A simplistic portrayal of a US-European divide is a complicating factor in establishing the correct approach to Iraq, writes Andy Storey.
Gerard Baker (October 3rd) thinks Europeans are too critical of US foreign policy. The reality is that they are not critical enough. On the face of it, there might appear to be substantial differences between American and European world views, as has recently been argued by Garret FitzGerald (September 23th).
Harvard professor Andrew Moravcsik, writing in the journal Foreign Affairs, claims that there is "a deep European commitment to multilateral institutions and civilian power".
Moravcsik argues that Europeans "prefer to deal with problems through economic integration, foreign aid and multilateral institutions" - the instruments of so-called "soft" power - whereas the US prefers to rely on "hard" (military) power. But there are a number of factors that complicate any simple hard-American-versus-soft-European dichotomy.
First is the willingness of the European states to endorse rather than oppose the exercise of US military power. The EU unanimously endorsed the 1999 Kosovo-related bombing campaign by NATO and the 2001 US assault on Afghanistan. Some European states have proved willing to directly lend "hard" support to US operations. Britain is obviously to the fore here, but, for example, Germany has 2,500 soldiers in Afghanistan, and their deployment in the north of that country releases US troops for an intensification of offensives in the south (and for service in Iraq).
Even in relation to the war on Iraq, the split between Europe and the US amounted to rather less than it seemed, as Prof Moravcsik has chronicled: "Even in the recent crisis, the vigorous rhetoric of some European governments was balanced by more tempered action . . . is misleading to portray France and Germany as having attempted to balance American power.
"Neither state took material action against Washington, nor even proposed multilateral condemnation of the US position . . . (Indeed, Germany and other countries informally aided the war effort)."
Another complicating factor in any simplistic portrayal of a US-European divide concerns the way in which Europe's (primarily) "soft" power acts, in practice, as a complement to US "hard" power. A very topical illustration of this is the current debate about the roles of the US and the UN in Iraq.
George Monbiot, writing in the Guardian, has argued that a wider UN role in Iraq could have negative consequences for other parts of the world, and possibly even for Iraq itself, because a force under a UN flag might be no more acceptable or effective than the Americans and British.
An increased role for the UN would allow Bush to pull US troops out and deploy them elsewhere.
And if the UN, financed at least partly by the EU, agrees to clean up the current mess, then Bush may well be encouraged to attack some other country (Iran may be next in line) in the expectation that he can later hand over responsibility for whatever havoc he wreaks. Versions of this handover model ("hard" power succeeded by "soft" power) have already been practised in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
Initially, it suited the US to be in complete charge of Iraq for several reasons, including control of oil, and the disbursement of reconstruction contracts to politically connected US companies. But that calculus is changing (US casualties and costs are the key factors determining this), and the option of an EU-backed UN escape route is obviously becoming attractive to the US.
Under its drafts of a Security Council resolution, the US is proposing that a UN-mandated multinational force operate in Iraq, but under US command and with the US still playing the dominant role in the civilian administration of Iraq.
France, Germany and Russia are leading calls for the UN resolution to go further towards a dilution of US military and political control, but differences might yet be overcome and the Europeans may ultimately pitch in to help out the US.
This begs the question: why should European governments be even considering options to allow Bush off the hook in this way?
While European leaders talk publicly of the need to reassert Iraqi sovereignty, access to oil revenues and reconstruction contracts for French, Russian and other companies will obviously be at the back (or forefront) of some minds. The French Foreign Minister, de Villepin, has already indicated that exclusive US control of reconstruction projects is one issue for discussion regarding the new UN resolution.
More broadly, the willingness of European leaders to even countenance bailing Bush out in Iraq lies in the idea of Europe and the US exercising "soft" and "hard" power in a complementary fashion. In the words of Prof Moravcsik, "Europe needs American military might; America needs European civilian power".
Europeans are seen as complementing US military power through instruments such as reconstruction and development aid and the supply of "post"-conflict peacekeepers. Following the exercise of US "hard" power, European governments can claim a role for themselves by exploitation of their "soft" power predominance. This model of collaborative US-European power projection may be the ultimate aim of many European politicians when they critique aspects of US unilateralism.
Of course, there are tensions in all this. For example, France in particular would like to see Europe doing more to develop its own "hard" power capabilities. But an excessive focus on claimed differences between Europe and the US can be profoundly misleading.
The record shows that European decision-makers have usually been willing to endorse and directly support the exercise of "hard" American power, and that Europe's own "soft" power has largely been deployed to complement, not compete with, US military might.
This is not a model for a just world order. Is a world dominated by a "good cop/bad cop" EU-US alliance likely to promote peace and prosperity for a majority of the world's people? The question has a resonance well beyond Iraq.
Andy Storey lectures in the UCD Centre for Development Studies and is a board member of Action From Ireland