The re-election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has profound implications for European security and the future of transatlantic relations. How worried should we be? Very.
Trump’s previous tenure in the White House was marked by an innate contempt for the very premise of collective security, an intrinsically transactional approach to allies, a profound hostility towards the European Union and a preference for the company of autocrats. His worst impulses, however, were constrained by the so-called “adults in the room” — most of whom opposed his re-election.
Throughout his election campaign, all this was again on full display. According to Trump, Russia could “do whatever the hell they want(ed)” in Europe — especially to those not paying their rightful Nato dues. His framing of Nato’s 2 per cent defence spending target is that of a mob boss’s racketeering scheme — pay for protection or lose protection. His running mate suggested that Nato protection would be withdrawn from EU member states if they threatened the business interests of big US companies such as Elon Musk’s X. Musk is now, of course, a close adviser and cabinet member.
Many seasoned European diplomats extol caution in response. It was an election after all, they tell us
Trump’s economic policy calls for universal import tariffs which will inevitably spark equivalent tariffs from the EU and threatens a much wider trade war. Appointments thus far to Trump’s national security, foreign policy and economic teams suggest nothing if not a doubling down on these ideas and this “America First” strategy.
Many seasoned European diplomats extol caution in response. It was an election after all, they tell us. Things said in the heat of a campaign — especially from a candidate not known for his tempered restraint — can be at least partially discounted. Moreover, the laws of economic and political reality still apply, and US national interests are predicated upon strong alliances. Trump is also highly transactional and loves the “deal” even more than he loves the excitement of shaking things up. In any event, they tell us, we survived Trump 1.0 – why not the same for Trump 2.0?
Apart from the renewed ideological vigour of this second Trump administration – to be found in his Project 2025 manifesto, from which he has distanced himself – we have yet to factor in what lessons Trump himself has taken from his first government. As noted, his personnel choices are eliminating any prospect of checks and balances coming from within his own White House. He has also secured majorities – and Maga [Make America Great Again] majorities at that – in both congressional houses and he has a bespoke supreme court majority. He also has scores to settle. His nemesis Angela Merkel may be gone, but the kinds of European leaders he despises are all there. He also intends to take a scythe through the US military establishment, the senior leadership most attuned to the needs and strengths of America’s military alliances. Trump has also forged close ties with many on Europe’s right-wing populist front – celebrating, for example, Hungary’s Viktor Orban. The bottom line: this isn’t likely to be a rerun of Trump 1.0.
There is no need for Trump to withdraw from Nato to destroy the alliance’s credibility
From a security standpoint, it’s also useful to remind ourselves that Nato’s credibility does not rely on treaty text. Indeed, in drafting the treaty it was a US demand that Nato’s response to any crisis would rely on what each state “deemed necessary” rather than any automatic military response. Thus, there is no need for Trump to withdraw from Nato to destroy the alliance’s credibility. He has only – through his own words and actions – to continue to disparage the US commitment to the alliance to allow Nato’s adversaries to draw their own conclusions and to accelerate the kinds of hybrid attacks we are already witnessing.
The European strategy in responding to all of this is to trust in Europe’s capacity to “manage” Donald Trump. This will be accomplished, we are told, by explaining how much Europe is contributing to Ukraine’s defence, by pointing to the number of Nato members already meeting or far exceeding the 2 per cent threshold, by underlining Europe’s potential role in leveraging China on issues of importance to Washington, and by serving up political “wins” to Trump that he can showcase as evidence of his deal-making genius. This is the opening European strategy – but is it also European wishful thinking? Is it perhaps the diplomatic equivalent of whistling past the graveyard of the transatlantic partnership?
If this second Trump administration makes good on what has been said and on what is said to be planned, the transatlantic relationship will enter a period of profound crisis and potential collapse. Options are limited. It is possible that the European Union will respond with the kind of collective power it evidenced in the euro and Covid crises. EU defence bonds may put hundreds of millions into national defence budgets and the bones of an EU common defence may come into being. Europe may fill much of the gap in helping Ukraine defend itself. Europe may even stand toe to toe with the US in the upcoming tariff battle, withstanding threats of blackmail. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and especially Poland may also rise to the occasion, creating a bold coalition of the willing, capable as a Euro-Nato or EU+European Political Community to forge the necessary will and deploy the resources required to thwart Russian imperialism and proxy Chinese adventurism via North Korea.
The lamps have most certainly not gone out over Europe, but there are now threatening winds blowing from the West and Ireland will inevitably be caught in some severe storm-force crosswinds
Alternatively, European capitals will beat separate paths to Washington to supplicate at the court of Trump, and to secure whatever bilateral assurances and guarantees may be available. Trump may craft his own illiberal coalition in partnership with Orban, Le Pen, Fico and others, thereby collapsing the European Union’s foreign policy and drawing into question its own political foundations. Russia will keenly exploit Europe’s weaknesses, possibly even creating its longed-for buffer zone of client or neutered states across its western borders.
The lamps have most certainly not gone out over Europe, but there are now threatening winds blowing from the West and Ireland will inevitably be caught in some severe storm-force crosswinds.
Ben Tonra MRIA is full Professor of International Relations at UCD. A version of this article was published with the UK in a Changing Europe project
- Listen to our Inside Politics Podcast for the latest analysis and chat
- Sign up for push alerts and have the best news, analysis and comment delivered directly to your phone
- Find The Irish Times on WhatsApp and stay up to date