Events in Cairo have been reminding US diplomats of an earlier popular revolution, writes LARA MARLOWE
AROUND THE time Egyptian protesters were setting fire to President Hosni Mubarak’s party headquarters yesterday, the US State Department marked an earlier Middle East upheaval by celebrating the 30th anniversary of the liberation of 52 US diplomats who were held hostage in Tehran for 444 days at the height of the Iranian revolution.
Yellow ribbons were handed out, like those worn from November 1979 to January 1981 to signify that the United States remembered its hostages.
Nancy Powell, the director general of the state department, recalled black and white photographs of diplomats being led blindfolded from the chancery in Tehran. “The world changed forever. It was the 9/11 of diplomacy,” she said.
For an hour, the auditorium seemed to flip back and forth, between revolutionary Tehran and the alarming images coming from Cairo. Yes, one diplomat said, he’d seen this before.
Ambassador John Limbert, who was a 37-year-old political officer in Tehran at the time, said when the embassy was overrun he initially thought it would be a harmless student sit-in, like anti-war demonstrations on US campuses in the 1970s. Instead, “It turned into this huge international event that brought down an American president.”
In 1979, US diplomats did not imagine that the Vienna convention would be discarded, that some of their number would be beaten, held in solitary confinement, or subjected to mock executions.
“We thought the cavalry would arrive, and that we’d get to leave, maybe not with our Persian carpets . . .” joked Alan Golacinski, who was chief of embassy security.
The US has since transformed its embassies into impregnable fortresses. But why, I asked Mr Limbert, has it been unable or unwilling to stop supporting regimes that rig elections, torture prisoners and deny citizens their basic human rights?
He answered testily: “It may have escaped your attention that countries have multiple interests. Sometimes you need to deal with governments that are not democratic.”
Ambassador Bruce Laingen, who was chargé d’affaires in Tehran in 1979, remembered his futile remonstrations to the Iranian foreign minister.
“I tried to make sure we got all the protection the government was obligated to provide, only to find they were helpless. They couldn’t do it, and by the end of the day they were out of power and we were hostages.
“In Tehran, the mistake we made was trying to support the regime of the Shah while trying to reach out to the opposition,” said Donald Cooke, who was a 25-year-old vice consul in Iran.
“As the demonstrations continued, we were still debating about whether to sell the Shah anti-riot equipment. We caused resentment and distrust on both sides.”
Three decades later, the dilemma is the same: can the US afford to abandon a loyal if despicable ally who may prevail and remain in power? By defending protesters, does it risk precipitating the very chaos it seeks to avoid?
Until yesterday, when the Obama administration struck a more severe note against Mubarak, it seemed seized by the same ambivalence.
If a dictator begins to make concessions, as the Shah did, it can encourage his adversaries. “The lesson that some people draw is that we should have supported the Shah to be tougher,” Mr Limbert said.
“I hear people saying that Egyptian demonstrators are middle class teachers, doctors and lawyers,” Mr Limbert continued.
“That doesn’t immunise a society against extremism . . .If there are lessons out of Tehran, one might be to approach these things very carefully.”
In Tehran, as in Cairo, there were westernised, secular leaders among the opposition.
“But the real power was held by people with a hidden agenda, who were capable of anything – throwing acid in people’s faces, burning down rival parties’ headquarters,” Mr Limbert warned.
“Unfortunately, in a revolution these are the people who come out on top.”