CommentThe gulf between Europe and the US will continue during a second Bush term but critics may find the President kinder and gentler, suggest Jonathan Eyal
Although all European governments have maintained the customary official silence during the US presidential campaign, it is an open secret that a huge majority of ordinary Europeans - even in Britain - rooted for a John Kerry victory. With President Bush now guaranteed to remain in the White House, Europe's adjustment to the realities will have to be quick, and may yet be painful.
In broad terms and looking at the key European players, Bush's victory is good news for Britain's Tony Blair, a really bad omen for Germany and of marginal significance for the majority of other European states.
Of all Europe's leaders, Tony Blair was most vulnerable. Bush's re-election, coming hard on the heels of John Howard's triumph in Australia, effectively removes the perception that those who have led the Iraq war would be punished by their electorates. It is also a personal vindication for Blair, who has long argued that his heavy political investment in supporting Bush was a matter of necessity, given the US electoral system.
But Bush's re-election also holds some dangers for Britain. The British were hoping to withdraw their troops from Iraq by the end of next year, giving way to an international coalition force to which other countries were to contribute. This may have been easier to achieve with John Kerry in the White House, but remains much more difficult to predict with Bush.
So, although Blair himself is the biggest European political winner from the US elections, his country may find itself in a fairly tricky situation in the months to come, attached to America with an umbilical cord, hoping to disengage from its commitment, but unable to do so with any dignified speed.
For Germany, however, the consequences are almost diametrically opposite. In the last few months, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who broke with decades of pro-American solidarity by opposing the Iraq war in virulent terms, hoped that a change of power in Washington would allow Germany to patch up its differences. This is clearly not likely to happen, for the Bush administration is not only politically hurt by what it sees as Germany's "desertion", but also harbours a personal resentment against Chancellor Schröder.
George Bush snr, the President's father, was instrumental in facilitating Germany's unification at the end of the Cold War more than a decade ago. The entire Bush family - as tightly knit as ever - regards Germany's behaviour over Iraq as pure betrayal, a feeling which is now set to linger, at least until Schröder himself has to face re-election at some point during 2006.
France, meanwhile, sits somewhere in the middle. Although the French wanted John Kerry to win, officials in Paris privately pointed out over the last few weeks that they did not believe in Kerry's professions of affection for the Europeans, or the Democrats' promises to consult much more closely with their allies.
Indeed, in many respects, Bush's re-election keeps the world as a fairly predictable place for the French: they can maintain their opposition to America's policies in the Middle East without any undue complications. And it offers France some diplomatic opportunities. French officials will start putting about the message in other European capitals that Europe's integration efforts should be redoubled in order to stand up to the Americans: "Are you really looking forward to four more years of Bush?" will be the slogan from Paris to other European capitals.
Overall, however, Europeans remain aware that much will depend on precisely how a second Bush administration chooses to behave.
On the one hand, the message from the US election campaign is that ordinary Americans do not wish to be isolated, and that they broadly resent Bush's failure to forge a larger coalition of allies for the war in Iraq, and the continued fight against international terrorism. That may suggest that, safely re-elected, Bush could change his tune by tacitly admitting some of his previous errors, and by becoming more flexible, especially since he still needs Europe's contribution in the Middle East.
But an equally good case can be made that Bush was re-elected by a higher margin of the popular vote this time than four years ago and that, therefore, his confrontational stance has been vindicated. If this interpretation is adopted in Washington, then the Europeans should brace themselves for even greater disputes.
The received wisdom in Europe is that both the Secretary of State and the Defence Secretary will be changed in a second Bush term. And, while Europeans assume that the Pentagon will remain in the hands of a hardliner, the State Department may well be given to a person closer to Bush himself. This could mean the reassertion of the power of US diplomats over their military, something which may give the Europeans some hope.
If history is any guide, a second term of any US presidency can be very different from the first. With a president unable to seek re-election and therefore no longer beholden to interest lobbies, Washington can afford both to recognise previous mistakes and undertake bold initiatives.
The result may, therefore, be a pleasant surprise for governments which now regard Bush as a unilateralist, bent on forcing his own, supposedly extremist military agenda around the world.
In the immediate future, it is clear that Bush's re-election will give Washington a free hand in launching a massive military offensive against pockets of resistance in Iraq. So, initially, the fighting there will intensify.
Nevertheless, European governments - which fear this development most - may also discover that Bush's need for new troops in Iraq, in order to reduce America's commitment, will outweigh any temptations which may exist to settle scores with the Europeans over previous Iraqi disputes.
But, although Iraq may continue to hog media headlines, the biggest security challenge of the second Bush presidency comes from the nuclear programmes of Iran and of North Korea. Both countries are in key parts of the world, and cannot be ignored, for very good strategic reasons.
US policy in the Middle East is to prevent the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, while keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict simmering (if it cannot be resolved) and propping up the pro-Western monarchies of the Gulf. The entire structure will collapse if Iran becomes nuclear.
The same can be said about Asia. The US dominates the region because major countries individually rely on Washington for their ultimate protection. If, however, North Korea emerges as a nuclear power, some of these countries will acquire their own weapons as well. And, if this happens, the US will lose its role as regional arbiter. Nobody - not least Bush - is prepared to countenance such possibilities.
Does it mean that Bush will embark on a new military adventure? Not necessarily. US troops are currently over-stretched in Iraq. So, no other military confrontation is feasible until early 2006, even if Bush wanted to reach for the gun now. The American public, already split over the Iraq war, will also need a great persuasion before contemplating any fresh military action against North Korea or Iran.
But, more importantly, a political framework exists, ready to be used for both crises. China is now engaged in a mediation effort over the North Korean issue. Washington may not believe that the Chinese can deliver, but it has no interest in brushing them aside. And the Europeans have now accepted that they have to draw closer to the Americans over Iran , if only because their own previous policies have failed. In short, the US has all diplomatic options at its disposal, and plenty of time to explore them.
To be sure, the pace of events will quicken. Immediately after his inauguration on January 20th, 2005, the President may well identify North Korea and Iran as the key security threats to the US. There will then be huge pressure on Asian and European countries to co-operate and, if these efforts fail, the US may well refer the matter to the United Nations, perhaps by the autumn of next year.
If, in turn, these diplomatic manoeuvres fail to produce a satisfactory outcome, military options will be considered in Washington at some point during 2006. But it is important to remember that no decisions have been taken and that, therefore, America's traditional allies around the world still have a great deal of influence over what Bush may be contemplating.
In almost all other areas, continuity - rather than surprise - is almost guaranteed to remain the order of the day. The global war against terrorism will continue but, yet again, subtle changes will be implemented, especially in winning the battle for the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims, an area where the administration now frankly admits it has been a disaster.
Furthermore, although opposition to international environmental controls such as those contained in the Kyoto Treaty will persist, the overall promotion of free trade should remain one of Washington's priorities, now that Bush no longer has to pander to protectionist elements at home.
Overall, therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that Bush has returned to power, unbowed and unchanged. His strategy for winning re-election at home - sticking rigidly to his message that everything done overseas, including the war in Iraq, was both necessary and successful - appears to have worked.
But, as the coming months will indicate, he knows that his overseas security strategy badly needs to be overhauled. A "cuddly" president with a co-operative international agenda Bush will never be. But a more emollient US president he can certainly become.
Nevertheless, the gulf which has opened up between Europe and the US remains as wide as ever. It is, at the end, less of a political or strategic issue, and more of a psychological divide.
The Europeans have watched with ill-disguised puzzlement as the US elections were decided by issues such as an exaggerated patriotism, opposition to abortion and deep religious convictions, all matters which hardly feature at all in Europe's current political debates.
A reinvigorated Bush may well try to narrow his political differences with the "old continent". Yet the psychological gap with Europe, and with much of the rest of the world, will continue unabated.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London