One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958-1964 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali (Pimlico, £12.50 in UK)

The world seemed to be lurching into war in 1961, and it very nearly did so. Fidel Castro's appeal to the Soviet Union for nuclear missiles was largely dictated by fear of an American attack - not unreasonable, considering the Bay of Pigs fiasco which had American backing and collusion. However, it was plain that the US was not going to stand for a nuclear battery within range of its coasts, so Khrushchev was given an ultimatum when Russian transport ships were already on their way with the missiles. He backed down at the twelfth hour, with fatal results for his prestige at home, while Kennedy's correspondingly rose. The revelations of this book mainly concern the busy backstairs diplomacy, including Kennedy's many undercover meetings with his Soviet contact, Georgi Bolsakov.