WORLD VIEW:THE EUROPEAN Union has taken a measured route between Putin's Moscow and Cheney's Washington this week in refusing to impose sanctions on Russia after its military and diplomatic actions in Georgia, but firmly setting a test for Moscow over the next two months about its willingness to co-operate with other Europeans, writes Paul Gillespie
Instead of the widely canvassed divisions, there was a surprising consensus at Monday's summit about how to proceed between harder and softer positions. The crisis emphasises what is at stake in creating a more coherent EU foreign policy, the importance of doing so, and the marked contrast between EU and US approaches to European security.
Expressing grave concern about the conflict, violence and the "disproportionate reaction of Russia", EU leaders condemned Moscow's "unacceptable" decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They stressed the right of "all European states . . . freely to determine their foreign policy and their alliances" and respect for the legitimate "security interests" of each, Russia included. They pledged large scale humanitarian aid to Georgia, freer trade agreements and vowed to pursue an enhanced political agreement with it under the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy.
This built on France's rapid initiative in brokering a six-point ceasefire agreement last month, and although it has several ambiguous clauses, it does provide a benchmark to evaluate the scaling down of military confrontation and a pledge to monitor it, with unarmed EU observers.
Several commentators have pointed out that Russia was probably more willing to deal with France as the EU presidency than with a smaller state such as the Czech Republic, recalling the enhanced arrangements provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. These would give greater continuity of a more high profile EU president over two and a half to five years, along with a foreign policy High Representative straddling the inter-governmental council of ministers and the commission.
While these would not in themselves guarantee a reconciliation of differing national policies and interests, and reproduce existing institutional rivalries, they do make the EU more visible as an international actor and probably would make it more effective.
Gradually, pragmatically and often accidentally over recent years, the EU has acquired many characteristics of an external strategy encompassing territorial politics, economics and value projection at internal, regional and global levels. Lisbon brings them together into a more coherent framework. Such crises will increase the imperative to ratify and implement the treaty among other member states, a political fact that Irish parties and voters should be aware of.
Of course, all this also means EU policy will be subject to more criticism for failing to live up to its political or rhetorical promise, or for hypocrisy in disguising its interests in universalist language.
That is the price of acting in a more multipolar global setting. But most member states and voters want it that way, seeing that their interdependence and insecurity on their border regions necessitate common action.
Similarly, most member states and voters prefer the EU's concentration on soft power, based on attraction and projection of values rather than hard military action, if it is feasible. That is in contrast to US policy. It is a mistake to assume a simple convergence between EU and US values and interests.
There is much tension between them after the end of the cold war and through the periods of EU and Nato enlargements of the 1990s, followed by the US-led effort to project them both in a global setting, especially in Afghanistan. That remains controversial and will stay so, whoever wins the US election.
In several major respects the emergent EU strategy is pitched against US policy. This can be seen through the Georgia events.
While Washington emphasises Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine, that is still resisted by France and Germany as provocative. And while Poland and the Baltic states value US security guarantees, they stop short of referring to a new cold war and realise the importance of reaching a long-term deal with Russia on energy, security and political freedoms. Russian leaders have a real stake in that and are expected to respond rationally if they want to avoid a new isolation.
The EU's European Neighbourhood Policy is quite inadequate in relation to this task. Russia demands separate treatment, but there is a great absence of long-term thinking about a coherent relationship between the two strategies and how they should be better resourced. The opportunity was missed to initiate and reach such a deal; it will be much harder now that the Georgian crisis has hardened attitudes all round.
Russia is a regional rather than a global power. In its post-communist persona it lacks an exportable ideology and has a notably reduced power to attract allies. Significantly, China refused to extend it solidarity on Georgia, notwithstanding their shared authoritarian capitalism. Instead, Moscow behaves as a 19th century power to reinforce its pride and insert fear into its near abroad. It is not a sustainable policy, but a transitional one out of the humiliating 1990s. Despite energy, Russia's economy is only about seven per cent of the US and EU ones combined, and qualitatively less developed.
So a long-term response is best by the EU, taking account of political mistakes on how to manage relations with Russia since 2000. Its leverage is more political and economic than military; but security looms large in both those dimensions.
• pgillespie@irish-times.ie