REFORM of the EU's institutions is seen as essential if the EU is to function properly when it enlarges to take in central and eastern European states. But the attempt to produce such reform produced the most dramatic failure at Amsterdam.
The EU's decision-making processes are already cumbersome. The 15-month IGC has worked on the basis that unless these processes are streamlined, an enlarged EU could find itself unable to make decisions on many issues.
There were three core changes sought, and there has been failure to reach agreement on all three.
Majority voting. All member states agree in principle that more decisions must be made by majority vote, rather than by unanimity. If the national veto is allowed to each state in an expanded EU, the chances of just one state blocking any decision would be very high.
However at Amsterdam, the German Chancellor, Dr Helmut Kohl, blocked a proposal to move a long list of policy areas under a majority voting regime. One issue - dealing with research and development - had the national veto removed.
Reweighting of votes. At Council of Ministers level when a majority vote is being taken, each member state has a "weighted vote" depending on its population. Thus, for example, Germany, France, Britain and Italy have 10 votes each, while Ireland and Denmark have four each.
The larger states argue that if the weighting was strictly proportional, they should have much greater strength relative to smaller states. They fear that in an enlarged union, a coalition of small states could unfairly out vote larger states.
But again, the EU leaders failed to agreed this issue at Amsterdam. A specific Dutch presidency proposal which would give the four largest states 25 votes compared with, for example, six each to Denmark and Ireland, was not agreed. A number of member states - notably Spain - felt their national interests to be threatened by the reweighting. The EU now moves towards enlargement with this issue unresolved.
The size of the Commission. Ireland and the smaller states have retained their right to nominate a member of the EU Commission, despite pressure from larger states to curtail that right. They argue that in a union of 25 or more member states, a Commission of this size may prove unworkable. The five largest states, which currently nominate two Commissioners each, have agreed to lose one commissioner each upon enlargement.
However, the issue is to be reopened when the next enlargement of the EU takes place. The continuation of the guaranteed commissioner per member state is now conditional on a resolution being found to the reweighting issue.
Other institutional changes were agreed at Amsterdam in relation to the European Parliament, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and other bodies. The decision-making procedures used by the Parliament have been cut from over 20 to just three, but the parliament still cannot initiate legislation. A ceiling of 700 has been placed on the number of MEPs. Once the EU takes in several more members, other states, including Ireland, will have their number of MEPs reduced.
The authority of the President of the Commission has been strengthened by introducing a requirement that his or her nomination be approved by the Parliament. Member states will from now on have to agree their nominee for the Commission with the president, and he will be entitled to "reshuffle" his Commissioners.
The role of the Court of Auditors has been enhanced. Both the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions are given some new rights of consultation and are administratively separated.
The Commission has been asked to prepare changes in the system under which several hundred committees of officials oversee the detailed drafting of regulations and management of specific issues.