For professional footballers it is ideal to pay by results, with a bonus for reaching each next stage in a competition. The work of fund managers also lends itself to performance-related pay - the more money they make, the more they earn. However, a system that offered a 50 per cent bonus to the teacher who agreed to take responsibility for classes of double the average size might not find the same appeal from the parents of his/her pupils.
These are examples demonstrating that where outcomes are more to do with quantity, rather than quality, it is easier to relate them to pay.
In Britain, there are schools which deliberately shift internal resources from pupils with special needs and in need of remedial teaching to high-performing over-achievers. The reasoning is simple. The under-achieving pupils will never shine, whereas the high-flyers will get the results that will shoot the school up the published league table of results - and that is what determines the school's status and funding.
Yes, of course it is appalling to leave the weak unsupported, and we would never let it happen here - after all, it would be like sacking a physician because he gave too much valuable hospital time and space to his patients. The type of performance-related pay that has been Thatcher's legacy to Britain has had appalling consequences that have given the whole idea of relating pay and performance a bad name.
The problem with the current debate on performance-related pay in Ireland is the sense of unreality and ignorance informing so much of it.
The certainty with which people can line up for or against performance-related pay, as if it were a simple concept with no other side to it, is amazing. Those in favour tend to be employers, while those against tend to be union representatives, each in blissful ignorance of the fact that this is not a "one-size-fits-all" model.
If, for instance, through a national agreement, it were proposed to give every worker, on top of the basic increase, an additional 1 per cent pay for every 1 per cent increase in economic growth, the measure would receive widespread support. If, on the other hand, it were proposed that no worker would receive an increase until his or her work-rate was individually assessed and approved by the monitoring committee, there would be widespread objection.
Those are the two ends of the argument on performance-related pay. In the first, there is a general sharing of the wealth created by all our endeavours; in the second, there is nothing at all until after a harrowing, and perhaps biased, individual assessment.
Most of those involved in the debate rely more on strong assertion than sound evidence. Were they to take some interest in objective studies, they would soon discover some interesting results.
Management types would be disappointed to learn that pay for performance does not really motivate workers or increase team co-operation. In fact, it can create jealousies and disagreements in the workplace.
Some trade unionists would be astonished to learn that a performance element would be welcomed by many workers as a method of earning more money, having their commitment recognised and appreciated and allowing them to have an input into decisions on objectives and policy.
Performance-related pay has many facets. Individual assessment is the most objectionable, but many others are very attractive. If management wants workers to develop additional skills, we can do business. If there is a need for workers to acquire new qualifications and knowledge, we can do a deal.
If there is an option for workers to take on additional responsibility, then such opportunities can be welcomed through negotiation. In education, for instance, many of these reforms are already in place but because we have given them titles such as "posts of responsibility" or "degree allowances", teachers have not realised that these are perfect examples of performance-related pay.
A model of performance-related extra pay, which is voluntary and optional and which allows workers and management to develop common objectives and an agreed management structure to deliver them, is not unattractive. On the other hand, if it is merely a ruse to "get at" certain workers, or alternatively a crude attempt to get more work for the same money, then forget it, because it will not get off the starting block.
It could work in primary education. There is already a perfect model of performance management in primary schools. Primary schools now outline the school's strategy and objectives through the development of a plean scoile. Schools are also subject to a system of school evaluation through which their work and operations have to be approved by the Department of Education Inspectorate. I believe this is as intense an evaluation as is the case anywhere in the private sector and I argue that primary teachers should be rewarded for it now. Performance-related pay would allow us claim that reward.
As a more complex example of how it might work, we in the education sector, following discussion and consultation, might conclude that we need certain things delivered in the areas of, let's say, European languages, literacy, integration of pupils with special needs and others. Next, we agree the resources, and the teacher numbers required to achieve them. Finally, we establish a system of validating that the measures have been put in place.
The beauty of that example is that it is far more to do with inputs rather than outcomes. It is a model that could work effectively in the public sector, where the different sectors could take responsibility for delivering service-enhancing objectives. If everybody approached the thing coolly, rationally and manipulatively, we could reach a Chinese bargain where everybody leaves the table a winner.
Performance-related pay is a real lemon - impossible on its own but which can, in a measured and controlled way, sometimes give zest to a dull dish. Let's suck it and see.
Senator Joe O'Toole is general secretary of INTO