Events in Britain some weeks ago showed the dangers of ministerial, as distinct from governmental, public relations. The in-fighting between Peter Mandelson and Gordon Brown's PR man, Charlie Whelan, contributed to the departure of both from the Government team - even though at the time the Guardian made it clear Whelan was not the source of its report about Mandelson's house-loan from the then Paymaster-General, Geoffrey Robinson.
Whelan was thus eventually forced to resign for a leak for which he was not responsible. This was rough justice - but perhaps poetic justice, given the number of other leaks for which Whelan was responsible in his efforts to boost Gordon Brown, sometimes at Blair's expense.
We've never had such a ebacle debacle here, but the experience of some of our coalition governments suggests the employment of public relations people by individual ministers can be dangerous; it tends to undermine cabinet solidarity and responsibility.
I have favoured employing chefs de cabinet on the continental European model. There were special advisers here before they were rechristened programme managers by the incoming 1992 government. But the role I have seen for such appointees - and it is a crucial one - is not public relations, but rather one of helping ministers to operate effectively at cabinet, as well as helping to push the implementation of a government's programme at civil service level.
The first of these two roles is important because ministers are not merely political heads of government departments, but also cabinet members who decide complex policies collectively.
The system works thus: a memorandum from the department originating a policy proposal will make its case. However, this memorandum may not always give a full account of the counter-arguments, or of alternative ways of implementing it. Of course, other departments directly interested may argue against it or propose amendments. But where no such other departmental interest exists, it is then up to ministers to ensure there is adequate debate.
Now, busy ministers will rarely have the time themselves to research matters. And it is unreasonable to expect to find in a minister's department, other than the Department of Finance, expertise on economic or social matters that are outside that department's own specific area. So, unless ministers can call on outside expertise, their ability to contribute at cabinet will often be very limited.
That is why, as minister for foreign affairs, I employed an economic adviser, as I did when I became taoiseach.
Such an expert adviser - whether he or she is called special adviser, chef de cabinet or programme manager - may also have another important role. This is to steer the party's programme through the legislative process, maintaining pressure on the civil servants as well as on the Attorney-General's office and that of the parliamentary draughtsman.
But it is important appointees to these programme manager positions be professionals. They should not just be ministerial pals, brought in to give him or her moral support. I have no doubt about the importance of such key appointments, but I am very doubtful about the proliferation of appointments to ministers' private offices. For the greater the number of such appointments, the more the temptation for idle hands to dabble in matters best left alone - in particular, public relations on behalf of "their" minister.
A curse of modern governments is the over-preoccupation of many politicians with their "image" - a preoccupation sometimes indulged at the expense of the actual job they are supposed to be doing. And when this preoccupation overflows into competitive self-promotion between ministers, the consequences for government cohesion can be serious.
In our political system the task of overseeing the presentation of the government's activities is undertaken by the government press secretary who, in the case of a coalition-type government, is now usually assisted by a colleague or colleagues appointed by the leader(s) of the other government party or parties. In such coalitions, much depends on the cohesion of these appointees - on the willingness of the government members' press team to work for the whole government rather than the parties which compose it.
In the present and immediately preceding governments, this government press system seems to have worked well. But the Government now suffers from the disadvantage of not employing the kind of structured system of programme managers that worked so effectively in the case of its two predecessors. There are still serious problems in some departments which no government has succeeded in eradicating.
Thus, the Department of Agriculture has been much in the news in recent years because of its extraordinary performance in relation to the beef industry.
For its part, although the Department of Justice has had some good ministers - as well as others not so good - its performance in relation to prisons and refugees suggests that even the best of ministers has been able to make little impact upon it.
For their part, the Revenue Commissioners have notably failed to maintain public confidence in their capacity to carry out their task with visible even-handedness, as between the rich and the less-well-off. The Revenue would, no doubt, contest such a comment, and in relation to tax evasion would probably claim lack of support from politicians and from the Department of Finance - both of whom have been excessively fearful of "frightening away capital". But that can excuse only part of the Commissioners' Revenue's past failures.
And quite apart from these individual departmental weaknesses (which seem to me to make the case for incorporating some kind of inspectorate-general role into the system, possibly but not necessarily within the Department of the Public Service) it would appear that the whole civil service clearly believes itself to lack much of the expertise needed for modern government. That is the only conclusion one can reasonably draw from the present scale of civil service employment of consultants, often for work which is not highly specialised and which could be undertaken by a civil service adequately equipped with professional skills.
The cost of such consultancy arrangements is great. It is likely if the relevant expertise is incorporated in the system, much money could be saved. Also, the current long delays involved in commissioning such consultancies could be avoided, accelerating the whole turgid process of government.
ON A quite different point, I believe the reform of the higher-level promotion system which John Boland and I introduced almost 15 years ago has had a discernible impact on the quality of higher civil servants. But this system was diluted by a change in the appointment system for departmental secretaries that was made by Charles Haughey following the 1987 change of government.
Under the system that our government set up, a Top-Level Appointments Committee TLAC), on which served four departmental secretaries (those of the Taoiseach and Public Service, and two others who rotated) were made responsible for recommending to ministers the names of people for promotion to the rank of Assistant Secretary or Secretary of a Department. This post is now called Secretary-General.
Under this scheme, as originally devised, only one name was to be put forward in each case. Ministers tended to accept this nomination, and because the single name that emerged was often that of an official in a different department, this introduced an important element of much needed interdepartmental mobility into the system. (Previously, ministers had tended almost always to promote from within their own department, choosing someone they had come to know or, in the case of promotions to Assistant Secretary, often a person recommended to them by their Departmental Secretary.)
For some reason my successor as Taoiseach decided that in the case of appointments to secretary grade, three names should be proposed rather than one. And as, almost invariably, one of these three names has turned out to be that of an official within the department involved, ministers have tended to take the line of least resistance by choosing the internal candidate in such cases, rather than risking poor relations with their own officials by preferring an outsider. Some of these internal appointees may, of course, originally have come from another department when appointed to Assistant Secretary level.
