THE innocent dead and wounded at Canary Wharf are argument enough for the IRA to resume its ceasefire.

But the political balance sheet shows there are other factors closer to home.

The damage flowing from Canary Wharf is untold: it undermined, Gerry Adams, John Hume and nationalist Ireland while strengthening John Major and David Trimble.

Far from advancing the republican, cause, it disabled the Sinn Fein leadership and strengthened partition. Resolving this crisis requires an about turn by the IRA. But the British and Irish governments have much to do as well.

Leaving aside the arguments over the morality and the effectiveness of "armed struggle", the ceasefire clearly transformed northern politics. The initiative passed from the British to the nationalists. This placed the republican struggle on an exclusively political level where mass popular support was what mattered. Armed activity of any sort by the IRA automatically rebounded on Sinn Fein, weakening its negotiating position.

This sea change also affected the South. Politicians who had excoriated Sinn Fein were forced by public opinion to rethink their positions and to sit with Gerry Adams in the Forum. The same was true at an international level. For three decades the US State Department underwrote everything 10 Downing Street uttered about the North. Suddenly, after August 31st 1994, Irish republicanism had access to the White House. European politicians began to follow suit.

Unionist leaders, by contrast, found themselves increasingly isolated at home as well as abroad. Public opinion surveys in Northern Ireland repeatedly indicated the majority of the unionist electorate, wanted substantial talks involving Sinn Fein. Even after Canary Wharf, one poll showed a majority within the North for such talks - with or without a ceasefire.

In that survey, 70 per cent of the Protestants who took part favoured talks in the event of a ceasefire. Intransigence there was, but it came from the unionist political elite, not the grassroots.

The Ulster Unionist Party faced this crisis and answered it in the traditional sectarian fashion. By electing David Trimble, the "hero of Drumcree", as leader, it signified that "not an inch was still the policy. Meanwhile, Mr Trimble set about provoking the Provos through delay after delay and a weak British government felt bound to comply. An unending obstacle course was set up for the republicans before talks could take place. No opportunity was lost to pour scorn on both the peace process and the nationalist leaders.

Stalling tactics of this sort are evidence in themselves that the nationalists were winning the political battles. Problems as complex and as embittered as the North take years, not months, to unravel. But sections of the IRA were growing more band more impatient. Again and again over the 17 months of the ceasefire unionists prophesied a resumption of the conflict. Eventually the IRA fell into that trap. It gave a blank cheque to David Trimble and John Major, just as their account was running out.

If the IRA believes Canary Wharf produced action after 17 months of inactivity, it should examine the small print on the agreement between the Taoiseach and the prime minister on February 28th which set the date for talks. The speed with which the date was agreed suggests that it was only a matter of time before pressure from Dublin and Washington would have secured it through negotiation, had the IRA held back.

BUT, as Vincent Browne pointed out in this newspaper recently, Sinn Fein participation is conditional under this deal. The party will have to satisfy the unionists about its commitment to non violence and the Mitchell proposals on decommissioning will be item one on the agenda. In other words, the unionists have the opportunity to stall the process at the very beginning. The bomb produced considerably worse terms from the IRA's point of view than could have been achieved through negotiations.

There is an inevitable conclusion for the IRA in all this. It must quickly resume the ceasefire or lose the only serious opportunity for a just peace since the formation of the Orange State.

But that can only be a part of the resuscitation process. Others, such as John Bruton and John Major have to recognise their mistakes as well. It is patently misleading, if not downright false, for Mr Bruton to suggest that the June talks will go ahead only if the ceasefire is resumed. The threshold for these talks has been raised and will have to be lowered again.

The motive force of the IRA lies in the failure of Southern politicians to defend Northern nationalists. To many in the republican camp, Mr Bruton has failed in this regard. He must gain their trust if the ceasefire is to be resumed and he must see that as his central task.

The crucial problem facing both leaders is the intransigence of the unionist parties. It is simply not enough for Mr Major or Sir Patrick Mayhew to allow the UUP and the DUP to block meaningful discussions. They have failed to engage in the peace process thus far. They must be told that if they persist it will go on without them. Their stance does not have the support of their electorate. If Canary Wharf was wrong, it is also wrong for these parties to play poker using peace as a gaming chip. We have a right to expect politics from politicians.