On the day the Ulster Unionist Party confronted Sinn Fein directly at Stormont, the BBC began a four-part series which repeats the allegation that the Sinn Fein president was a senior IRA commander.
The series also alleges that Sinn Fein's chief negotiator, Mr Martin McGuinness, was a top IRA representative, and that in 1991 the Northern secretary, Mr Peter Brooke, authorised contact between Mr McGuinness and MI6.
While the UUP argued that Sinn Fein should be expelled from talks, BBC1 began The Provos, written and presented by Peter Taylor, which examines the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein throughout the Troubles.
Mr Taylor has published a book, also called The Provos. Both book and series claim Mr Gerry Adams was a senior IRA figure during the early days of the conflict, a charge Mr Adams has consistently denied.
Mr Taylor cites a former MI6 officer, Mr Frank Steele, who allegedly arranged a meeting between the IRA leadership and the then British Northern secretary, Mr William Whitelaw, in 1972.
Mr Steele was previously posted in Kenya, and he is quoted as stating: "We had interned Jomo Kenyatta because of his links with the Mau Mau, whose techniques and obscene rituals made the IRA seem like a Sunday school choir. If you are talking to people like that in Kenya, and the royal family shake his hand, it seemed pragmatic to talk to the IRA."
The series also has the then IRA chief-of-staff, Mr Sean Mac Stiofain, confirming that all delegation members, including Mr Adams and Mr McGuinness, were in the IRA.
According to the book and the series, Mr Brooke gave permission for contact between Mr McGuinness and a senior IRA figure in Derry in 1991.
It alleges a chain of contact between the British government and the IRA around this time, which was crucial in laying the groundwork for the two IRA ceasefires of 1994 and July this year.
The former RUC chief constable, Sir Hugh Annesley, also told Mr Taylor he was convinced the IRA ceasefire of August 1994 was genuine, and that he conveyed this message to the British prime minister, Mr John Major.
"I thought at the time and for a considerable period afterwards that republicans meant what they said and that was the view that I and the intelligence community conveyed to the prime minister," said Sir Hugh.
Mr Taylor was also given access to the republican movement's minutes of meetings between British sources and the IRA around the time of the 1975 IRA ceasefire which claim that the British government was prepared to confront the issue of "withdrawal".
One section of the minutes states: "The tendency is towards eventual British disengagement . . . but will stop if the republican movement goes back to war."
