ANALYSIS:While US president Barack Obama struggles to wade through the quagmire of health reform at home, he is making bold and significant strides in central and eastern Europe, writes DAN McLAUGHLIN
His abandonment of plans to build a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic has been welcomed wholeheartedly in Russia – which saw itself as the real target of a project ostensibly aimed at countering Iran – and by most Poles and Czechs, who “hosted” quite enough foreign troops during the Soviet era and had little enthusiasm for new US bases.
But the alarm bells rung by the usual US suspects – mostly the right-wing cold warriors who championed the missile scheme – are also tinkling in the ears of some of Russia’s neighbours, who still fear that any perceived diplomatic victory for Moscow must carry a dangerous corollary for them.
Lech Walesa, a founder of the Solidarity movement and former Polish president, said Obama’s decision marked an unfortunate shift in US thinking in relation to central and eastern Europe, where history has instilled not only a deep distrust of Russia but a suspicion of deals between major powers in which the futures of smaller satellite states are used as stakes at the negotiating table.
For people of such a mind, Obama’s declared bid to “reset” relations with the Kremlin is looking dangerously one-sided.
Russia has not been made to pay, financially, diplomatically or militarily, for the war it prosecuted with Georgia in the dying days of the Bush administration. Moreover, it continues to undermine the Tbilisi government with warnings of further clashes and a campaign to convince countries to recognise the independence of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Venezuela has now joined Russia and Nicaragua in acknowledging the sovereignty of these Kremlin-controlled enclaves, with President Hugo Chavez announcing the move during a visit to Moscow that saw him sign a huge arms deal.
While Russia strengthens links with abrasive leftist governments in Washington’s backyard, it remains determined to keep pulling the strings in its own, where the Kremlin and its local allies continue to undermine Ukraine’s pro-western leaders ahead of January’s vital presidential election.
Moscow is also fighting hard to maintain its grip on the strategic Caucasus and Central Asia region, where it is stymying US and EU efforts to strengthen relations and secure the oil and gas that would help them wean themselves off the unpredictable flow of Russian energy.
Central European critics of Obama’s “reset” policy point out that Russia has made no concessions on these issues since he came to power. They argue that scrapping missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic only strengthens hawks like prime minister Vladimir Putin.
Supporters counter that the more aggressive administration of George W Bush made no progress with Russia on these matters, hardened Moscow’s position on many of them and only served to highlight the limits of western influence in places like Georgia during last year’s war.
Obama appears to hope that by not treating Moscow as a pariah, it will be less hostile to US allies like Georgia and Ukraine, more amenable to the west’s pursuit of energy deals across the old Soviet Union, and less likely to launch more “gas wars” or conflicts of any other kind.
Obama has also made clear distinctions between Russia’s leaders: the hardline Putin, whom he accused of still having one foot in the cold war, and the more liberal president Dmitry Medvedev, whom he has praised as a intelligent, pragmatic and modern.
Russian analysts believe the US administration hopes a less confrontational approach will strengthen the more emollient Medvedev, or at least help him hold his ground against Putin and an entourage of former KGB men who may still see US-Russian relations as a zero-sum game.
Both Russian leaders praised Obama’s decision on missile defence. But Putin immediately pushed for more concessions from Washington on technology transfers to Russia and on its bid to enter the World Trade Organisation jointly with Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Obama will meet Medvedev in New York this week, and hope for a sign that he really is a man with whom he can do business.
The meeting will be closely watched in central Europe, where there is a general sense of relief that the missile shield will not be built.
The political fallout has also been minimal, with Poland’s government performing strongly and having little riding on a deal largely championed by its predecessor, and Czech politics in limbo under a caretaker government before early elections.
What last week’s decision rammed home to leaders in Prague and Warsaw, Tbilisi and Kiev, was that they are still not part of the biggest games played by the US and Russia.
In the months ahead, Washington and Moscow should be able to find agreement on nuclear arms reductions and ensuring the continued flow of supplies to Nato troops in Afghanistan.
But consensus will be more elusive on how to neutralise the perceived threat from North Korea and, especially, Iran.
Russia is the builder of Iran’s known atomic facilities and supplier of its nuclear fuel. It is the prospective provider of advanced air-defence missiles which Israel fears could dangerously alter the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Moscow has long resisted pressure for tougher sanctions on Iran, and Putin and Medvedev insist that there will be no automatic quid pro quo for Obama’s missile defence move when the UN Security Council meets Iranian negotiators on its nuclear programme on October 1st.
Some analysts note that Moscow has little economic incentive to stabilise the Middle East, given its preference for high oil prices and few reliable energy-exporting rivals in the region.
If Obama can sway the Kremlin on the issues, then relations between the US and Russia will really have been “reset”, to the benefit of eastern Europe and the rest of the world.