China and Europe have an important opportunity to forge a new relationship, but it will take more intellectual effort, writes David Gosset.
With the handover of Hong Kong and Macao there are now no important bilateral disputes between China and Europe.
While Beijing and Moscow have still numerous serious political and border problems to solve and still have to build trust; while China and Japan are competing for leadership in Asia and are still psychologically prisoners of the war; while Beijing and Washington can dispute the general geopolitical configuration of the Asia-Pacific and do not exclude military confrontation over Taiwan; while China and India cannot overcome mistrust and issues over their shared border, Beijing and Brussels are free of any current contentious inheritance.
And in the process of globalisation, trade is booming between a more independent and assertive EU and an opening China. Total two-way trade has increased more than fortyfold since reforms began in China in 1978 and was worth €103.4 billion in 2001. In 2002 China became the EU's third-largest trading partner, overtaking Japan. There has been a striking upward trend in the first three months of 2003. Trade has grown by 20 per cent, and EU foreign direct investment (FDI) in China by a staggering 80 per cent.
So is the China-Europe relationship tending towards complementarity and equilibrium? That would be an oversimplication, and there are problems that are potential sources of friction.
Arriving at a common EU China policy has been difficult; every member-state has its own history with Asia and especially China, and some have competing economic interests. Current issues can also be problematic: on human rights, for example, there are different sensitivities among European countries. Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, sensitive to public opinion, put the issue on the top of their agenda. At the other end of the spectrum, the Latin countries seem relatively less concerned.
And different interpretations can be placed on China's Europe policy. China's motives have evolved over time. Europe was first a counterweight to the Soviet Union and then to the US. China insists that there is no longer a "European card"; as Deng Xiaoping said: "I personally love to play bridge, but China does not like to play political cards".
The booming trade can also be a point of friction. Even if in a globalised economy, bilateral deficits are no longer as significant, and the Europeans will continue to complain about their fast-growing, sizeable trade deficit with China. The Chinese for their part will complain about EU trade barriers.
Moreover, the highly complex Taiwan issue can be a problem for Europe's strategic approach to China. There is a disproportion between Beijing's concern (reunification being understandably its top priority, second only to modernisation), and EU members' lack of a harmonised policy on such a crucial issue.
With these problems in mind it is easier to formulate suggestions to facilitate and deepen the relationship.
China should be a place for Europe to act cohesively rather than as the sum of individual nation-states. While European nation-states had specific historic relations with China, these relations have left a less bitter taste than with other parts of the world. It should be easier to create a more cohesive European presence in China than in the Middle East or in north Africa.
Second, China needs to have more presence and visibility in Europe. China has to explain its views, its specific difficulties and its achievements to the Europeans. To deepen the relationship we need information, not propaganda.
It is important for China to communicate better its own world view. European countries have bodies like the Goethe-Institut, the British Council or the Alliance Française. China could think of a similar tool to introduce its language, culture and world vision to Europe.
Third, to guarantee a sustainable economic relationship where frictions can be overcome by negotiation, both sides have to create the conditions for genuine mutual understanding. Forums, exchanges between academics, joint projects in education all would help.
Fourth, Europe should work towards a comprehensive China policy which would incorporate the encouragement of co-operation between China and Taiwan.
More than ever in the post-September 11th world, we need more than a stable Euro-China relationship. China and Europe are cradles of two magnificent civilisations stretching back almost to the beginning of recorded time. They have both entered a new phase of their respective history, with China now in the post-Maoist phase and the countries of Europe developing a closer Union. The two extremes of the Eurasian continent have a unique opportunity to find enough wisdom in their traditions to build a meaningful relationship.
An analogy can help. We can think of China as the far east's Europe, and Europe, the far west's China. If Europe gave western civilisation most of its main features, China brought to Asia some of its central values. But like China's history - the incipit of the Chinese novel Three Kingdoms warns: "After division, the Empire must unite, after unification, the Empire must divide" - Europe's history since the Roman Empire is also the alternance between unification and division and, in this perspective, both Europe and China are more than nation-states.
But that does not mean they are the same. We should see the differences as elements which can bring us closer. Why does Europe need to build a politico-administrative body to meet its unique common civilisation? Why does China need to give more space for the expression of its internal diversity?
How it was possible for Europe to guarantee individual freedom within a distinctive common set of values. How it was possible for China to ensure a continuous reinterpretation of its own tradition. The list can not be exhaustive here but it offers a perspective on how differences can be a source of synergy.
This work will lead us not only to construct a relationship for ourselves but also to build a meaningful relationship within a concrete multipolar world. There is something superior to the alternative between divergence and convergence. Not to diverge does not mean necessarily to converge.
Westerners have tried for centuries to change China, and it will take some more intellectual effort to show that real harmony is the art of combining differences. But China also has to make the effort to avoid indulging in one of its strong tendencies, that is the Sinisation of the barbarians, the non-Chinese.
As Confucius put it in his Analects: "The gentleman is looking for harmony without assimilation, the others are looking for assimilation without harmony".
David Gosset is director of Academia Sinica Europæa.
gdavid@ceibs.edu