The Defence Minister, Mr Smith, recently affirmed that Ireland will support UNIFIL (the United Nations mission in southern Lebanon) until 2001. A press release following his meeting with UN officials in New York gives it a positive spin. The negative interpretation would be that Ireland will withdraw from Lebanon next year.
This latter hypothesis was confirmed in a second release on the Minister's return. The Kildare Nationalist reported him saying the next Irish battalion due to depart for Lebanon in October next would be the last unit to serve there.
This clarifies the position significantly. The Government intends withdrawing the bulk of its troops from UN service in May 2001.
Ireland has served in UN peacekeeping operations since 1958. It has a proud record and has paid a heavy cost in casualties.
Currently the Defence Forces have 920 peacekeepers serving abroad. Of these 760 serve with UN operations. The remaining 160 serve with the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union operations in the Balkans. The Minister's proposal will reduce the number serving with the UN from 760 to a mere 66.
From next May our contribution to the UN on the ground will be derisory: 40 in East Timor, 10 in the Middle East, six in Western Sahara, four in Cyprus, six in Iraq/ Kuwait. Certainly a case of spreading a small number widely throughout the globe so we can paint our contribution to UN as being "in five missions worldwide".
In one way it is hard to fathom this desertion of the UN. Why should we desert the UN now, when during decades of isolation that body provided us with an effective world platform? Are we witnessing a shift in Irish foreign policy?
ail is in recess? The White Paper on Foreign Policy, in discussing UN peacekeeping activity, states inter alia: "Given the unique role and authority of the UN and the fact that its peacekeeping activities have proved an important element in containing conflict, the Government is committed to sustaining the overall level of Ireland's contribution to peacekeeping".
A year ago Mr Smith signed up to the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) in New York. In this, he promised to provide up to 850 troops for UN peacekeeping at any given time. The earlier drafts of the White Paper on Defence were fulsome in their praise of the UN, its peacekeeping operations and our support for them. This was altered in the final document. That warns us that the UNSAS agreement "is an expression of policy intent and not a binding commitment".
The press releases, at the time that Mr Smith signed the papers in New York, made no mention of this. Having sidelined UNSAS, the Defence White Paper next moves in to undermine and deal a death blow to UNIFIL, our only major commitment of Irish troops overseas. Here it tells us: "It is important to recognise that a military presence of this kind should not become a permanent fixture in any country."
We have been in Lebanon for almost 22 years. It is a long commitment to any one theatre. In the years when the Departments of Finance and Defence refused to allow recruitment into the Defence Forces this "wither-on-the-vine policy" had many adverse results for the organisation.
Many soldiers became old and unfit, so the remainder were obliged to serve multiple tours in Lebanon. This was not good for the organisation, and the dangers inherent in over-familiarity with the mission area were self-evident. This problem has long since passed.
The authorisation given to the Chief-of-Staff by the Government, to automatically recruit up to a given ceiling, is producing young and vibrant Defence Forces. This is very evident in Lebanon. Up to the mid-1990s, "first-timers" serving in each Irish battalion in Lebanon numbered under 20.
Now they number hundreds in each battalion. In addition, Lebanon continues to be a very good proving ground for new soldiers.
Given these circumstances, it might seem illogical for the Department of Defence to propose our turning away from the UN. The Minister has another covert reason for the proposals, however. The nub of the problem is that the sums in the Defence White Paper are wrong.
In a situation where "aid to the civil power" duties had not dropped significantly, where no redeployments from the Border were planned, where our commitment to UN peacekeeping was increasing, and where a significant commitment to a EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was around the corner, the White Paper actually came up with a plan to cut the Army strength by 10 per cent.
This underestimated the pressure, resolve and speed with which the RRF would be pushed by our European partners. It also rested on the premise that we could "double-hat" our commitments; in other words promise, say 1,000 troops to the RRF but say that 920 of these were already serving on peacekeeping missions (with the UN).
This did not work. The numbers we will pledge in a couple of months (estimated at about 1,000) cannot be double-hatted. In addition, such troops will have to be sustained in the mission area for at least a year. This means the requirement will be for a base of 3,000 troops.
This widening of the pledge by a factor of three is a normal military convention. The thinking behind it is that 1,000 are deployed on a four or six-month tour, 1,000 are in training and ready to be rotated into the area of operations and 1,000 have returned home and are with their families in home stations.
It would have been just possible for the Defence Forces to take on all tasks had the Defence Forces Reorganisation Implementation Plan (1996) been adhered to, although that plan foresaw additional troops being required if there were "significant changes in the internal or external security environment".
A further cut of 10 per cent rendered the mission impossible. In trying to find a way out of the predicament, the Minister has decided to cut our UN commitment in 2001 so that we can have troops available for European commitments at the end of that year. It is robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Another factor has also not been taken into consideration. If the RRF is not called into action, or if the Government wishes to dissociate itself from a planned mission such as, for instance, a deployment into north Africa, then with no UN peacekeeping commitments, we will have a highly trained Army with no place to go. It is the sporting equivalent of having a team trained to peak condition without ever playing them in a match. It will soon collapse.
It is not too late for a solution to this self-inflicted problem. A reduced but meaningful UN commitment, rather than complete desertion of the organisation, would be a possible solution. Ultimately, soldiers are the only side of the ministerial-Civil Service-military triangle that knows from experience what they are talking about.
Lieut Gen Gerry McMahon (rtd) was chief-of-staff of the Defence Forces from February 1995 to August 1998