutional rights, negligence, and breach of duty by the State in that regard. In Jamie Sinnott's case further damages may be awarded on review of his situation in April 2003.

Mr Justice Barr then turned to the question of damages.

In the case of Jamie Sinnott, Mr Justice Barr said that in the interest of justice it was proper that Jamie Sinnott should have the best available primary education and training so that he may have the maximum prospect of making up lost ground and thus limiting the degree of permanent damage which he had suffered through the defendants' breach of duty.

Mr Justice Barr assessed damages in Jamie Sinnott's case to be £200,000. This was made up as follows. Firstly, the estimated cost of an applied behavioural analysis home-based programme of education for two and a half years was assessed at £70,000 (subject to review on completion). He said that it would be necessary for the court to award further damages to cover the cost of any additional programme which may be required. There was another element of potential further loss which Jamie Sinnott might suffer such as earnings from sheltered employment if it transpired that through protracted delay in his education he would be unable to learn sufficient skills to open up that possibility. Mr Justice Barr said that such a potential loss was too speculative to establish its likelihood on the balance of probabilities. Secondly, ancillary services (speech, physiotherapy, occupational and music therapy and medical care) were assessed at £15,000. Thirdly, genera l damages for additional suffering, distress and loss of enjoyment of life from October 1981 to date were assessed at £90,000. Fourthly, for on-going distress into the future through gross delay in providing education and training and permanent additional damage suffered by the plaintiff on that account, he awarded £25,000.

In the case of Mrs Sinnott, Mr Justice Barr said that it was difficult to assess compensation for a devoted mother's overlay of distress and anguish in a case like this and for the burden of unnecessary work inflicted on her over the years both as a carer and in her struggle trying to achieve Jamie Sinnott's rights from a reluctant bureaucracy. He assessed damages for her in the total of £55,000 comprising of agreed special damages £15,000, general damages from 17 December 1993 to date of £30,000 and general damages into the future of£10,000.

Solicitors: Ernest J. Cantillon & Co (Cork) for the plaintiffs; the Chief State Solicitor for the defendants.

This decision is under appeal to the Supreme Court.