Hamid Gul thinks that negotiations offer the only hope of peace in Pakistan and Afghanistan, writes MARY FITZGERALD, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
HAMID GUL is a man whose reputation most certainly precedes him.
In his work with Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) – he was its director for two years in the late 1980s – Gul worked closely with the CIA and their Saudi counterparts in supporting and training thousands of mujahideen sent into battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
His Islamist credentials were, and still are, considered impeccable. Although long since retired, the septuagenarian Gul has remained in the spotlight, frequently courting controversy with pronouncements including his belief that the September 11th attacks were an “inside job”, or prompting speculation that he retains a hand in the murky nexus that exists between jihadi groups and Pakistan’s intelligence services. Most recently, Gul denied allegations that he had provided advice and support to Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Pakistani outfit linked to the Mumbai attacks last year. In an interview last December, Pakistan’s president Asif Ali Zardari, when asked if the US had demanded Gul’s arrest in the wake of the attacks, described the former spy chief as “more of a political ideologue of terror rather than a physical supporter”.
Sitting in the study of his home in the garrison town of Rawalpindi, Gul explains that two forces drive him: Islam and Pakistani nationalism.
“Pakistan is a passion for me that is larger than life,” as he puts it.
Gul, who is widely considered sympathetic to the Taliban on both sides of the border, keeps a close eye on the situation in Pakistan’s northwest, where the growing strength of an emboldened indigenous Taliban prompted an army offensive three months ago. More than two million locals fled their homes as a result, and the military operation to dislodge remaining pockets of militants continues. Gul is critical of the army’s decision to employ air strikes in the area, and warns of its consequences.
“They resorted to unnecessary fire-power, precisely as the Americans have been doing in Afghanistan. That is why they had to ask the people to vacate.
“There was no need to dislocate people because the local population had already turned to the government’s side because of the conduct of the Taliban,” he argues.
Though some 600,000 of the displaced have now returned to their homes, Gul believes that if the government drags its feet on reconstruction and relief efforts, such a scenario will play into the hands of the Taliban.
“Young men, if they get angry, will join the ranks of the adversary. That is my worry. If you do not provide relief quickly enough then their minds will very quickly be converted to the other side and that will be very dangerous.”
Gul says the Pakistani government must engage with the country’s home-grown Taliban to resolve the situation. “You have to talk to them. There’s no other way. If they are our own flesh and blood then why the hell can we not talk to them?” He prescribes the same for Afghanistan. “If another victory comes their way then they [the militants] will be unstoppable. And that victory is coming, I can assure you, unless you talk to them and through negotiation you settle it,” he argues. “Whenever I have come across Americans, I have told them, for God’s sake, before your noses are rubbed on the hard soil of Afghanistan and before you are made to quit Vietnam-style, before that happens, talk to them, settle the matter politically, and go gracefully.
“As a professional soldier I can tell you [the Nato-led forces in Afghanistan] stand defeated tactically, and it is just a matter of them accepting their defeat . . . I predict that in October they will begin talking [to the Taliban], irrespective, and towards the end of next year they will be calling it quits.”
Gul claims that Taliban leader Mullah Omar would be prepared to talk if the right approach is made. This, Gul says, should include invoking the Koran.
“I think they will not be able to run away when you quote the sura [Koranic verse] that says: ‘When the enemy come towards you with peaceful intentions you have to go half way’.”
But what about the conundrum presented by the fact the insurgency in Afghanistan has become far more fluid, containing different factions and groupings? Who do you talk to if you want to talk to the Taliban? “Mullah Omar,” Gul replies. “He is still the unquestioned leader. Symbolically he is the only one.”
Gul advocates a milli shura or national assembly for Afghanistan, and believes the Taliban would be willing to participate. “If the Americans stay long enough there will a Taliban government by force. They will force their way through. But that would not be my preference.
“This time round there has to be a national consensus. The Taliban government in the 1990s was not through consensus, they got in with the sword. They also went out by the sword because it was used against them. That doesn’t work.”
Gul praises the record of that Taliban government, but also criticises it. “They did many good things: they brought peace; they de-weaponised Afghanistan; they finished off poppy cultivation; and they gave a central authority to that unruly nation,” he argues. “But they did bad things too, such as the treatment of women and forcing people to do things. That was all un-Islamic.”
The defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s was considered divinely ordained by those who had flocked to the country under the banner of jihad. It was a victory that was later to give rise to the likes of al-Qaeda, and it continues to inspire a constellation of militants across the world today.
Gul says he has no regrets about harnessing the power of jihadist ideology, despite the fact the consequences are still being felt in the region, and indeed throughout the world.
“I regret not one bit what I did. Religious fervour was the only thing that could have thrown the Russians out. Without that it was impossible. It was only religious zeal that made it possible for the Russians to be defeated in Afghanistan.”
Pakistan series concludes