Questions are being asked about the military and political aims of the impending attack on Iraq. Politicians seem defensive. Perhaps the speculation is inspired disinformation. Perhaps the pundits simply don't know.
However, in democracies, the public unease and the contrast with Israel's violations cannot be ignored. Creative diplomatic initiatives continue.
The political aims, and the resultant directive to the commander, are vital. Military history shows the necessity of "getting them right". They affect the "preparation" of public opinion, the forces sent and the tactics to be used.
"No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter is the operational objective." Karl von Clausewitz (17801831).
Clausewitz, that long dead, but ever-relevant tapper on generals' shoulders, is disregarded at great cost.
Linking Clausewitz to Suez, Field Marshal Lord Carver put the matter well: "The outstanding politico-military lesson is an old one: that one should clarify one's aim before one embarks upon a military operation: ruthlessly and objectively dissect and analyse where it will lead one, what is to be gained from it, and what one will be faced with when it is over.
"The Suez (1956) affair is the supreme example of failure to subject policy to such an examination. Once embarked upon, many factors make it very difficult to extract oneself . . ."
Perhaps fewer wars would be launched if Clausewitz was read more carefully by more people.
Eventually, these aims are broken down and converted to military "missions" and appear in the orders issued to and by subordinate commanders. In the uncertainties of war his mission is the commander's guide.
Formulating the political and military objectives for the impending conflict is difficult. In 1990 the Iraqi army had crossed an international frontier and forcibly occupied Kuwait.
The objective came directly from Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) 660 and 880 (1990) "to use all necessary means" to make Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to their positions of August 1st, 1990.
Oddly, Gen Schwarzkopf's memoirs indicate he did not get a clear directive with the coalition's strategic and political war aims, although he sent a draft to Washington.
Aims recently discussed vary from "Target Saddam" (Daily Telegraph) to "Isolate Baghdad so that Kurds and Marsh Arabs rise and the army removes him" (London Times).
More significant versions are: To deliver a serious blow that will significantly diminish Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (Sandy Berger, US National Security Advisor).
". . .not to overthrow Mr Hussein. The military option was designed to degrade Iraq's WMDs and its ability to threaten its neighbours". (Gen Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
Of 1991, Gen Schwarzkopf wrote: "We repeatedly asserted that the US was not trying to kill Saddam Hussein . . . and that was true, to a point", - but Saddam's most likely bunkers headed the target list.
Showing the revived awareness of Clausewitz which followed the Vietnam war, Gen Schwarzkopf continued: "Saddam was . . . an enemy centre of gravity . . . that if destroyed, will cause the enemy to lose the will to fight." Silencing Saddam by destroying his communications and command capability was enough.
The military magazines have been speculating about new "bunker-busting" bombs and satellite controlled missiles. A US spokesman has said that many new weapons are not yet "robust in terms of numbers".
There are also "Hard Target, Smart Fuze, Void-counting" bombs with warheads that could penetrate a roof and continue undetonated, counting the floors as they go through. They could be set to explode in say, the fourth floor, where vital equipment or personnel are thought to be. High-temperature incendiary bombs to vaporise chemical and biological weapons are also mentioned.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) has about 20 GR-1 Tornado bombers in the area, as well as some 15 naval Harriers on their aircraft carrier Invincible. Electronic upgrading of the GR-1 has only just started, but some will have the improved "Thermal-Imaging Airborne Laser Designator" (TIALD) which will facilitate accurate bombing.
For years the RAF relied on low-level approach and attack techniques. Superbly trained pilots, able to fly close to the ground beneath defensive radar coverage, were needed.
These techniques arose from necessity, because of the lack of a "stand-off" attack capability. Despite great bravery and steadiness, British aircrews had disproportionate casualties in training and in the Gulf. It was magnificent - but was it war? (Even Mrs Thatcher is said to have queried the losses). It seems that new equipment has allowed new tactics.
US aircraft could launch missiles many miles from a target and be well away before the target was hit. US technology and concentrated power got results, while conserving lives.
The Americans have had time to absorb the lessons of 1991/92. They now face seemingly insoluble problems with many limitations on action. This is something the military mind rather likes. Given time to study a problem and break it down into details, well-thought out plans will usually emerge.
The Americans, in war and industry, are particularly good at this. Nothing appears to be happening for weeks or months; then, when everything is ready, action starts and everything clicks into place.
This happened with "Desert Storm". Saddam should be worrying.