The analysis of the first Irish Times/MRBI poll two weeks ago predicted that the gap between the two sides in the Nice Treaty referendum would narrow. And so it has.
Committed support for the treaty has fallen to well below an absolute majority (from 52 to 45 per cent). Explicit opposition to the treaty has gone up from 21 to 28 per cent and the "don't knows" remain the same at a substantial 27 per cent. Excluding the "don't knows" suggests that opinion has shifted from a ratio of 71:29 to 62:38. The latter was the precise outcome of the Amsterdam referendum.
There are other shifts. For one thing, people's sense that they know what is going on has improved slightly. The proportion of people who feel they have at least some grasp of the issues involved in the Nice Treaty has gone up from 37 to 47 per cent. The problem is that this still leaves half the electorate either "only vaguely aware of the issues" or "not knowing what the treaty is about at all".
A second perceptible change, although small, is particularly notable in that it tilts the balance of opinion towards the Eurosceptic side. In the first Irish Times/MRBI poll of the campaign, 46 per cent of the electorate chose the statement, "Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the EU" as being closest to their own view, while 41 per cent opted for the statement, "Ireland should do all it can to protect its independence from the EU" (13 per cent gave no opinion or said they did not know.)
These figures from the first poll already represented a significant narrowing of the gap between these two camps since the Amsterdam treaty referendum. In the present Irish Times/ MRBI poll, the gap has closed; indeed, if anything, opinion leans marginally toward the protect independence option.
This is the first time a measure of overall attitude to the EU in the Republic has leaned in a negative direction. One must be careful here. This is not an anti-integration stance. Thirty-three per cent of those who hold this view intend to vote in favour of the Nice Treaty. The results are compatible with the well established Eurobarometer finding that Ireland has one of the highest rates of approval of membership of the EU (in excess of 75 per cent).
What the present question captures is a shift in emphasis in people's policy preference. This shift was already in evidence at the beginning of the campaign. It has been developed further in the 10 days leading up to last Tuesday and Wednesday (the days on which this poll was conducted). There is no evidence to indicate that this trend will continue. If, however, it were to do so, the result could be very tight.
However, the shifts that have occurred have been small and, strikingly, there has been no increase in the likelihood of voting. This, as indicated last week, is some 20 percentage points lower than at a general election and, on a very rough estimate, this would suggest a turnout in the mid- 40s.
The Yes camp appears to have a marginal advantage on the turnout front. Their supporters are somewhat more committed to voting and, if the margin gets tighter between last Tuesday/Wednesday and next Thursday, this could be crucial. In terms of voter mobilisation, the other striking thing is that the proponents of a No vote have not been able to capitalise on the uncertainty and confusion. In contrast to the Amsterdam referendum, there is not much evidence that lack of understanding of the issues is leading people to vote against the treaty.
As the charts on this page show, the current Irish Times/ MRBI poll also brings new evidence into the equation. Thus, a plurality of the electorate (46 per cent) rejects as unacceptable the Nice provisions for the eventual rotation of the right to a commissionership (34 per cent are willing to accept the proposal and 20 per cent don't know.)
Opinion on the commissionership issue is more negative than on another of the institutional changes, - the reweighting of the votes in the Council of Ministers, opinion on the latter being more or less evenly balanced. This contrast presumably reflects the high profile of the commissionership in the Irish context and the public's relative lack of familiarity with the Council of Ministers.
While the particular institutional changes presented in the question may be remote (being dependent on the membership of the Union reaching 27), the evaluation of the proposals do seem to matter here and now. For example, when the "don't knows" are excluded, support for the treaty is touch and go (51 to 49) among the substantial segment of the electorate which finds the Nice proposals on membership of the Commission unacceptable.
The poll also throws some further light on attitudes to the Rapid Reaction Force. In an effort to get at attitudes to the full range of tasks allocated to the Rapid Reaction Force, the question in the present poll referred to humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking and asked whether Ireland should participate in such a force or negotiate an opt-out from participation.
Responses to this question were very similar to the responses to the question in the first poll - 49 per cent in favour of participation, 32 per cent against and 19 per cent don't know (the proportions in the first poll were 50:29:21).
Irish people are divided on the Nice Treaty. On several issues, the division of opinion is much more finely balanced than it has been in the past. What is striking, however, is that, with one exception, these divisions do not seem to bear much relationship to socio-demographic characteristics. The exception is gender. On almost all the attitudes and preferences considered, there is a 10 percentage point gap between men and women, with women being less pro-integration in each case.
The main source of the gap in support for integration is the fact that women are more likely to be undecided or otherwise to fall into the "don't know" category. While a gender gap on these issues is not uncommon in other European countries, the gap in the Irish case is much more evident in the second Irish Times/MRBI poll than in the first and seems, therefore, to have been accentuated by the campaign.
As of the middle of last week, the Irish public was divided approximately three to two in favour of the Nice Treaty. On more general attitudes to integration, opinion is much more finely balanced and this could result in a further closing of the voting intention gap over the last 10 days of the campaign.
Prof Richard Sinnott is Director of the Public Opinion and Political Behaviour Research Programme at the Institute for the Study of Social Change at University College Dublin