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Premature and dangerous to call for withdrawal of Irish troops from Lebanon

Asking the Irish to evacuate does not absolve Israeli forces of responsibility for the reckless endangerment of our peacekeepers

In the current situation, the big challenge for Unifil is force protection. Photograph: Carl Court/Getty Images
Ray Murphy
Tue Oct 08 2024 - 06:00

The fighting in Lebanon has focused attention on the role of the United Nations Interim Force (Unifil) and predicament of Irish forces there.

Israel’s last invasion of Lebanon in 2006 ended with the adoption of a much-heralded UN Security Council resolution 1701. This followed the conclusion of a devastating and unsuccessful 34-day invasion that aimed to drive Hizbullah, the Iran-backed militant group, from southern Lebanon. The resolution seemed to point the way toward a lasting peace, by obliging Lebanon to restrain Hizbullah and Israel to respect Lebanon’s sovereign frontiers. The United States and Israel have pushed consistently for a more robust response from Unifil to the perceived threat from armed groups. For their part, Hizbullah failed to abide by resolution 1701 and proved unco-operative and often hostile towards Unifil.

In the current situation, the big challenge for Unifil is force protection. The standoff with Israeli forces located adjacent to an Irish Unifil observation post recalls the early years following Irish deployment in 1978 and the tensions between Ireland and Israel after several serious clashes between Israeli-backed forces and Irish Unifil troops.

Since 2006, Unifil has remained a mission straddling the line somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and more robust peace enforcement

Why did the Israeli forces establish a position beside the Irish forces especially when they already have other posts nearby along the so-called Blue Line that represents the de facto Lebanese-Israeli border? It is a further violation of resolution 1701 and endangers the Irish forces. Using UN posts as human shields has been a tactic frequently adopted by armed groups in the past. Asking the Irish to evacuate does not absolve Israeli forces of responsibility for the reckless endangerment of Irish peacekeepers.

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Since 2006, Unifil has remained a mission straddling the line somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and more robust peace enforcement. This has caused serious rifts among permanent members of the security council. In the past, the US has criticised Unifil and advocated for a more assertive role in confronting armed groups. This criticism is unfair. The peacekeeping force is not there to serve the needs of US foreign policy. Its basic principles include consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

The Murphy report on the deaths of two Irish Unifil soldiers in 1981 highlighted a range of problems at the time. While these have been addressed, the fundamental question of how command over Irish forces is exercised in a crisis has yet to be tested. On paper, the Irish contingent comes under operational control of the UN force commander. The Murphy report recommended that UN headquarters not be allowed to override the Irish commander’s view on what action was appropriate. These are incompatible positions.

While protecting themselves must remain a priority, the Irish and other UN forces cannot ignore humanitarian and protection tasks provided for in their mandate

Unifil adopted a strategy for protection of civilians in 2015 which allows for intervention up to and including the use of deadly force. Under the then Irish force commander Gen Beary, Unifil put an implementation plan in place that attempted to translate this strategy into meaningful action. This was most recently updated in 2024 and Irish troops have contingency plans and conduct regular training to identify collection points and potential safe zones. The requirement for the force commander to approve any action to protect civilians is problematic in this situation. Relations with the local population have deteriorated as Hizbullah’s influence has grown. While protecting themselves must remain a priority, the Irish and other UN forces cannot ignore humanitarian and protection tasks provided for in their mandate under resolution 1701.

Before the Israeli invasion, the big challenge was the lack of progress towards implementing a permanent ceasefire and disarmament of non-state actors. Hizbullah posed a serious threat to governance in Lebanon and its activities in the south contravened security council resolutions.

While a robust UN posture may enhance the ability to control the area of operations in the short term, it will always be required to take account of the need for political processes rather than relying on coercion.

Hizbullah in particular was able to build strength based on the local population’s resentment of Israeli occupation and intervention

The Israeli offensive reflects a failure to learn key lessons from its 1982 invasion. While a heavy military assault in that conflict achieved short-term success for Israel, it also created long-term security, political and humanitarian problems. Hizbullah in particular was able to build strength based on the local population’s resentment of Israeli occupation and intervention.

Although Unifil has always confronted a near-impossible situation and failed to implement its mandate, it would be wrong to ignore its contribution to negotiation, mediation and confidence-building that will be vital again when the current hostilities subside. It is too early and dangerous in the current situation to call for a withdrawal of the Irish contingent. Unifil may still play a crucial role in resolving the current crisis. That may change if Israel decides to establish a security zone that incorporates the Unifil area of operations similar to the post-1982 invasion.

Prof Ray Murphy is at the Irish Centre for Human Rights in the School of Law, University of Galway. He served in Lebanon as part of Unifil in 1981/82 and 1989.