ON several measures of attitudes to European integration, we know the Irish are among the most supportive. The Irish Times/MRBI survey sought to measure not just overall support but enthusiasm for the European Union and found that a majority (56 per cent) would be "very sorry if the EU were scrapped" (see figure 1).
The question is should we regard the glass as half-full or half-empty? Integrationists may worry and say: "What? Only a bare majority wholeheartedly support Europe?" And they would have a point. If Ireland is to adapt to change on the scale required as it becomes a net donor to the EU budget and as it is asked to play a real part in a common foreign and security policy, a positive attitude to European integration will need to be deep-rooted and widespread.
On the other hand, if we compare Irish support for the EU as measured in this way with support in the other member-states the situation looks relatively rosy for integrationists: only Luxembourg and Italy are more enthusiastic. The comparable figure for the EU as a whole in spring 1995 was 40 per cent "very sorry if the EU were scrapped" (see bar chart).
It was only at or barely above this average in the powerhouses of integration - France, Germany and the Netherlands. It dipped as low as one-third in Spain, Portugal, Finland and Austria and, right at the heart of Europe, in Belgium and it was a mere 18 per cent among the new Euro-sceptics - the Swedes. On these comparisons, the Irish glass is certainly half-full.
It was not always so. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, enthusiasm for European integration declined right across the member states but declined more in Ireland than elsewhere. In 1983-84 the Irish were substantially behind the European average. Then came the Singled European Act and the referendum to approve it and enthusiasm in Ireland grew more strongly than in Europe generally.
The gap between the Irish level of support and the European level has widened since 1991 as Ireland was less affected by and recovered more quickly from the downturn in support for integration that occurred across the Community around the time of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. In short, full-blooded support for European integration in Ireland may not be overwhelming but it does constitute a majority, which is more than can be said for most other member-states.
The other side of the coin to this majority support for integration is not outright opposition, which in Ireland is minuscule (8 per cent), but indifference. In The Irish Times/MRBI survey, the proportion who either explicitly say they would not care if the EU were scrapped or that they do not know how they would feel if a very substantial 37 per cent - or almost two in five.
The proportion varies remarkably across the sectors of Irish society. Given that Irish politics are renowned for their lack of a class basis, it is more than a little surprising to find a gap of 26 percentage points in indifference to the EU between those in middle-class occupations (20 per cent indifferent) and those in working-class occupations (46 per cent indifferent).
The gap is equally large (28 to 56 per cent) between the employed and the unemployed. To a lesser but still significant extent, and again surprisingly, the degree of indifference to the EU distinguishes men from women (29 to 43 per cent).
In short, the integration project has failed to bring the working class, the unemployed and women along equally with everyone else. In any society this would be a considerable weakness for any movement seeking mass support. In a society which holds periodic referendums on the issues in question, it may be a recipe for trouble.
Despite considerable indifference to the EU as such, the majority (90 per cent) of Irish people have an opinion on the complex question of economic and monetary union and a single currency. And that opinion is pretty overwhelming: abstracting from the issue of what Britain does, 76 per cent favour joining the single currency. This commitment is relatively unshaken by the prospect of Britain saying no: 70 per cent would go ahead even if Britain chose to stay out (see figure 2).
The social and economic contrasts which were a marked feature of attitudes to the EU are much less in evidence in this case. While support for the single currency is somewhat lower among the unemployed, among women and among small farmers, they are all substantially in favour and there is no appreciable difference on the issue between the middle class and working class.
The positive attitude to the single currency appears to take the form of faith: it is widespread, it is unmoved by consideration of the consequences of Ireland being in and Britain being out, it is little affected by social or economic position and it is untainted by agnosticism.
It is a belief either in the good or the inevitable and, for subliminal nationalist reasons, it may well be reinforced rather than diminished by the prospect of Ireland being in EMU while Britain is out. Economists and industrialists worried about the effects of Irish entry to EMU without Britain may have their work cut out to undermine such faith.
On other policy fronts, faith is less in evidence. On assuming the Presidency of the EU in July of this year, the Government committed itself to pushing for coordinated action on two problems that beset Ireland and Europe: unemployment and drug abuse.
The Irish Times/MRBI survey set out to measure public reaction to these initiatives. Obviously, there would have been little point in asking the public whether these were a good or bad idea - any action on these problems is likely to be seen as a good thing. The real question is: how much belief is there in the efficacy of such measures? The answer is: not a lot.
Fifteen per cent believe that in the case of unemployment, a common effort by the EU, initiated by Ireland, would make a big difference (see figure 3). There is marginally more optimism on the drugs issue, with 19 per cent saying it would make a big difference (see figure 4).
The optimists are substantially outnumbered by the pessimists (34 per cent "no difference" on employment and 30 per cent "no difference" on drugs). The public is not, however, without hope. In between the very small minority of optimists and the more substantial minority of pessimists, there is a majority (50 to 51 per cent) who feel that these initiatives will make "some difference".
It would be unfair therefore to portray Irish public opinion as reacting negatively to these initiatives. Should this 50 per cent not also be regarded as optimistic and in favour of what has been proposed? True, their reaction is favourable, but it is probably more accurate to describe it as hopeful than as optimistic.
Most importantly, there is a message here for the Irish presidency and for the EU as a whole: such initiatives raise hopes and expectations which, if not fulfilled, may return to sap such commitment to European integration as currently exists and to foster further indifference.