It used to be said about the Irish Question that "Every time the British came up with the answer, the Irish changed the question". While Ireland's relationship with the EU may be very different from the historic interaction with its nearest neighbour, a similar situation could well arise over Nice.
Sifting through the political fallout and international news coverage of the referendum result, I found myself saying, "They still don't get it." It was disconcerting to read, for example, that the primary reasons the treaty was rejected were opposition to enlargement and concern about a mass influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe. In fact, there was no explicit opposition to enlargement and immigration featured very little.
Neutrality certainly was a major issue and the foreign press is correct to highlight this fact. The assumption, or at least hope, among the political class in Dublin and other European capitals seems to be that some gesture or form of words on neutrality may be sufficient to get the treaty passed in a second referendum.
Since it appears at this stage that a second poll may have to wait until after the general election, we are probably looking at a date sometime in the autumn of 2002. If a week is a long time in politics, then 15 months is an eternity and who knows what the mood of the electorate will be at that time.
One group opposing the treaty, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) focused exclusively on the alleged militarisation of Europe. Sinn Fein also highlighted neutrality in its posters and the Green Party mentioned it prominently, but it was only one of a number of issues raised by these two parties. The No to Nice Campaign, which produced those ubiquitous and controversial black and red placards, did not stress neutrality and preferred to focus on sovereignty in its broadest sense.
Indeed, there were charges by the No to Nice group and the Green Party that the Government was itself deliberately emphasising neutrality to distract attention from other, more central issues in the treaty such as enhanced co-operation which allegedly created a two-tier Europe. Given its informal links with the militant anti-abortion group Youth Defence and the Christian Solidarity Party, it can be assumed that the No to Nice Campaign is concerned about the prospect of Europe "imposing" liberal abortion laws here.
Apart from advocating a No vote, there would appear to be very little in common between, say, PANA and the No to Nice Campaign and, in theory, the anti-Nice factions could be prised apart. That presupposes a formula on neutrality that would persuade PANA and possibly others to stand aside. A PANA spokesman says it would only consider a protocol clearly excluding Ireland from participating in or paying for the Rapid Reaction Force.
But even if such an explicit protocol were forthcoming, which seems unlikely, and PANA decided to accept it, which is by no means certain, at least some of PANA's affiliated groups and supporters - including greens, leftwingers and republicans of different shades as well as Third World solidarity groups - would have other strong reservations. The No to Nice Campaign would still be there too, the Green Party would retain its shopping list and, if the pundits are right, Sinn Fein could well be riding high in autumn 2002 following a successful general election.
While not wishing to belittle the importance of neutrality, the real problem to be addressed is the far less tangible one of alienation and distrust. It would have been better for the body politic if a mainstream party - Labour being the obvious but not the only one - had seen its way to opposing the treaty. This would at least have meant that the political mainstream was debating both sides of the issues. There is puzzlement among both the member-states and candidate countries, which assumed that the Irish were "happy campers"; recipients of Brussels largesse for many years who were now making the transition from donor to beneficiary.
It's like a teacher's reaction when a model pupil suddenly fails an exam. The malaise has its roots to some extent in the alienation of voters from the Heath Robinson-like vastness and complexity of EU structures and procedures, but there are other difficulties closer to home.
Every election or referendum has its own mindset and if one were to take a psychological snapshot of the Irish voter at this time it would probably reveal that there is a backlash against the perceived condescension of the political establishment on European issues. People do not like to be taken for granted.
It is not a question of supporting the Christian Solidarity Party, the Greens or Sinn Fein, who will all presumably remain minority groupings after the general election. It is a reaction against the smug assumption of domestic and European leaders that the electorate here will do what it is told and that there is no need to knock on doors or give time for a proper debate. Since joining with the rest of Europe was meant to provide great opportunities for political, economic and even psychological liberation, it was sad that the recent referendum had some of the trappings of a colonial exercise.
A colleague just returned from Germany tells me that the stories he read on the referendum were datelined London, Brussels and, in one case, Ljubljana. There has been nothing like it since the Skibbereen Eagle was keeping an eye of the Tsar of Russia.