The Supreme Court yesterday overturned a High Court decision preventing the trial of a priest on 28 charges of indecent assault and gross indecency against a boy. The priest now faces trial on 66 sex abuse charges involving a total of eight boys.
The Chief Justice, Mr Justice Hamilton, said the court would allow the appeal by the DPP against that part of a High Court decision which prohibited the trial of the priest on sex charges in respect of one boy. The High Court had also ruled that the trial on charges relating to seven other boys should proceed.
Mr Justice Hamilton said the Supreme Court would deliver the reasons for its decision at a later date. This approach was taken so that the trial should proceed with no further delay.
In December 1997 the High Court held that the trial of the priest on 38 charges of abuse against seven boys should proceed.
However, Mr Justice Geoghegan ruled that the priest's trial on 28 other charges against another boy should not go ahead because, he found, the accused could not be held responsible for excessive delay between the alleged committing of the offences - 1981 to 1984 - and the first complaint to the Garda about the alleged abuse in 1995.
The priest had appealed the decision on the charges relating to the seven boys while the DPP cross-appealed the decision to prevent the trial in respect of the eighth boy.
Yesterday the Supreme Court was told the priest had withdrawn his appeal and the court then heard the cross-appeal only.
Mr Maurice Gaffney SC, for the DPP, said the eighth boy was "shattered" when nothing was done by the church after he told a priest in 1986 that he had been sexually abused by the accused priest for a number of years.
When the boy, then aged 16, confided in a priest about the alleged abuse, he was given the option of going to the Garda or having the complaint processed through the church, counsel said.
The boy opted to have it dealt with by the church and expected something would be done, but nothing was. He was interviewed within the church and had received a letter of thanks from his local bishop which did not specifically mention the allegations.
The boy's failure to report the matter to the Garda at the time was a consequence of the abuse itself and the fault of the alleged abuser, not the boy, counsel said.
The nature of such offences was that an early complaint was not to be expected, and this was an inevitable consequence of the abuse, said Mr Gaffney.
He submitted the High Court was wrong in finding that, because the alleged abuser no longer had physical dominion over the boy when the boy had confided in the other priest, the accused was not responsible for the boy's failure to report the matter to the Garda at that time.
Since the High Court decision, the Supreme Court had accepted in another case that dominion was only one factor in explaining delay in reporting abuse. Dominion did not necessarily cease because the immediate personal association between an abuser and abused came to an end.
In this case, the boy found the courage to report the alleged abuse after another boy complained. The boy was not mature when he had complained in 1986 to the other priest.
There was no doubt he expected the alleged abuser would be dealt with, and when that did not happen he could only assume the church did not want to know or it was so awful they did not want to talk about it, and then he did not want to talk about it either.
Mr Gaffney said it was also very important that the alleged abuse involved homosexual activity. The boy had normal heterosexual tendencies at 16 and he did not want to be exposed as being involved in homosexual activity.
Only when another person came forward did the boy get the courage to complain, counsel said. Opposing the cross-appeal, Mr Aindrias O Caoimh SC, for the priest, said it was not clear from the psychological evidence in the case that there was a triggering factor which led to the boy reporting the alleged abuse to the Garda in 1995.
In the High Court, the psychologist had addressed the issue of delay in relation only to the period when the alleged offences were committed, and had not addressed any subsequent period.
The DPP had failed to adduce evidence to explain adequately the period of delay, or to conclude the delay was attributable to the priest.
He said the High Court judge had not misunderstood the concept of dominion and had had the benefit of hearing all the psychological evidence. The Supreme Court should not overturn his decision on the basis of a possible alternative reading.
