John Bowmanexamines British ambassador Robin Haydon's view that Jack Lynch was out of touch with the North when he took power in 1977.
In yesterday's edition John Bew reported from the National Archives in London that Robin Haydon, the then British ambassador in Dublin, had found the incoming taoiseach, Jack Lynch, "out of touch with trends and personalities in Northern Ireland" and that this should enable the British "to feed our own thoughts and ideas" into the new Fianna Fáil government.
Such a characterisation of Lynch as a walkover is on the face of it implausible: but even if Lynch was not well briefed on one occasion, it seems extraordinarily naive of Haydon to expect that Lynch would not have diligent gatekeepers among his civil servants to withstand such a British approach.
From reading through the copious files on the making of Dublin's policy on Northern Ireland, what is manifest is just how in touch with the trends and personalities in Northern Ireland were the civil servants both in the taoiseach's department and in foreign affairs. They not only had an encyclopedic knowledge of Northern Ireland but combined this with a nuanced appreciation of the political culture peculiar to the province. As the records of the London embassy confirm, Irish diplomats were assiduous in tracking the formation of British policy on Northern Ireland: indeed on one occasion Garret FitzGerald knew more about Conservative policy than Margaret Thatcher herself. In papers just released there is further evidence of thorough homework and of its being put to use in order to hold the Conservatives to their promises.
In August 1977, the Irish ambassador in London, Paul Keating, informed Iveagh House that he had invited Thatcher to meet Lynch during the taoiseach's forthcoming visit to London for the Callaghan summit. He had issued the invitation through Airey Neave, the Conservative shadow spokesman on Northern Ireland. Neave reported Thatcher as being "most anxious" to meet the incoming taoiseach as she "had matters to discuss with him in the context of a probable autumn election" which Thatcher expected to win "in an overwhelming manner".
Moreover, before the election the Conservatives would not be making any deals with other parties; indeed "they deprecate greatly" the deal whereby, in return for extra Westminster seats for Northern Ireland, Labour had an understanding with the Official Unionists that they would not bring down the minority Callaghan government.
The Conservative position was that whereas they supported the extra seats on their merits "they do not feel that political representation is a matter for inter-party deals". Keating reported Neave as being "extremely disillusioned" with the Ulster Unionists and "particularly averse to deals with characters such as Enoch Powell". Neave added that "in negotiating with the Unionist Party at the moment one had no idea where power lay or with whom one was dealing".
Although Keating himself did not expect an early election, this did not diminish the importance of the fact that Thatcher "now appears ready to establish good working relations" with the Dublin government and Keating advised that "the opportunity to meet her is a valuable one".
In the aftermath of the Lynch-Callaghan summit reported in these pages yesterday, Lynch hosted a lunch for Thatcher and Neave at the Irish embassy on September 29th. Keating reported that "the most interesting exchanges occurred" when discussing Thatcher's views on powersharing.
Lynch had informed her about Callaghan's misgivings about the term powersharing, while holding to the policy itself as Labour's preferred outcome. Lynch asked if the Conservatives would concur with this approach to which Thatcher responded with some indignation: was not powersharing "our initiative!" - a reference to Willie Whitelaw's political achievement in preparing the ground for the Sunningdale breakthrough.
This response was especially welcome to Keating, who had been wary of what he saw as Neave's studied reluctance to even mention powersharing since he had been appointed Conservative spokesman.
Keating added that subsequently, Neave privately emphasised that powersharing had "become so loaded with political undertones that it is a word they do not wish to be tagged with. It would be most desirable to have some other formula which would not alarm the Unionists in the same way".
Keating replied that Dublin for its part did not want to "frighten the SDLP and for us the use of the word powersharing was important". Lynch did agree that the term would be avoided in any press briefings that followed, but was reassured that he had elicited a firm confirmation from Thatcher that Conservative policy had not changed.
Moreover Thatcher indicated "most firmly" that she was opposed to any policy of integration and she generally impressed her Irish hosts by what they saw as her "appreciation of the dangers that arose from the lack of any political institution in the North". Lynch's party found her "much more open" to the need for political initiatives than Labour ministers had been.
Apart from the North there was also some discussion of European matters. Keating felt that Thatcher was "somewhat lukewarm in her enthusiasm for the Community and indicated that she would not care greatly if the direct-election timetable [to the European Parliament] was not met". Indeed she admitted a preference for the current system which gave the political parties "a greater element of control". He also reported her opposition to any extension of the parliament's powers. "All in all her attitude to this is very close to Mr Callaghan's and shows a strong nationalist rather than European bent."
Some indication of the Irish bent can be gleaned from the briefing note for Lynch before this visit to London. Commenting on the proposed enlargement of the European Community with Spain, Portugal and Greece then applicants for membership, Lynch was advised that the Community was "already stagnating - because of the lack of the political will among the member countries, and because of administrative inadequacy". The addition of three more member countries with different traditions and different cultures could be expected to "aggravate these difficulties".
At a time when the large countries appointed two commissioners each, it was anticipated that if the new applicants were admitted there would be a total of 17 commissioners as against 13 at present: this "could well be unworkable". Also the addition of three new languages "could create a new form of Babel"; moreover, each of 13 countries "seeking to maintain its own 'vital national interest' could make decisive action by the Community impossible".