Selected extracts.
The robbery at the Northern Bank on December 20th
The robbery took place at the headquarters of the Northern Bank in Donegall Square in central Belfast. It was a complex crime that was clearly the result of long and careful planning. Two employees of the Northern Bank and their families were abducted on Sunday 19 December by individuals threatening violence with firearms, one at Poleglass on the outskirts of Belfast, and the other at Loughinisland, County Down, some 20 miles away.
Under the threat that serious harm would be done to their families, these employees were coerced into delivering the money to the robbers during the course of the following day.
They and their families were released after the robbery. A number of people were involved in the abductions of the victims, in the actual robbery in central Belfast and in the removal and disposal of the cash.
We have carefully scrutinised all the material of different kinds that has become available to us since the robbery, which leads us to conclude firmly that it was planned and undertaken by the PIRA.
Context: other incidents
In our third report, published by the two governments on 4 November 2004, we commented on a number of major robberies which had taken place in Northern Ireland in the preceding months. We said that we believed PIRA was responsible for the major theft of goods at Dunmurry in May.
We also concluded that members of republican paramilitary groups had been involved in recent large scale robbery and violent theft, though we said that we could not yet make firmer attributions.
Since completing work on that report we have been able to consider in depth the significant further material which has become available about some of these incidents. We conclude on the basis of the information available to us that PIRA was responsible for:
- The theft of goods at Makro in Dunmurry on 23 May (the incident to which we refer above);
- The abduction of people and the robbery of goods from the Strabane branch of Iceland on 26 September;
- The abduction of people and the robbery of cigarettes with a market value of approximately £2 million from a bonded delivery vehicle in Belfast on 2 October.
It follows from this that the robbery at the Northern Bank, though by far the most serious incident, was one of a series of crimes that have enabled PIRA to gain very significant resources in recent months. Violence, or the threat of violence, has been a feature of all these incidents.
Leadership of PIRA
We believe that the Northern Bank robbery and abductions and the other robberies and abductions referred to above were carried out with the prior knowledge and authorisation of the leadership of PIRA.
Implications for Sinn Féin
Parties to the Good Friday Agreement affirmed their total and absolute commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means of resolving differences on political issues and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose. The agreement also requires that as a condition of appointment to the Executive, Ministers must affirm the terms of a pledge of office. That pledge includes a commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means. The Northern Ireland Act 1998, as subsequently amended, provides for the application of a number of measures to a Minister or a party in the Assembly for non-fulfilment of that commitment. Specified measures are: exclusion of a Minister, Junior Minister or members of a political party from holding office; non-payment of the whole or part of their salary; non-payment of the whole or part of the financial assistance for a political party; and censure resolutions. Article 7 of the agreement establishing the IMC states that, when reporting under Article 4 (as we are doing here), the IMC shall recommend any remedial action considered necessary and may also recommend what measures, if any, it considers might appropriately be taken by the Northern Ireland Assembly, such measures being limited to those the Assembly has power to take under relevant United Kingdom law.
In our first report, published by the two governments in April 2004, we said that it was difficult to be precise about the relationship between Sinn Féin and the PIRA, or about the PIRA's decision-making processes, but we summarised what we believed to be the situation in these words:
" - Some members, including some senior members, of Sinn Féin are also members, including, in some cases, senior members of PIRA.
- Sinn Féin, particularly through its senior members, is in a position to exercise considerable influence on PIRA's major policy decisions, even if it is not in a position actually to determine what policies or operational strategies the PIRA will adopt. We believe that decisions of the republican movement as a whole about these matters lie more with the leadership of PIRA than with Sinn Féin.
- Within the PIRA some decisions follow a process of consultation with the membership initiated by the leadership".
We went on to conclude that Sinn Féin had to bear its responsibility for the continuation by PIRA of illegal paramilitary activity and had to recognise the implications of being in this position. We draw the same conclusion about the responsibility of Sinn Féin in relation to the recent series of abductions and robberies.
In our view, Sinn Féin must bear its share of responsibility for all the incidents. Some of its senior members, who are also senior members of PIRA, were involved in sanctioning the series of robberies. Sinn Féin cannot be regarded as committed to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means so long as its links to PIRA remain as they are and PIRA continues to be engaged in violence or other crime.
Although we note Sinn Féin has said it is opposed to criminality of any kind, it appears at times to have its own definition of what constitutes a crime.
We do not believe the party has sufficiently discharged its responsibility to exert all possible influence to prevent illegal activities on the part of PIRA.
Furthermore, citizens - even more so public representatives - have a responsibility to prevent crime by reporting an impending incident to government or to other authorities, or to take other appropriate steps.
Recommendations
One lesson we draw from recent events is that to enable us in future to make full and rounded assessments of paramilitary activity and criminality as a whole and to draw dependable conclusions, we need an adequate period of time.
The six-monthly period set for us in the International Agreement over which we monitor all the illegal activities of all paramilitary groups seems to us well suited to this task.
We had hoped that, as the peace process developed, we would be monitoring a situation of declining criminal activity, and, as we have indicated in previous reports, in many respects this has been the case.
However in some respects, as this series of robberies shows, the situation is very disturbing.
In our first report we said that, in exercise of our powers to make recommendations under Article 7, had the Assembly been sitting we would have recommended measures to be taken by the Assembly up to, and including, exclusion from office in respect of both Sinn Féin and the Progressive Unionist Party, and that any recommendations we might make following restoration of the Assembly would be proportionate to the then prevailing circumstances.
We went on to suggest that, in the absence of the Assembly, the Secretary of State should consider taking action in respect of the salary of Assembly members and/or the funding of Assembly parties so as to impose an appropriate financial measure on both these parties.
The Secretary of State imposed a 12-month financial penalty on both parties.
The provisions available to us to make recommendations for measures to be taken by the Northern Ireland Assembly in respect of parties, Members or Ministers are determined by the International Agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 as amended.
It remains the case that we can say only what we would have recommended had the Assembly been sitting, or can again invite the Secretary of State to consider exercising his powers. This does not however prevent us from making our position clear.
If the Northern Ireland Assembly was now sitting, we would be recommending the implementation of the full range of measures listed in paragraph 12, including exclusion from office.
We say this recognising that this would have implications for the running of the Executive and the Assembly.
We are very aware that the imposition of financial penalties is bound to seem paltry against the background of a robbery of £26.5m.
It has also been put to us that if financial penalties are imposed, Sinn Féin will try to benefit from that by portraying themselves as victims.
Be that as it may, in the light of the provisions of the legislation, we have decided to recommend that the Secretary of State should consider exercising the powers he has in the absence of the Assembly to implement the measures which are presently applicable, namely the financial ones.
It has also been suggested that Sinn Féin should not continue to receive public money from other sources if they are denied it in the context of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
However, this is outside the measures available to us to recommend.
The series of robberies culminating in the Northern Bank crime emphasises again the importance of tracing and seizing the financial proceeds of paramilitary crime committed by PIRA and all the other groups.
We have been directing our attention to this issue and how it may be addressed, and hope to make more extensive comments in a future report.
The leadership and rank-and-file of Sinn Féin need to make the choice between continued association with, and support for, PIRA criminality and the path of an exclusively democratic political party.
The real issue is not the expression of condemnation through the imposition of particular penalties.
It is that the ending of all illegal activity by PIRA, and indeed by all paramilitary groups, is fully and permanently addressed.
Only in that way can trust be restored and the objective set us in Article 35 - which we believe all law abiding people share - thereby advanced.
Until this happens, it is hard to see how further useful progress can be made.