Convention on the Future of Europe: The Irish Times debate
Yes, says Eamonn Gallagher, former Director General of Fisheries
The European Union is a work in progress. It is a union of states, not yet of peoples - a collection of democracies, not a single democracy. But unlike in any previous multi-state organisation, a Commission, with at least one nominee from each member-state, has the sole right to propose legislation for consideration and decision by the European Council and Parliament. This is the "community system" or "method".
The Commission must, therefore, be impartial and well-informed about the Union as a whole. Its members must protect their independence from the member-states both individually and collectively. Without these attributes the community system would not work.
The Nice Treaty requires that, when there are 27 or more member-states there must be fewer than 27 commissioners. They are supposed, nevertheless, to be "representative" of the whole Union.
Mr Giscard d'Estaing, President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, is said to envisage a maximum of 10 commissioners. In that case 17 or more member-states, in equal rotation, would have no nominee in each five-year period and each member-state would be without a nominee for up to 10 years at a time.
If there were 18 commissioners - the probable maximum intended by those advocating slimming down - each member-state would be without a nominee in every third Commission.
The consequences include:
1) - A Commission of 10 to 18 members, leaving many states without a nominee in each Commission, cannot possibly be "representative" of an increasingly diverse Union. Evading this issue in the Convention, as appears to be the mood currently, guarantees serious future conflict.
2) - A diminished Commission, by definition not representative of the whole Union, would not be adequately equipped to fulfil its obligations. Its authority, impartiality and independence would be questioned.
3) - Policies proposed and decisions made by such a Commission would be increasingly vulnerable to resistance. The temptation, especially for larger member-states without a nominee, to disregard unpalatable proposals or decisions and to propose alternatives, would become irresistible and could eventually affect decision-making by majority.
4) - Smaller member-states, with little voting weight in the Council and Parliament, would be marginalised more than larger ones when without a nominee on the Commission. This is especially harmful for smaller member-states not part of a linked group like Benelux or the three Nordics, which will always have at least one nominee.
The argument:
1) - that a smaller Commission is better suited to executive tasks is not relevant to its policy-proposing function. Its legislative role is its most important one and it should not be subordinated to executive convenience.
2) - that "legal equality of rotation" somehow ameliorates reduction of the Commission is plain self-deception as it does nothing of the kind.
3) - that a smaller Commission would be easier to organise in that, for example, it would avoid having senior or junior commissioners, simply reveals a lack of organisational imagination.
In the absence of anything more substantial, such banalities do not justify jeopardising a community system that has long proved its unique value.
A fully representative Commission remains the necessary underpinning for majority voting. It defends against creeping intergovernmentalism and undue domination by the larger member-states, neither of which formed part of Monnet's vision.
The larger member-states should understand that imposing constitutional change, without a convincing case, endangers the Union itself, both by downgrading a key institution and by removing it further from the people.
No, says David O'Sullivan, Commission Secretary General
The Commission is the cornerstone of European integration. Its monopoly of legislative initiative and the large number of daily decisions it takes affecting the lives of citizens requires it to be seen to be legitimate and sensitive to national realities. This pleads for a Commission with at least one member per country.
Equally, its decision-making must be rapid and effective to respond to the ever-increasing pace of the modern world. This pleads for a smaller Commission, closer to the average size of most national governments.
Another important feature of the Commission is its collective responsibility, its collegiality. However, the more the Commission expands, the harder it becomes to make collegiality work.
At its inception, the legitimacy of the Commission was encapsulated by giving it two members for large countries and one for smaller countries. However, it was already recognised at Amsterdam in 1997 that this situation would not be sustainable following enlargement.
In recent years, the balance between the Commission's policy inception role and its role in executing policy has changed dramatically towards executive functions. And in the Convention, the Commission is arguing that this executive function should be further strengthened.
A first response was the decision to slim down the Commission to one member per country. However, this is clearly not sufficient given the rate at which enlargement is proceeding and the likely growth of executive functions.
A Commission of 30 cannot be a collegiate executive. It will be an assembly. And one in which, paradoxically, smaller countries will be proportionately over-represented relative to larger ones. For this solution to work, radical changes in the structure and organisation of the college would be required. One idea is to have senior and junior commissioners, with an 'inner circle' within the Commission and a strengthened role for the Commission president in setting policy priorities. But some member-states may prefer to have no commissioner rather than a system of equal presence but unequal influence. Small member-states in particular should be more concerned about strengthening the Commission's unique role in defence of the European interest, than about a guarantee of representation in a body that may have less impact.
The alternative is a "slimmed down" Commission. This would be more effective and more collegial, but would need compensatory arrangements to ensure fair treatment of all member-states notably through the accountability of the Commission to Parliament and Council.
The dilemma is real. Maintaining the status quo is not an option, and no solution is perfect. However, the Treaty of Nice already provides part of the answer. It limits the Commission to one member per country up to a ceiling of 27, at which point there must be fewer commissioners than member-states.
It is not clear whether the Convention will endorse this or take a different position. But the Nice solution may offer the best way to ensure a strong Commission, with the legitimacy to assume its role of defending the general European interest and the efficiency needed of a modern executive body.
Next week: Should we extend the harmonisation of our criminal justice systems? Eugene Regan v Michael McDowell