Festival of Science: The world is on the verge of a new arms race, one involving biological weapons. There is also a growing risk that terrorist groups might attempt to launch a bioterror attack, writes Dick Ahlstrom, Science Editor, in Salford
A downbeat assessment of the world's ability to counter the threat of biological weapons was heard yesterday at the British Association's annual Festival of Science, under way this week at the University of Salford.
Intelligence services were unable to quantify the risk, the world lacked a transparent, independent verification system, and the technology needed to produce bioweapons was cheap and easily accessible.
These factors together represented a considerable risk, according to Dr Mark Wheelis, a microbiologist at the University of California, Davis.
Many countries coveted these weapons, something that could escalate research and cause bioweapon proliferation.
"We are on the cusp of a potential bioweapons race," he said yesterday.
Dr Wheelis also believes that there is a very real possibility terrorists would use this technology. "With every year that passes, I think the dangers of a bioterror attack increases."
The world's intelligence agencies had demonstrated their inability to detect countries that became involved in bioweapon production, he said. There was evidence of a "serious failure of intelligence" to quantify bioweapons research.
The former USSR had a very significant programme but nothing was known of it. "Intelligence is notoriously inadequate to assess the risk of biological weapons. Intelligence by itself is pointless. The question is what you do with it," he said.
Again, the world community was at a disadvantage. While international treaties had outlawed biological weapons in 1928 and possessing them became illegal in 1975, there was no way to enforce these controls.
"We have the treaties that outlaw this but we lack the mechanism to inspect these facilities. In the long term, if the world community wants to control bioweapons, it will require transparency and a verification body."
It was known that Iraq had a bioweapons research programme and this may have progressed to the point that it had useable weapons, he said. Yet no bioweapons had been discovered since the invasion of Iraq. It was probable that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction but had retained the expertise to make use of this technology.
The UN weapons inspectors operating in Iraq before the war were targeting sites on the basis of US intelligence but nothing was discovered, Dr Wheelis said. If the presumed Iraqi bioweapons threat was so pressing that an immediate invasion was necessary rather than waiting several weeks for UN sanction, "then the evidence for this would want to be conclusive", he added.
It was "virtually impossible to say" how likely it was that a bioterror attack might be launched.
"A bioterror attack could come at any time but it would be a small attack," he said. Terror groups lacked the technology to launch large-scale attacks but small attacks involving a limited number of deaths were possible.
It was difficult to predict what might happen in the event of a bioterror attack, according to Pro Alastair Hay of the University of Leeds, who also spoke on the bioweapon threat. "There are a range of different scenarios and it isn't clear how these things will map out," he said.
"It is very unclear what would happen with a biological attack. We may have no warning. The most likely thing is we would begin to see people becoming sick." This made the ability to detect unusual patterns of illness an important first step in any response to bioterror, he added.