Air bombardment is solidifying Serbian intransigence and raising doubts in Western parliaments and public opinion. It is also heavily damaging Serbian air defences, at the cost of one plane so far.
Some weeks ago this writer described the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept. This arises from the development of cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, hi-tech navigation systems and high-speed information technology. The missiles, in particular, can be used without their launching "platforms" (ships, aircraft or submarines) crossing enemy frontiers or endangering their crews.
It is claimed, with justification, that they are very accurate. This eases the new problem for the generals and politicians in "high income, low birth-rate" societies - public reluctance to accept casualties.
The RMA promises short, devastating wars and low casualties with few ground troops. This concept has gained more acceptance among the academics than among the military. We are now seeing why accuracy is not consistent. As the Iraq bombing has shown, "locking on" to targets by guided bombs can fail if the targets are obscured by smoke or flames, as happened with the third wave of an attack near Pristina last Thursday.
All this said, accuracy and reliability are improving as pilot experience and equipment performance improve. There seem to be genuine efforts to limit "collateral damage". After the lock failure the attack was aborted, but the first bombs continued falling on to waste ground, we are told.
Like the dog that did not bark, the Yugoslav air defences did not initially react. Many radars were switched off, probably to avoid triggering a missile attack down their radar beams. Some US planes have equipment for this. The Yugoslav system was "hyped up" to the NATO public and pilots, perhaps to prepare people for the worst. On the face of it, the air defences are outdated and the pilots must know this.
Modern air-defence systems need fighter planes and their ground control communications radars to locate enemy aircraft or missiles and control anti-aircraft guns. Multiple communication links missiles and anti-aircraft guns. These components should be electronically integrated, but capable of independent action. The costs are very high.
The teeth of the Yugoslav Air Defence system are 64 MiG-21 (various marques) and 15 MiG-29 fighter planes. The MiG-29 was a hi-tech sensation when it appeared in the 1980s. Many Warsaw Pact countries bought them from Russia. They were said to outclass their Western equivalents in speed and agility. When the Berlin Wall fell, MiG-29s in some Warsaw Pact countries became available to the West.
Much has been made of the MiG's threat to NATO aircraft. We were not told that NATO pilots have been flying them in mock air combat against NATO aircraft for the past eight to nine years, so comparative strengths and weaknesses are known in the West.
The Yugoslav pilots have no such experience. It is claimed that five MiG-29s have been shot down by NATO so far. NATO has about 250 combat aircraft and 150 support planes against Yugoslavia's 79 first-class fighters and about 170 support planes. We were told that the Serb anti-aircraft missile systems had been updated and are now a serious threat to NATO aircraft. But the same experts said this about Iraq, last December. The US/British airforces did not lose a plane in the intense pre-Christmas bombardment or in the thrice-weekly attrition raids since. At time of writing one NATO plane has been lost.
The radars and communications may have been improved, but look at the missile list: Russian SAM2s, SAM-3s, SAM-6s, SAM-7s. The SAM-2 brought down Gary Powers, the spy-plane pilot, over Russia in the 1960s. The SAM-7 (a shoulder-fired infantryman's missile) first appeared in Vietnam. The Russians have long since replaced them. Electronic countermeasures to the SAM-3 and SAM6 were produced during or since the October 1973 war. Like the fact that MiG-29s are in NATO hands, these points were not mentioned in much pre-war analysis.
The missiles have been modified, of course. The Russians tend to retain the same titles on updated weapons. Those given above are NATO designations. But 30-year-old missiles, no matter how modified, are hardly able for the new American planes and sophisticated electronic countermeasures.
As for the anti-aircraft artillery and machineguns, the air force controls 15 air-defence artillery regiments including many of the rapid-firing heavy AA machineguns, so deadly in the 1973 war. The Yugoslav army has its own air-defence artillery also. This may make NATO's new low-level attacks difficult.
Finally, Yugoslavia has good universities. Yugoslav engineers greatly improved Russian landmines and artillery. We should not discount Yugoslav ability to modify missiles and radars. But NATO has had time to locate the factories of the extensive armaments industry and much depends on the damage done by the current attacks.