Weeks after the Gulf war ended, in the early spring of 1991, our TV screens showed Kurdish refugees scrambling up snow-clad hills in retreat from an Iraqi offensive. In April, Mr John Major, to his credit, proposed "safe havens" for the refugees. Although initially reluctant, the Americans rapidly got troops on the ground and set up well-equipped camps for them.
It seemed, in legal terms, an intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq, forbidden by Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, Security Council Resolution (SCR) 688 on protection and humanitarian aid for the Kurds was passed. The justification was that the movement of refugees to Turkey and Iran threatened international peace and security.
The legality of the military measures now being contemplated by the US and Britain against Iraq is by no means clear. The consequences of a violation of international law by these two powers could be very serious, and have not been adequately considered.
The context is the original Ceasefire Resolution 687 (April 1991), which requires Iraq to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of chemical and biological weapons and facilities, all ballistic missiles with ranges above 150km, and nuclear weapons.
By September 1991 Iraq was making difficulties about the use of helicopters by Unscom (UN Special Commission) inspection teams. In August 1992 the allies imposed a no-fly zone, claiming legitimacy under UN SCR 688 .
Difficulties with Iraq continued, with disputes about UN surveillance cameras, Iraqi troop deployments and Kuwait's new borders; some co-operative periods mixed with many difficult ones. The US lost patience and launched missile and bombing attacks, notably in 1993 and 1996. Cruise missiles went astray and killed civilians in 1993.
The allies still relied on the 1991 resolutions. There was also general reliance on the original 1990 SCR 678 which prescribed "all necessary means" to end Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and restore "peace and security in the region".
Foot-dragging on UN resolutions is not new. The Israelis still ignore the resolutions on south Lebanon and other Occupied Territories.
In 1996 Saddam's troops were invited back into northern Iraq by a Kurdish faction. There were signs of Arab disillusion with the US after a further air attack on Iraq, with refusals of take-off facilities for US bombers in neighbouring states.
Despite the difficulties, Unscom, with good helicopters and a U2 surveillance plane, discovered and destroyed a considerable amount of forbidden materials and missile warheads in 6 1/2 years.
Last year Saddam set up "no-go" areas, alleging an inspector was a spy. The reports of Unscom and the International Atomic Energy Agency, published in October, showed progress with missiles and chemical weapons (including the recent destruction of related equipment and materials). Access and information on warheads and VX nerve agent were still needed. Control of nuclear weapons was generally satisfactory.
Biological-weapons investigations were "unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's programme", a serious matter. Iraqi allegations that the Unscom teams are biased, because too many are Westerners, are being addressed.
Perceived impartiality is vital.
The creation of no-go areas by Saddam was an oft-tried ploy to frustrate "verification inspections" elsewhere. If deliberate efforts to create such areas are not firmly taken up at all levels, attempts will be made to institutionalise them. The blockages, once created, prove difficult to remove. This experience ensured UN firmness when no-go areas were tried elsewhere.
Nevertheless, given the claims made for the ubiquity of US and Israeli intelligence services in the Middle East, Arab states are bound to be suspicious about some inspectors pinpointing targets for future assassinations and air attacks. Some Iraqi concern may be understandable. The Israeli Mossad certainly, and the CIA possibly, are trying to assassinate Saddam. He does not sleep for many consecutive nights in the same place. One would like to know more about the "palaces". Are these really marblehalled, or could they just be safe houses for Saddam and his guards?
Saddam is said to visit provincial towns and walks through the streets being hailed by the populace. This could be staged, but even opponents have said that it explains some of his popularity.
In the fog of demonisation, information about Iraq is hard to get. Education seems good, producing practical engineers and doctors. Women are better educated than in many other Arab countries. Street-signs pointing to Christian churches are, or were, normal in Baghdad. Social and health services seem to have been good.
It has been said that these things make Iraq more formidable than its weaponry does, and have something to do with the perceived US determination to destroy it. If the integrity of UN weapons verification is to be maintained, however, no-go areas cannot be accepted. The reports of biological agents are too serious.
It seems agreed that a new Security Council resolution is needed to cover the major attacks now contemplated by the US and Britain. The other permanent members of the Security Council, Russia, China and France, have indicated disagreement with the use of force, and may veto such a move. If an SC resolution is unobtainable, Britain and the US have said they will act without one. That would be a serious matter for states like Ireland, which need an ordered world where the rule of international law is respected.
Mr Yeltsin's prediction of general war is wildly exaggerated - for now. But if two great democracies ignore the UN and take the law into their own hands, they will eventually have emulators.
Inter-state and intra-state lawlessness will follow. Might will prevail. There will be resistance and revenge. Euphemisms cannot cover injustices indefinitely - and weapons of mass destruction await.