A CASE has, of course, been made for President Reagan's Cold War policy of rearmament, on the grounds that this forced the Russians to compete, and eventually to bankrupt their economy. It is too soon to say what truth there is in this thesis: that verdict must be left to history.
But away from the potential Cold War issue some of the policies pursued by the Reagan administration, and later by George Bush, appeared to many in Europe to be destabilising and counter-productive.
In particular, the Central American policy pursued by the US during this period, involving support for the Contras against Nicaragua, and tolerance of the death squads in El Salvador, appeared indefensible and seemed to be based on a deep-seated paranoia about a non-credible communist threat to the stability of the United States, emanating from the countries to the south of it.
While some European countries, concerned at all costs not to disturb their relationship with the US, were visibly reluctant to oppose these policies openly, most European countries, Ireland included, made no secret of their unhappiness with the course of events in Central America.
By 1983, Europe's discontent with Reagan's Central American policy reached the point where, at the Stuttgart European Council, a policy statement was adopted, on the proposal of the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium, effectively challenging US policy and condemning the use of military force in that area.
Central America was not the only area of contention at that time between the United States and Europe. The invasion of Grenada, a member of the Commonwealth, by the US, without consultation with or warning to the United Kingdom, evoked a very sharp response indeed from Margaret Thatcher, who was normally the European leader most supportive of the Reagan administration. I recall, indeed, her remarking to me some days later, with considerable feeling, that "the Americans are worse than the Soviets".
Another American decision with which Margaret Thatcher also disagreed was the support given by the United States to the Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. She turned down President Reagan's request that Britain also support this action on the grounds that it was a breach of international law and, as she told me on several occasions subsequently, she put him on the spot by asking him what he would say "if we bombed the Provos in Dundalk"! I am not aware that he attempted to reply to this loaded rhetorical questions.
Nor was Europe greatly impressed by the American invasion of Panama and the kidnapping of its president, Noriega, although European voices were perhaps more muted on that occasion because of the character of Noriega and his regime. I do not recall that any European country offered any particular support for that action.
Since the change of administration four years ago American foreign policy has, however, evolved in more constructive directions, e.g. in relation to Haiti, Northern Ireland and, until the advent of the Netanyahyu administration in Israel unhappily coincided with the run-up to the presidential election in the US, in Israel also.
A dangerous gap, opened up in respect of Middle East policy during the election campaign, has had to be filled for the time being by Europe which, however, has very much less influence on Israel than the US, and which has been able to do very little more than hold the fort until, with the elections behind it, the US government can address this crisis more effectively.
More than anywhere else, perhaps, it was in Bosnia that for a period President Clinton's foreign policy came unstuck. When several years ago a peace agreement had been finally reached between the parties this achievement was, unhappily, destabilised by the fact that the Bosnian government felt at that moment that it received encouragement from the American administration to toughen its stand.
The result was nothing less than disastrous. Despite American connivance with the secret importation of arms by both Bosnia and Croatia, the result was that the Bosnian Serbs by the most brutal force won territory that they had conceded to the Bosnian Muslims in the earlier agreement.
It is, of course, true that it was the Americans who forget the settlement - eventually reached, and currently being enforced by Ifor, through the Dayton accord, and despite the damage done earlier, the credit for peace eventually achieved in Bosnia must thus be accorded unreservedly to the US.
But the settlement is one that from a Bosnian point of view is considerably less favourable than the earlier agreement, and in the meantime an enormous number of people have lost their lives under the most atrocious circumstances, and more have lost their homes.
The policy aberration that involved support for the Bosnian Muslims of a kind that encouraged them to continue the war, ultimately to their own disadvantage, derived from pressure of American public opinion, understandably horrified by the way the Bosnian Serbs had been behaving. But foreign policy founded on righteous indignation, that takes insufficient account of realities on the ground, ends up doing more harm than good.
It has to be added that European criticism of American policy in Bosnia must be muted because of the way in which Europe's own failure to tackle the Yugoslav crisis effectively at the outset contributed to the whole disaster.
Finally, as I mentioned in last week's article, perhaps the most significant constructive policy move of the first Clinton presidency may prove to have been the speech by the US Secretary of State, Mr Warren Christopher, at Stuttgart on September 6th last in which he proposed to bring Russia within the European security structure through a new framework described as a charter.
What can we expect from the second Clinton presidency? First of all, the fact that the President will no longer have to concern himself with being re-elected clearly leaves him greater freedom of action in the foreign as well as the domestic sphere, at least during the first two years of his presidency; thereafter there will almost certainly be a "lame duck" element.
It is to be expected that his principal concern will be to attempt to build on the American initiative of September 6th last. For the most crucial task facing the West as a whole, and the US in particular, is how to establish a totally new kind of relationship with Russia. This must be one which will enable Russia to view NATO no longer as a threat, but rather as a guarantee of stability on its western borders.
It will not be easy to arrange this. There will certainly be doubts and hesitations on the European side about building a new North Eurasian security structure with Russia as an equal partner; doubts which, however, will certainly be overcome.
But there can be no certainty that this project will succeed, not least because of the uncertainty created by the continuous instability of Russia itself.
We cannot know at present by whom and how that country will be governed in the years ahead, but the charter proposal, which seems to meet a number of Russian preoccupations, should at least help to minimise Russian fears of the West; fears that could be so easily exploited by populist nationalist forces within that huge country.
What of Northern Ireland? It is certain that if any opportunity arises for the second Clinton administration to contribute to a peaceful evolution of the Northern Ireland situation, that opportunity will be grasped with enthusiasm.
Moreover, our experience during the past two years has shown that American intervention can be acceptable to both sides and can be effective. The trouble is that, while clearly Gerry Adams and those who have joined with him in initiating the peace effort are highly conscious of the importance of American intervention, others in the IRA could prove to be immune to these kind of considerations. If there is a recurrence of violence then there will be little that the US can do to help. In this matter we must hold our breath and wait upon events.