WORLD VIEW:INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS are changing. For the first time since 1991, Russia has used military force against a sovereign state in the post-Soviet area. One could see it as a return to the past, with the Georgian-Russian war being a new episode of the "frozen conflict" dating back to the early 1990s.
After all, Russia has always tried to retain sway over the immediate neighbourhood. But, so far, it has only used the autocratic power of persuasion against the Asian republics and Belarus. Now it has opted for tanks and fighter aircraft.
The world will not be the same, since a new phenomenon is unfolding in front of our eyes - that of an emerging, or re-emerging, power willing to use force to guarantee its interests.
The West is not ready for this. The Bush administration has concentrated all its attention on the war against terrorism and Islamic extremists. It is achieving a respectable result in that crusade, preventing the Arab paymasters of al-Qaeda and other extremist organisations from supporting and financing their activities. Washington is not ready to register another fundamental threat on its radar. The war in Georgia will at least create a different ferment.
Clearly, a sense of realism should not be lost when assessing the endeavours of president Mikheil Saakashvili. The leader of the "revolution of the roses" of 2003 believes in nothing but his own wisdom. He behaves like a geopolitical narcissist who has undertaken a struggle for the soul and consciousness of the western world.
Saakashvili had known very well the waves he would produce in Moscow by reacting to the incidents in South Ossetia that ignited the current conflict. He had no doubt that, in spite of the engagement of 130 American military trainers, the Georgian army was not in the position to head off a great power. He did not even attempt to do that, leaving the Roki tunnel untouched and allowing Russian forces to flow into South Ossetia.
Saakashvili knew intervening in Ossetia would not help the prospects of Georgia's entry into Nato. He hoped instead to shake up the West and make the Georgian case a test of its effectiveness. Saakashvili called the United States and Europe to the drawing board. He did not miss an inch when it came to Russia's reaction.
Attacks against civilians, attempts to bomb the oil pipeline from Baku to Turkey and the naval blockade all showed Russia as a ruthless aggressor. Saakashvili himself used the international media to the utmost, broadcasting live on BBC and CNN, sitting against a backdrop of Georgian and European flags. Sympathetic, good-looking and wearing an open smile in spite of the dramatic events taking place, Saakashvili seemed to be "one of us", especially when contrasted with bland Dmitry Medvedev and angry Vladimir Putin.
The West had assumed for a long time the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could get out of hand. More recently, it had hoped, however, the weariness of both with the stalemate would lead them to the negotiating table. The EU had planned to gradually increase its presence in the region, with the possibility of sending a peace force to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It was believed this could be achieved with Russian acceptance given the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Putin's favourite resort, an arm's length from Abkhazia.
The EU can legitimately feel deceived by Medvedev, who sent positive signals on the "frozen conflicts" in the Caucasus at the June EU-Russian summit. The European diplomats felt a delicate breeze in the wings.
Medvedev chose instead the role of Putin's shadow. Clearly, nothing suggests the war in Georgia could lead to an internal reassessment in Russia. Provoked or unprovoked, as a great power, Russia should know better what to do and where the red lines lie. Once more it proved to be a victim of its wounded pride and exposed itself by showing what it is about - not an attractive sight for anyone in the civilised world.
The West reacted as it should have, expressing in an unequivocal fashion its point of view and not closing off the road back to reason for Russia.
No one among the key leaders stumbled, no sentiments emerged apart from a shrinking group of doctrinal Russophiles in Berlin or Rome. The generation of Chirac and Schröder has gone with the wind.
The immediate objective for now is to cool down emotions, prevent further bloodshed and start talks. Strategically, the purpose should be to demonstrate that the West and the principles it espouses cannot be played with.
In spite of its imperfections and the temper of its president, Georgia is, as of now, a geopolitical part of the West. Its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations should gain a more tangible dimension.
It is as important to launch a serious reflection on how to stop offensive, unscrupulous Russian nationalism. The way is not by writing Russia off as a partner, however tempting that might be to some.
The West must know better how to liberate itself from an excessive embrace with Russia, not burning all bridges - this would be as unrealistic as getting rid of Chinese computers or T-shirts.