British intelligence in the days ahead of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq signalled that Saddam Hussein's forces did not have the capability to deploy chemical weapons, senior officials said today.
The Iraq Inquiry heard an official dossier to justify war that said Saddam could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was understood by British security circles to refer to battlefield chemical weapons and not ballistic missiles.
There had been scant new intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme since UN inspectors left the country in 1998, although it was assumed Saddam would step up efforts to obtain such weapons, the officials said.
Tim Dowse, head of Counter Proliferation at the Foreign Office in 2001, and William Ehrman, who was Director International Security, said they believed Iraq's nuclear weapons ambitions had been contained by sanctions.
The second day of the inquiry heard officials had been more concerned about Iraq's bid to acquire more chemical and biological weapons (CBW), although evidence suggested its arsenal had been destroyed in the 1990s.
"We did in the very final days before military action receive some (intelligence) on CBW use that it was disassembled, that he might not have the munitions to deliver it," Mr Ehrman told the inquiry.
He said other evidence, including that from UN weapons inspectors who had been in Iraq before the 2003 war, had previously backed up fears Iraqi forces had chemical and biological weapons.
The officials were also asked specifically about the government statement that Saddam could deploy WMDs within 45 minutes. It was widely believed to mean Iraq could strike against neighbouring countries, but no such weapons were found.
Mr Dowse said when he saw the report he assumed this referred to battlefield weapons, and not missiles that could be fired at other states. "I don't think we ever said that it was for use for a ballistic missile in that way," he said.
"Speaking personally, when I saw the 45 minutes report, I did not give it particular significance because it didn't seem out of line with what we generally assessed to be Iraq's intentions and capabilities with regard to chemical weapons.
"It subsequently took on a rather iconic status that I don't think those of us who saw the initial report really gave it. It wasn't surprising."
The officials also said while Saddam supported Palestinian militant groups, there was little evidence of contact between al-Qaeda and Saddam's government over the spread of WMDs.
"We never found any evidence that chemical or biological material had been passed by the Iraqi regime to terrorists," Mr Ehrman said.
Mr Dowse said Saddam and al Qaeda were not allies. "In fact, after 9/11 we concluded that the Iraqis had actually stepped further back. They didn't want to be associated with al-Qaeda."
Reuters