The High Court yesterday ruled that the trial of a priest facing 66 charges of sexual offences against eight boys is to proceed in relation to all but one of the boys.
Mr Justice Geoghegan issued an injunction preventing the Director of Public Prosecutions from bringing the priest to trial on 28 charges relating to one boy. Those charges related to alleged offences of indecent assault and gross indecency. The trial could proceed in relation to the other seven boys.
In a judgment delivered yesterday, Mr Justice Geoghegan said the 28 offences were allegedly committed on dates between 1981 and 1984 and were first reported to the gardai in March 1995. The other charges related to seven boys and dated from 1981 to 1987. Most were reported in 1995.
The judge said the priest had sought to prevent the trial proceeding on three grounds. He contended there could not be a fair trial because of the length of time between the alleged commission of the offences and the commencement of the prosecution, and because of excessive adverse pre-trial publicity. He had also argued that the preferment of 66 charges was an abuse of the court's jurisdiction and was oppressive and unjust in that it rendered impossible the preparation of a proper defence.
The Supreme Court had outlined a list of general principles to be applied to the question of whether delay should prevent a prosecution. It had stated the court should look at the circumstances of each case, the issues involved and the constitutional interests of the parties.
Mr Justice Geoghegan said it was a well-established principle that sexual offences involving young children could fall into a special category. Factors relevant in such cases included relationships and dominion.
The judge said he did not take the view that, in all cases where a person was charged with sexual abuse of a child some years previously, any claimed prejudice on account of delay could be negated by a claim that the accused exercised dominion over the child. Only in the rarest of circumstances should a court allow a prosecution for sexual offences against children which had occurred a long time ago proceed in the absence of the element of dominion and its psychological continuance, he said.
Applying those principles to the present case, the judge said he was satisfied the priest had not established, in relation to the alleged offences involving seven boys, that there was delay or excessive delay causing him prejudice. But, Mr Justice Geoghegan said, he took "a wholly different view" in relation to the alleged offences relating to one boy. In 1986, when the boy was approximately 16, the priest had been replaced by another priest. The judge said the boy had told a psychologist that he had, over a period of time, confided in the new priest and disclosed what had happened between himself and the accused.
The judge said it was difficult to see why that boy should be perceived as being under such continuing dominance of the accused that the accused must be taken as being responsible for the ultimate delay in reporting the alleged offences.
In those circumstances he found the time lag between the alleged offences and the prosecution was excessive, the judge said. In the absence of some cause for that delay being attributable to the accused, the accused should not, as a matter of fair procedures, face a trial so long after the events.
On the other submissions made on behalf of the priest, the judge said there was no doubt about adverse publicity in the case but he did not believe it had prejudiced the priest's right to a fair trial.
