The Military Intelligence files marked "top secret" released by the National Archives cast penetrating light on the events which rocked the Dublin establishment in 1970.
The new evidence addresses the key question of whether the attempt to import arms for the North was authorised by the State.
Col P.J. Delaney, who succeeded the late Col Michael Hefferon as director of Military Intelligence in April 1970, was determined to set the record straight.
As Fianna Fail was caught up in the Northern maelstrom, the Taoiseach, the late Mr Jack Lynch, dismissed two of his most powerful ministers, Mr Charles Haughey (Finance) and the late Mr Neil Blaney (Agriculture); Mr Kevin Boland resigned in sympathy. Mr Haughey said on May 8th, three days after being sacked: "I now categorically state that at no time have I taken part in any illegal importation or attempted importation of arms into this country."
Mr Haughey and Mr Blaney were arrested on May 28th, 1970 and charged with attempting to smuggle guns. Charges against Mr Blaney were dismissed in July because of lack of evidence. In October, Mr Haughey and three others - Capt James Kelly, an Army Intelligence officer; Mr John Kelly, a Belfast republican; and Mr Albert Luykx, a Belgian-born businessman - were found not guilty.
The arms conspiracy trial arose from the reaction of a confused and divided Cabinet to the Northern crisis. After concerted attacks on Catholic districts in August 1969, the Government decided to make a sum of money - "the amount and the channel of the disbursement of which would be determined by the Minister for Finance" - available to the victims; £100,000 was voted by the Dail.
Subsequent inquiries unearthed a labyrinth of bank accounts and contacts. While most of the money was used for the purpose stated, some went to publish Mr Seamus Brady's newspaper, Voice of the North, and to finance the arms-buying trip which landed the defendants in the dock.
Mr Blaney said on December 8th, 1969, that Fianna Fail had never taken a decision to "rule out the use of force if the circumstances in the six counties so demanded . . . If a situation were to arise in which the people who do not subscribe to the unionist regime were under sustained and murderous assault, then as the Taoiseach said on August 13th, we `cannot stand idly by'."[Mr Lynch said in the course of his August 13th speech: " . . . the Irish Government can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse."]
Military Intelligence files record that on February 6th, 1970, the minister for defence, the late Mr James Gibbons, informed the Chief of Staff, Lieut-Gen Sean McKeown, and the Director of Intelligence, Col Hefferon, that the Government had instructed him to order the Chief of Staff to prepare the Army for incursions into Northern Ireland "if and when such a course became necessary, and to have respirators and arms and ammunition made ready in the event that it would be necessary for the minority to protect themselves".
Mr Gibbons "explained that the Taoiseach and other Ministers had met delegations from the North. At these meetings urgent demands were made for respirators, weapons and ammunition, the provision of which the Government agreed as and when necessary.
"Accordingly, the Chief-of-Staff was instructed to put truck-loads of those items at readiness so that they could be available in a matter of hours if required." (MI file 2)
He was also instructed to be ready to discuss estimates with Mr Haughey, who was recovering from a riding accident.
Mr Gibbons's ministerial directive formed the background to the attempt to import arms. But a Military Intelligence file states that the Army was to "base its plans on the existing strength of the forces and the equipment and armament currently available . . . [giving] the lie to the allegation by Col Hefferon and Capt Kelly that the directive was `a back-up' for the purchase of pistols" (MI file 5).
According to a Military Intelligence document, Mr Gibbons confirmed to the Defence Forces that incursions were envisaged only in circumstances of a complete breakdown of law and order in the North, and the sole object would be to protect the homes and property of nationalists.
On April 2nd, 500 rifles, 80,000 rounds of ammunition and 3,000 respirators were stored in Dundalk Barracks. According to a Military Intelligence document, the Chief of Staff said he was told by Mr Gibbons that he [Mr Gibbons] ordered the rifles to be sent to Dundalk in order to get Mr Blaney "off his neck".
The document said there was no intention to issue them to civilians in Northern Ireland. "Military Intelligence subsequently ascertained that the information given to the Minister [Mr Gibbons] regarding reported attacks on the minority and the withdrawal of British security forces were without foundation." Following intelligence reports of the possibility of a raid by subversives, the guns were returned to Dublin. (MI files 2, 4).
Capt Kelly had been employed as a field liaison officer by Col Hefferon from late August 1969 because of his "cross-Border connections". In the following January - before the ministerial directive - the captain informed Col Hefferon that he wanted to assist the Northern defence committees to procure arms. The colonel told him to retire: "As an Army officer he could not continue to involve himself in the illegal purchase of arms," states a Military Intelligence document.
Col Hefferon told the captain to inform Mr Haughey and Mr Blaney that he had refused to let him help in this way. "He proposed that they should get him a suitable civilian job."
Military Intelligence commented: "Was Capt Kelly working for Messrs Haughey and Blaney, and not for his director? Despite Col Hefferon's refusal, Capt Kelly's activities did not cease. Should Col Hefferon not have informed the Chief-of-Staff of Capt Kelly's illegal activities? Why did Col Hefferon tell Capt Kelly to tell Messrs Haughey and Blaney: should he not have arranged for this to be done through proper channels?" (MI file 4)
Military Intelligence documents record that Mr Gibbons was briefed on April 22nd that Capt Kelly was attempting to import arms illegally. The documents say his activities gave cause for disquiet; he had been operating openly as an intelligence officer on both sides of the Border and consorting with illegal groups. "It must be accepted that British Intelligence, now operating in a big way in Northern Ireland, will get on to it . . . These arms will eventually end up in IRA hands" (MI file 3)
Col Delaney took over as Director of Intelligence on April 10th, 1970. He said he did not receive any brief on Capt Kelly's activities from Col Hefferon. "I inquired from Col Hefferon on numerous occasions as to what Capt Kelly was doing. I got the reply that Capt Kelly was a valuable staff officer, and because of his connections in Northern Ireland he would be quite valuable in an emergency. He never informed me as to Capt Kelly's particular activities."
Another document asserts: "It would appear that they had hoped to have the arms landed before Col Hefferon retired . . . " (MI file 4)
Col Delaney decided "that I could not have as a personal staff officer, nor could I tolerate in the Intelligence Section, the presence of an officer whom I had never met, who did not report to me, or about whose activities I knew nothing."
According to a Military Intelligence document, the minister "agreed readily" on hearing the new director's reasons for wanting to transfer Capt Kelly out of intelligence, the ultimate one being: "His emotional reactions to events in Northern Ireland pointed to his having lost that cool behaviour so necessary in an intelligence officer. Col Hefferon was present at this interview and did not dissent."
Without a hint of irony, Mr Gibbons tried to have the captain seconded to the Department of Agriculture as an anti-pig smuggling executive.
On April 28th, Capt Kelly was taken, by two security officers attached to the military, to Col Delaney, who told him: "You are now getting an order to desist completely and entirely from your present activities."
The same document stated that he was to meet Mr Albert Luykxx, an agent for a German arms dealer. By doing so, "he has blatantly disregarded a direct, lawful, verbal order". The Garda knew from April 17th that Capt Kelly had applied for a licence to import arms. The six tons of "goods" got no farther than Vienna.
Commenting on a remark attributed to Capt Kelly, that "it would be a terrible thing to bring in arms to the North", Military Intelligence noted: "This is strange considering Mr Haughey would guarantee that after importation by Aer Lingus they would go straight to the North." (MI file 4)
Capt Kelly retired voluntarily on May 1st, 1970.
He gave little information when interrogated by the Special Branch. "He said he was engaged in liaison activities between the Government Departments in the 26 counties. He would not say with whom he was engaged. He indicated his determination to continue his activities, saying he could not stop now." (MI file 5).