Without principle or precedent to underpin it, the Cabinet's calculation of Irish national interests has been exposed under the most unflattering light of public scrutiny ahead of today's Dail debate on Iraq, writes Ben Tonra
How democratic and open do we expect foreign policy to be? Recalling the Dáil to debate the Government's decision on the use of Shannon by US military forces illustrates both how far we have come - and how far we have yet to travel - in the direction of a democratically accountable and open foreign policy.
We should first recall that foreign policy-making has always been treated as a special case - and not just in Ireland. Foreign policy is traditionally made in such a way as to insulate it to some degree from what are often seen as the fickle winds of public opinion.
For example, in most parliamentary democracies special rules apply to the supervision of foreign policy and most governments are especially protective of their rights and responsibilities in this area. Moreover, those civil servants with the responsibility for proposing and implementing foreign policy have always been recruited, trained and operated separately from the rest of the Civil Service.
This centralised and specialised model of foreign policy-making is also reflected in the Constitution, where the Government is formally mandated with control over the State's external relations and the Dáil is given very specific and delimited powers.
The rationale for this special treatment of foreign policy is as obvious as it may be objectionable - that the passions and peculiarities of public opinion should not override the essential pursuit of national interests overseas.
The case of Ireland's position on the crisis in Iraq is illustrative. The Government has judged that Irish interests are best served in offering tacit support to the United States and Britain.
Directly and indirectly, the Government has invoked a litany of economic and political interests as rationale for that position. In so doing, however, it has found itself uncomfortably exposed.
The Government's present difficulty is rooted in the fact that it had hoped to see the UN provide political shelter for its own reckoning that Ireland's economic and trade interests and the importance of maintaining a US-British focus on the Northern Ireland peace process together outweighed other arguments about war in Iraq.
Stripped of that option, the Government has recently, and in a somewhat inelegant fashion, been trying to dispense with principle and to rely instead on precedent.
Instead of fully endorsing British and American legal arguments that a second UN resolution would have been politically helpful but legally unnecessary (although there have been Irish hints of support for this position), the Government is now attempting to rely upon the precedents of Vietnam and Kosovo to justify US access to Shannon.
Neither, however, is persuasive since the EU - including Ireland - endorsed NATO's intervention in Kosovo as being both "necessary and warranted" while the Vietnam conflict occurred at the height of the Cold War and without any decision at the UN Security Council.
In stark contrast with both these examples, the arguments surrounding the rights and wrongs of war against Iraq have been thoroughly thrashed out in the UN, EU and NATO, resulting in the fact that there is now no multilateral institution offering its support to the US and its allies in this conflict.
It is also disingenuous to point to French and German policy in leaving air space and support facilities open to the US and Britain. These are all key NATO allies who, despite serious political and diplomatic differences over the war in Iraq, are nonetheless bound by a treaty of mutual defence.
For its part, Germany is also part of NATO's integrated military command structure with a substantial number of important US and British military bases on its soil.
Without principle or precedent to underpin it therefore, the Cabinet's calculation of Irish national interests is thus exposed in its most raw state and under the most unflattering light of public scrutiny.
This is not likely to be a pleasant experience for either the public or the Government - but it is, in a way, part of a necessary coming of age in Irish foreign policy.
For perhaps too long we have comforted ourselves with a mythology that foreign policy can be cost-free, that we can pursue interests and ideals without contradiction, without making difficult choices, without bearing a burden.
In that sense, our stunted and compromised version of military neutrality has been our comfort blanket to be pulled out from under the bed when worrisome events present themselves but wielded without effect, without cost and without sense of its implications.
What the crisis in Iraq illustrates is that if we are to pursue effectively the ideals and interests that we value, then we must take our foreign policy responsibilities seriously. If unsatisfied with the calculation of Irish interests made by the Cabinet, we must adjust the scales by which such decisions are made.
To what extent do we wish to place principles, ethics and morality at the centre of our foreign policy and how far do we want to prioritise trade, investment and other tangible returns from such a policy? How are we to strike such balances in the future and how should such decisions be made?
In order to strike appropriate foreign policy balances and to face their associated costs, can we continue to rely on ad hoc, case-by-case decisions or are there parameters that should be established by legislation and supervised by the Oireachtas? What kinds of formal advisory structures should be created so that the input of NGOs, interest groups and other experts can be factored into policy-making?
What kinds of research should be commissioned so that foreign policy decisions are informed by specialist, dedicated analyses?
Finally, with almost the smallest diplomatic service in the European Union, what are our expectations of Irish diplomacy and how best might these be pursued? In almost every other area of public policy the legislative, consultative, research and executive structures noted above are in place. In the case of foreign policy they are either grossly underdeveloped or simply non-existent.
In 1996, launching a process that led to the publication of the first White Paper on Irish foreign policy, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledged that "a revolution is taking place in Ireland . . . slowly but with growing resolution the people are seizing power . . . through demands for greater accountability from their elected representatives, more openness in government and wider access to information."
The fruits of that revolution have yet to ripen in terms of Irish foreign policy but perhaps we will see their propagation in today's Dáil debate.
Dr Ben Tonra is senior lecturer and deputy director, Dublin European Institute, UCD, and editor with Dr Eílis Ward (UCG) of Ireland in International Affairs: Interests, Institutions and Identities, IPA, Dublin, 2002