Severe criticism of siege scene commanders

Garda errors: Negligence and defective management by gardaí in command of the Abbeylara siege led to the death in April 2000 of John Carthy, the report of the Barr tribunal has found.

In his 744-page report, tribunal chairman Mr Justice Robert Barr says the officers in command during the 25-hour armed stand-off were guilty of a "high degree of negligence" in their conduct of operations, they failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, and were primarily responsible for Mr Carthy's death.

However he says there was not sufficient evidence to suggest that Garda Aidan McCabe (now sergeant), the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) officer who discharged the fatal shot, had acted unlawfully in killing Mr Carthy.

The failures of those in command, particularly the main scene commander Supt Joseph Shelly, but also the night-time commander Supt Michael Byrne, caused Garda McCabe to shoot Mr Carthy, the report says.

The decisions of their superiors, Chief Supt Patrick Tansey, assistant commissioner Tony Hickey and ERU officers Sgt Gerard Russell, who was the tactical commander, and Sgt Michael Jackson, the negotiator, also contributed to Mr Carthy's death.

The chairman's report finds that the management of the siege was defective and that the gardaí had committed numerous errors. Their most crucial mistake was their failure to anticipate and prepare for Mr Carthy's exit from the house.

Mr Carthy left his house shortly before 6pm on April 20th, 25 hours after he first holed himself up in his house with his shotgun.

This, Mr Justice Barr says, was "plenty of time" to prepare for a possible exit, by clearing the roadway of all personnel and vehicles and emphasising the importance to officers of remaining under cover. This did not happen.

When Mr Carthy emerged and began to walk towards Abbeylara village, there were several armed and unarmed gardaí in front of him on the road. Having the command vehicle on the road near the neighbouring house and allowing gardaí to "clutter" the area amounted to a "high degree of negligence". It was the risk Mr Carthy posed to these officers that caused Sgt McCabe to fatally shoot him.

"The consequent confusion and the negligence of those in command led to the tragedy of his death, which would not have happened if the Abbeylara road had been kept clear of vehicles and all personnel, which ought to have been the case."

Intelligence failures also contributed to Sgt McCabe's actions.

Supt Shelly was aware that Mr Carthy had earlier on the day of his death phoned a friend, Kevin Ireland, and had asked him to get a solicitor. He also told him that he had no intention of shooting gardaí. Mr Ireland was not subsequently interviewed by gardaí and the information he gave was not passed on by Supt Shelly to any of the armed officers at the scene including Sgt Russell, Sgt Jackson and Sgt McCabe.

Had Sgt McCabe had this intelligence, he may have been less likely to consider Mr Carthy a threat to life.

A further failure of intelligence on behalf of Supt Shelly was in not personally interviewing or instructing a senior officer to interview Mr Carthy's GP, Dr Patrick Cullen.

Mr Carthy suffered from manic depression, a serious mental illness, and, Mr Justice Barr says, it ought to have been apparent that urgent medical advice was essential.

Dr Cullen also passed on information relating to Mr Carthy's antagonism towards gardaí arising out of his wrongful arrest for burning a goat mascot in 1998. Supt Shelly did not make Supt Jackson aware of this. Depriving the negotiator of this information was an "extraordinary decision", as had Sgt Jackson could have changed his failing negotiation strategy.

If Dr Cullen had been properly interviewed, the existence of a psychiatrist treating Mr Carthy, Dr David Shanley, would have come to light and Dr Shanley could probably have been brought to the scene before midnight, rather than the following day, shortly before Mr Carthy's death.

The failure to bring a solicitor to the scene was "patently negligent", the chairman says. It was surprising that so little was done to respond to Mr Carthy's request for a solicitor, which he made both through his friend Mr Ireland and directly to the negotiator.

Mr Carthy feared that he would be put in prison if he surrendered to gardaí; a solicitor could have secured reassurance from the DPP that any matters arising from the siege would be deferred to allow Mr Carthy to enter into the care of Dr Shanley.

It was likely that Mr Carthy began the stand-off because he was defending his family home, due to be demolished by the local authority which was in the process of building a new house for the family. A solicitor could have secured an assurance from the county manager that the house would not be demolished pending further discussions with Mr Carthy.

A solicitor offered a "real possibility for ending the impasse without humiliating the subject by having to surrender to the police", Mr Justice Barr says.

"It is evident that the scene commander, the negotiator and other senior officers all failed to recognise the importance of responding to Mr Carthy's efforts to obtain the benefit of a solicitor."

The chairman says he does not criticise the decision to recruit the ERU to the scene, because they had experience in dealing with armed sieges, whereas the scene commander did not.

However Sgt Russell had not given enough tactical advice, most likely because he had been put in a "very difficult, if not untenable" position of having more experience than his seniors.

In light of this and of the failures of the Garda command, the ERU should have been put in full control of the scene.

"I am satisfied that responsibility for his death rests primarily with the scene commanders and to a lesser extent with the ERU tactical commander," Mr Justice Barr says. However the entire Garda management "fell far short of what was required to contend with the situation successfully and to minimise the risk to life".