VB Why the agitation on abortion now since, as far as we know, no abortion is taking place in Ireland and nobody is demanding a freer regime on abortion, apart from the few who engineered the passing of the pro-choice motion at the Labour Party conference late last Friday night when the big wigs were away?An outsider would wonder what is this all about.

WB Well, I think it is fair to say that abortion has been a crucial issue in most democracies in the last 30 years. There's been a rush internationally to embrace a system of wide- ranging abortions. Ireland is part of a wider international culture and in that context the issue is a very live one here. But more particularly, since the Supreme Court judgment in the X case, the law has been in an unsatisfactory position here. The judgment, for instance, would permit abortions to take place right up to birth. Also the formulations of the judgments of the four judges in the majority (Thomas Finlay, Hugh O'Flaherty, Seamus Egan and the late Niall McCarthy) were open to an interpretation which left very little protection to the life of the unborn.

VB Just dealing with the time factor first (up to what period of gestation an abortion would be permissible when the life of the mother was at risk from suicide), couldn't that have been dealt with by simple legislation?

WB Having read the judgments carefully, I don't believe so.

VB Why is that?

WB Because the judges gave no indication in timescale within which an abortion could take place in such circumstances.

VB In the absence of such an indication how can you say authoratively that it could not have been done - that legislation dealing with that would be found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court?

WB What happened in the X case was that under some degree of pressure of time there was an inadequate assessment of the issue involved based on limited evidence in the case. Some people might hope that if the court were to have a second look at it, it would modify its language. However it has to be said that in a number of subsequent cases the court seemed to affirm that very broad latitude (to abortion).

VB What parts of the judgments allowed for this very broad latitude to abortion?

WB Effectively, they allowed for a direct attack on the unborn life.

VB But only in the case of where there is a threat to the life of the mother.

WB They do so in a manner that involves no consideration of the rights of both parties involved (the mother and the unborn child). What happens in Irish maternity hospitals everyday is that the doctors in that situation have two patients, and act as having two patients and they do their best for both patients. There are cases where it is not possible to save both lives of course. But that is the correct formulation of the approach that the doctors should adopt and I'm glad to say that that is the approach that underlies the proposed referendum. But what is mistaken about the Supreme Court decision is that this element of attempting to do the best one can for both the mother and the unborn child is overlooked and that opens the way for a direct attack on the life of the unborn.

VB But a direct attack on the life of the unborn only in circumstances where there's a threat to the life of the mother.

WB As I say, the manner in which the formula was articulated by the Supreme Court, envisaged the direct targeting of the unborn, was broader than that.

VB What is now proposed is to remove the suicide dimension from consideration, is that fair? Is it really believable that there could never be a realistic suicide risk to the life of the mother because of her pregnancy that would be removed by a termination?

WB There's a huge body of evidence in that area and it's interesting to note that the All-Party Committee on the Constitution received evidence from the experts along those general lines. I'm absolutely certain that suicidal thoughts are part of many people's lives at various stages including, in the case of some women, during pregnancy. But the evidence shows that there is a far greater incidence of suicide among women who have had abortions than among those who have given birth.

VB Why shouldn't we leave it up to a court to decide where the balance of evidence lies and whether there is a real threat of suicide because of impregnation?

WB That sounds reasonable but, in practice, that is not what would happen. These decisions would not be taken by a court. They would be taken by those who carried out the abortion and, in practice, later be unreviewable by a court. Were we to do that we would gravely weaken the right to life of the unborn and do so in a manner that would give no real protection for them.

VB Nevertheless the proposed change now will give precedence to the life of the unborn over the life of the mother where there is as threat to the life of the mother from suicide. Is it fair in circumstances in which, say, a young girl was violently raped and traumatised not just by the rape but by the thought of bringing to full term the child of her rapist?

WB Undoubtedly the trauma after rape is immense. But the best treatment for people in this situation is to give, to envelop them with practical support and love. An unsatisfactory way is simply to recommend abortion. It involves the death of the unborn, a further trauma to the victim in these circumstances.

VB The point I'm putting to you is this: is it not implausible that there would never be circumstances that a woman traumatised by rape and further traumatised by the thought of carrying the child full term would be suicidal at the thought of carrying a rapist's child and that the love therapy you suggest would simply be inadequate?

WB The advice of caring professionals in the area is that the best approach for a woman or girl with suicidal tendencies is not to have an abortion which adds to the trauma and involves the death of the unborn but rather to give her with social and personal care, with love, with practical economic support to see her through the pregnancy.

VB On the issue of abortion generally - abortion is unique in that it is the only area where we, as a society, impose on a person the obligation to give their bodies to another person, even where they gave no consent to the conception of that other person and where it involves great distress and harm.

WB You are perfectly correct in identifying pregnancy as a time of huge dependency with huge demands. It is fair to say that in other situations in life conditions of dependency can arise between human beings, sometimes in family situations such as where an aged parent needs great attention or where a very young disabled child needs attention, so the experience of dependency and demands which constrict freedoms occurs in a wide range of areas of personal relationships but it is true what you say that pregnancy inevitably has those restrictions on freedom in the interests of the dependent unborn child.

VB But we don't say to people who have dependent parents that if they refuse to look after them, irrespective of the cost emotionally and financially to them, they will be prosecuted on a criminal charge. We do so in the case of a woman who is raped and who therefore gave no consent to the implantation of another person in her body.

WB All arguments by analogy are dangerous but as it happens in the context of support of one's aged parents, an obligation to support ones parents and other dependent relatives can arise. If you neglected your grandmother, who was in your care, that would be a matter of interest to the law. For instance, take an aged parent who gets Alzheimer's disease and requires ongoing attention. I think there is a moral obligation to look after such a parent, whether one ever consented to or otherwise.

VB Should that moral obligation be backed up by the force of criminal law.

WB In many countries it is. Perhaps it would be more useful for us to speak the language of rights rather than responsibility. A humane society recognises that dependent people at any age have the human right to be protected.