THE Minister for the Environment said yesterday he had no reason to be concerned in any way about the functioning of the Blood Transfusion Service Board before the hepatitis C scandal broke in February 1994.
Mr Howlin, giving evidence to the tribunal of inquiry into the crisis which occurred when he was Minister for Health, became aware of it when told by Department officials on February 18th 1994.
He was not aware of a letter concerning the infection of anti-D which the BTSB had sent to Dr Rosemary Boothman at the Department on January 28th. Dr Boothman was one of 11 people Mr Howlin appointed to the BTSB board between August 1993 and February 1994.
Nor did he know that Dr Boothman had prepared a memo based on that letter for a senior Department official. He had not been told at the February meeting of the possibility of an infection source from 1989. The meeting had dealt with the infection arising from the use of patient X's plasma in the manufacture of anti-D used in 1977.
But he became aware of "a potential further source of contamination" the weekend following February 18th. He agreed with Mr John Rogers SC, for Positive Action and the McCole family, that the BTSB letter outlining the background to the scandal dealt "almost exclusively with 1977". He agreed a public statement he made on February 21st 1994 had "no reference whatsoever" to any other source of infection, nor did it say anything about the recall of the anti-D product.
He also agreed that in his subsequent statements to the Dail and Seanad there was no mention "whatsoever of any concern, known to you, about the 1989-1991 product".
The "clear evidence" available to him related to 1977, he said, and that "largely conditioned the response". But as everyone who had received the product up to February 17th 1994 was to be tested "the clear import of that was that there was a potential infection in the entire anti-D stock from 1970 to date", he said.
A letter sent to the BTSB from the Middlesex Hospital in London on February 18th 1994, confirming that batches of the 1989 anti-D were positive, was not brought to his attention.
The BTSB had adverted only to the 1977 batches in its public statement of March 7th, he agreed. In addition, an "aide memoire" he brought to a Cabinet meeting on March 9th made no reference to the possibility of another (1989) source of infection. It had been prepared by Department officials, he said.
It was news to him that by then Department officials knew of the February 18th letter from the Middlesex hospital. He "knew subsequently" there had been confirmation of that letter's positive findings.
Mr Howlin had "no recollection" of seeing a letter from Mr Ted Keyes, chief executive officer at the BTSB, sent to the Department on April 8th 1994. It was accompanied by a draft letter from the BTSB, which it was planned to send to all GPs informing them of the 1989 infection. Mr Keyes sought ministerial approval to send the letter but Mr Howlin had not seen the letter, or the accompanying draft, "until now".
He agreed he had not told Positive Action about the 1989 infection at a meeting on June 14th 1994.
He agreed with Mr James Nugent SC, counsel for the tribunal, that he had told hepatitis C victims to contact community welfare officers, concerning out-of-pocket expenses related to the disease. He was "surprised" when the community welfare officers told the women they could not help. The suggestion was "made off the top of my head."
He was aware a look-back programme was in place to trace infected donors who had given blood, but did not know when it began. Nor was he aware the expert group had had a problem with co-operation from the BTSB until September 1994. He then appointed a new chairman to the board which increased the flow of information.
