The negotiations between NATO and Yugoslavia over the military implementation of the Kosovo accord remain frozen. But the chances are that talks between the military on both sides will resume soon. Milosevic is playing his usual short-term tactical games, yet the Yugoslav leader is unlikely to simply renege on the entire deal.
Belgrade caved in last week because it realised that NATO's political consensus was holding up and the alliance was preparing for a ground offensive. With Western troops now converging on the Balkans from all directions in ever greater numbers, Milosevic cannot possibly hope to abandon the deal which he has signed and his parliament ratified. The Yugoslav leader is not a man of honour and he has frequently broken his word.
Yet he is no fool, and he knows that, to all intents and purposes, his control over Kosovo is gone. The current shenanigans are much more concerned with safeguarding Milosevic's position at home by portraying the Yugoslav dictator as a warrior who cannot be defeated, as well as creating obstacles for NATO in the hope of exploiting Western divisions in the months to come.
Contrary to Yugoslav assertions, NATO did not try to gloat over the Yugoslavs' defeat. The international media were not allowed to witness the negotiations between the British Lieut. Gen. Sir Mike Jackson and his Yugoslav counterparts precisely for this reason.
NATO also answered some of Belgrade's genuine concerns, by promising that withdrawing Yugoslav troops will not be targeted from the air, provided they stick to prearranged travel corridors. However, it is true that NATO has added a set of onerous demands on the Yugoslav military which were not originally envisaged in the agreement.
One such demand concerns a 25km "disengagement zone" from the border between Kosovo and Serbia, in which no Yugoslav troops should be positioned. Another demand which NATO made was for the clearance of mines throughout the province, and for the withdrawal of young Serb males from Kosovo.
All these conditions are curious. The disengagement zone which NATO wants is immaterial, if only because Yugoslavia's forces will be in no position to mount a surprise offensive against the alliance. Clearing the mines which Yugoslavia planted in Kosovo makes no sense, either.
Even if the Serb military were to comply, NATO would be foolish to trust such efforts; Western engineers will therefore still have to clear minefields. Finally, the request to withdraw able-bodied Serb males from the province is tantamount to a new ethnic cleansing, in reverse. The best that can be said about these demands is that they are the result of deep suspicions in the West about Milosevic's real intentions.
Milosevic wants to reinstate the principles of a previous deal negotiated last October, according to which the Yugoslav authorities had the right to station around 10,000 troops in the province. Milosevic has demanded a lull between the period of his troops' withdrawal and NATO's entry into Kosovo. The Yugoslav leader was sure that the West would reject such demands. But, in still putting them forward, Belgrade has revealed a much more complicated long-term strategy.
It is now clear that Milosevic's main concern is the UN Security Council resolution which will form the basis of NATO's mandate in the province. He hopes this resolution will include a reassertion of Yugoslavia's legal ownership over Kosovo, and an obligation to disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Albanians' guerrilla movement. Milosevic knows that the West will not be able to deliver on both counts, but he hopes that, once this failure becomes obvious, rifts will open up between NATO and Russia.
In short, Milosevic is already positioning himself for the period after the peace deal is implemented, rather than being concerned with the finer details of his troops' immediate withdrawal.
As always, the Yugoslav leader is a good short-term tactician and a disastrous long-term strategist. The immediate effect of his games is another bout of air strikes. NATO may experience a few more difficulties, and the mood of co-operation between Russia and the West may be soured, as it was at the meeting of foreign ministers in Germany yesterday. Yet the basic deal is likely to remain unchanged, and Milosevic will remain its chief loser.
Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London