Sinn Féin’s journey from, in the effective judgment of the British government, a pariah party to being “treated the same as other parties” is tracked in declassified state papers released this month by the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland.
One of its files, “protocols for correspondence re: Sinn Féin”, covers the period from the early 1980s when republicans decided to pursue a policy of the ballot box as well as the IRA Armalite to the time when Sinn Féin was accepted into the talks that led to the Good Friday 1998 Belfast Agreement.
The first time British government ministers and senior Stormont officials had to seriously consider the matter was in July 1983, the month after Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams was elected as MP for West Belfast.
In one “confidential file” described as “more than usually sensitive” and to be accessed only on a “need to know basis” a senior Stormont official, J F Russell outlined how ministers and officials should respond to “approaches” by Mr Adams and other elected Sinn Féin representatives.
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Republicans decided to apply a political as well as a violent strategy following the hunger strikes of 1981 in which 10 men died. This dual strategy followed from the election of Bobby Sands – the first of the 10 hungers strikers to die – as MP for Fermanagh South Tyrone.
That election and the sympathy the deaths engendered among many nationalists convinced senior republican figures such as Danny Morrison, who first enunciated the “ballot box and the Armalite” strategy, that there were political gains to be made.
The following year Sinn Féin stood in the election to the Northern Assembly, which both Sinn Féin and the SDLP boycotted, winning five seats. The following year Mr Adams was elected MP for West Belfast.
Despite these successes the then Conservative Northern secretary Humphrey Atkins publicly insisted he would “in no circumstances meet a Sinn Féin member unless Sinn Féin renounce violence”. Nonetheless, ministers and officials had to figure out how to deal with Sinn Féin politicians.
Mr Russell in his confidential document attempted to chart the way forward. He advised that replies to Sinn Féin letters “should be made only where it is clearly unavoidable” and that respondents should pay “particular attention to the style, substance and possible implications” of the replies.
Letters should be “brief and formal avoiding any appearances of friendliness” and phrases such as “thank you for your letter” or “I regret . . .” should be avoided.
In 1985 Sinn Féin first stood in local elections, winning 59 seats. The advice remained however that any request from a Sinn Féin elected politician for a meeting with an NIO minister should be refused.
It was also to be made clear that any council deputations to see an NIO minister should not include any Sinn Féin councillors and if any did try to attend they “would not be admitted to the meeting”. And if ministers visited local councils the aim was to “avoid any impression that ministers are associating with Sinn Féin councillors while not allowing Sinn Féin to veto ministerial attendance”.
Also in 1985 the advice went out that letters from Sinn Féin elected representatives “should not receive ministerial replies but should receive curt, formal and short private secretary replies”.
That situation continued through the 1980s with in 1988 one official observing that “while care should be taken to ensure that all genuine constituency matters raised by Sinn Féin receive fair and adequate attention” that “ministers do not extend to Sinn Féin the customary courtesies and hospitality given to other elected representatives”.
Even up to early 1993 when secret attempts to kick-start a peace process were under way and when Sir Patrick Mayhew was the Conservative Northern secretary the instruction remained that Sinn Féin would “not be treated like a normal democratic party”.
Directly after the first IRA ceasefire of August 1994 Sir Patrick Mayhew’s position was the “there should obviously be no change in our position unless and until we are satisfied that there is a permanent end to violence”.
By October of that year when British prime minister John Major had “made a working assumption that the IRA ceasefire was permanent” there were “minor changes” to the rules regarding dealing with Sinn Féin. By December of 1994 the British government agreed there should be further relaxations by “progressive stages back to normality”.
The restrictions were reinstated however after February 1996 when the IRA resumed its campaign of violence.
When Tony Blair’s Labour government came to power in May 1997 those edicts remained but with the commitment that if the ceasefire were restored “Sinn Féin representatives at every level would qualify for the normal courtesies”.
On July 19th 1997 the IRA restored its ceasefire with Northern secretary Mo Mowlam thereafter deciding that once Sinn Féin signed up to the Senator George Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence “it should be treated in all respects like all other political parties in Northern Ireland”.
By September Ms Mowlam agreed that Sinn Féin should be thus treated after the party signed up to the Mitchell principles and was admitted to the talks that ultimately led to the Good Friday agreement on April 10th 1998.
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