EXPLAINING THE TREATY: The treaty changes the functions of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, writes Denis Staunton
The Nice Treaty changes the structure and functioning of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.
The Court of Justice rules on interpretations of the treaties and EU laws and ensures national laws are in keeping with the treaties.
The Court of First Instance is a subsidiary of the Court of Justice. It provides the first ruling on less-complicated cases but losing parties can appeal its decisions to the Court of Justice.
The treaty makes some administrative changes to speed up the work of the courts, whose caseloads have grown enormously in recent years.
It expands the role of the Court of First Instance and allows it to give "preliminary rulings" on issues referred to it by national courts.
This is designed to reduce the caseload in the Court of Justice and allow it to deal only with important cases.
Specialised judicial panels will deal with certain kinds of cases which at present come before the Court of First Instance. A grand chamber of 11 judges will be established within the Court of Justice to hear all but the most important cases.
The treaty also removes the requirement of unanimity in the Council of Ministers for further changes to the workings of the courts.
It removes the need for unanimity in appointing members of the Court of Auditors, which examines the EU's accounts. However each member-state will continue to nominate one member of the court. The Economic and Social Committee, an advisory body representing interest groups such as employers, unions and farmers, will also include consumer representatives if the treaty is ratified.
The treaty also removes the need for unanimous approval of members but leaves unchanged the number of representatives from each member-state.
It requires that members of the Committee of the Regions, which represents regional and local government in the EU, must be elected politicians or be accountable to an elected assembly.
The treaty acknowledges that EU enlargement has implications for the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). Enlarging an unreformed ECB to include up to 12 new members would turn the body that determines monetary policy for the euro-zone into an unwieldy group.
The treaty invites the ECB and the commission to propose solutions and institutes an "enabling clause" which allows limited ECB reform.